Offender sentenced to life imprisonment with 17 years parole ineligibility for brutal second-degree murder of elderly woman.
The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal killing of a vulnerable 75-year-old woman in her apartment.
The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 18-20 years, while the defence argued for 12-15 years.
The court considered the horrific nature of the attack, the vulnerability of the victim, the offender's lack of prior record, and his mental health issues.
Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years.
Application for accused to sit at counsel table denied; customary placement in the dock upheld.
The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial.
The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and preferred the line of cases holding that the dock is the customary position for an accused.
The court found that seating the accused in the dock does not infringe the presumption of innocence, avoids the prejudice of having multiple security officers surrounding the accused at counsel table, and ensures the accused remains visible to the jury.
The application was dismissed.
Charter application to exclude police interview dismissed; brief delay in informing accused of true jeopardy cured.
The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter application to exclude his police interview, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.
The arresting officer initially informed the accused he was arrested for unrelated offences, delaying mention of the homicide investigation for seven minutes to avoid upsetting the accused's family.
The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach as the accused was subsequently informed of his true jeopardy and provided his right to counsel multiple times, constituting a 'fresh start'.
The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, and would be admissible under s. 24(2).
