M. Cantlon

This endorsement addresses pre-trial applications and rulings made during jury selection for the first-degree murder trial of Umar Zameer.

The court permitted challenges for cause based on publicity, the accused's race/ethnicity/religion, and connections to police officers.

Justice Molloy rejected the defence's request for multiple-choice questions, particularly those probing jurors' opinions on the criminal propensities of racial or religious groups, deeming them inquisitorial and ambiguous.

The judge emphasized an open-ended, conversational approach to questioning jurors to better assess impartiality.

The endorsement also details the reasoning for accepting two specific jurors despite objections from the Crown and defence, respectively, finding them capable of impartiality.

The trial ultimately resulted in a "not guilty" verdict for Mr. Zameer.

This decision addresses an evidentiary ruling made during a first-degree murder trial where the accused was ultimately acquitted.

The defence sought to admit prior consistent statements made by the accused's wife to police at the time of her husband's arrest, arguing they fell under an exception to the rule against prior consistent statements.

The court ruled these statements inadmissible for their truth, affirming that the Edgar exception, which allows for spontaneous statements of an accused upon arrest, does not extend to statements made by a witness, even if made under similar highly emotional and spontaneous circumstances.

The judge also made strong findings regarding the lack of credibility and collusion among certain police officers involved in the arrest.

This decision addresses the admissibility of three exculpatory statements made by the accused, Umar Zameer, who is charged with first-degree murder.

The court ruled that two spontaneous statements made at the scene of the arrest were admissible under the *Edgar* exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, but only if the accused testifies and is subject to cross-examination, and not for their truth.

A third statement made 12 hours later at the police station was deemed inadmissible due to lack of spontaneity and failure to meet any hearsay exception.

The court also clarified the distinction between *res gestae* and the *Edgar* exception, explicitly declining to follow a previous inconsistent decision (*R. v. Tavares*).

The accused, charged with first degree murder in the death of a police officer, brought an application for disclosure or third party production of police training materials and disciplinary records of a key Crown police witness.

The court dismissed the application for the training materials, finding them irrelevant to the issues at trial.

However, the court ordered the production of the disciplinary records, finding that they were relevant to the credibility and reliability of the officer, who was a pivotal witness for the Crown.

The applicant sought disclosure or third-party production of Toronto Police Service investigation files regarding a tee-shirt fundraiser and police training materials.

The court found the investigation files met the first-stage likely relevance test under O'Connor/McNeil and ordered them produced for judicial review.

The request for training materials was dismissed as they were not relevant to any issue at trial.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal killing of a vulnerable 75-year-old woman in her apartment.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 18-20 years, while the defence argued for 12-15 years.

The court considered the horrific nature of the attack, the vulnerability of the victim, the offender's lack of prior record, and his mental health issues.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter application to exclude his police interview, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The arresting officer initially informed the accused he was arrested for unrelated offences, delaying mention of the homicide investigation for seven minutes to avoid upsetting the accused's family.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach as the accused was subsequently informed of his true jeopardy and provided his right to counsel multiple times, constituting a 'fresh start'.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, and would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial.

The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and preferred the line of cases holding that the dock is the customary position for an accused.

The court found that seating the accused in the dock does not infringe the presumption of innocence, avoids the prejudice of having multiple security officers surrounding the accused at counsel table, and ensures the accused remains visible to the jury.

The application was dismissed.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the investigating officer gave inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence connecting the accused to the apartment where the alleged murder weapon was found.

The defence applied for a mistrial.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's case on identity was overwhelming even without the knife evidence, and that a strong mid-trial instruction to the jury to disregard the inadmissible evidence was sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The accused was subsequently convicted by the jury.