Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file an appeal of his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that he was unaware of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and that he was unfit to stand trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was aware of the immigration consequences, the delay was unexplained, and the proposed appeal lacked merit as he had been properly found fit to stand trial and a conditional discharge was disproportionate to the offence.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) dismissing her application against her landlords for harassment, interference with reasonable enjoyment, and withholding vital services.

The tenant argued the LTB erred in law and breached procedural fairness by interrupting her and not allowing her to proceed with all claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law as the tenant's complaints related to findings of fact, and no breach of procedural fairness as the LTB member was exercising the power to control the tribunal's process.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine and heroin, and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and heroin.

During a police raid, the offender was found hiding in a bathtub, refused to comply with police directions, and was tasered, resulting in facial injuries.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the significant quantity of drugs and a lengthy criminal record, against mitigating factors such as mental health issues and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $1,500 all-inclusive.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs of the leave motion to be determined by the hearing panel.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Papageorgiou J. dated November 12, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the applicant fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of Myers J. dated February 25, 2022.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) analysis, misapprehended his evidence, and erred in assessing the complainant's reliability given her intoxication and memory gaps.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the credibility assessment principles, correctly understood the appellant's evidence as untruthful rather than a mistaken belief, and appropriately evaluated the complainant's reliability against the totality of the evidence.

The appellant appealed an arbitration and cost award under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

At the outset of the hearing, the Divisional Court raised preliminary questions regarding its jurisdiction to hear the appeal and whether leave to appeal was required under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court adjourned the hearing and directed the parties to provide written submissions on these jurisdictional issues.

The appellant brought a statutory appeal from an arbitration award under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act arising from the breakdown of a purchase agreement for a new build home.

At the outset of the hearing, the Divisional Court panel directed the parties to provide written submissions on whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal and whether the Arbitration Act, 1991 requires leave to appeal or limits the appeal to issues of law.

The applicant, charged with possession of controlled substances and assaulting a police officer, brought Charter motions alleging breaches of his s. 7 and s. 8 rights during the execution of a search warrant.

The court found that the police use of force, including a Conducted Energy Weapon, was reasonable given the applicant's resistance and the belief he might be armed, dismissing the s. 7 claim.

While the court found a s. 8 breach occurred when an officer searched the applicant's jacket for identification after a safety pat-down, the evidence of drugs was admitted under s. 24(2) as the officer acted in good faith to assist the applicant.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a stay of proceedings or an increase in juror remuneration, arguing that the current payment framework under the Administration of Justice Act breaches his ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights by excluding lower-income individuals and creating an unrepresentative jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that jury representativeness depends on the random selection of the jury roll, not diversity, and that the applicant failed to provide evidence that financial hardship disproportionately affects lower-paid workers or that increased remuneration would resolve the issue.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of section 577(a) of the Criminal Code, which allows the Crown to prefer a direct indictment.

The applicant argued that the provision violates section 7 of the Charter by permitting arbitrary exercise of Crown discretion without requiring reasons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that binding precedent establishes the constitutionality of direct indictments and that prosecutorial discretion remains subject to review for abuse of process.

The accused, Ubaidullah Patel, facing charges including sexual assault, applied under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant, C, about a prior incident where C was allegedly discovered viewing pornographic material and masturbating in a place of worship.

Patel argued this evidence was relevant to show C's motive to fabricate the allegations, fearing disclosure of his own conduct.

The Crown and complainant argued the evidence was irrelevant due to a one-month delay in reporting and potential prejudice.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of motive to fabricate and that its significant probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, allowing the cross-examination but limiting it to the specific incident.

This ruling addresses a renewed severance application brought by David Obregon Castro, who, along with co-accused Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, is charged with First Degree Murder.

Both accused intend to present "cut-throat" defences, blaming the other for the victim's death.

The application for severance was renewed after a prior ruling allowed Ms. Lopez-Iglesias to admit evidence of Mr. Obregon Castro's prior discreditable conduct.

The court dismissed the severance application, reaffirming the presumption that jointly charged accused should be tried together, especially when antagonistic defences are present.

The judge found that a single trial would promote efficiency, the truth-seeking function, and reduce the risk of inconsistent verdicts, relying on the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions regarding the use of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

This ruling addresses applications by co-accused David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias in a first-degree murder trial to adduce evidence of each other's prior discreditable conduct, given their "cutthroat" defences.

The court applies the balancing test for admissibility of co-accused bad character evidence, which is less stringent than for Crown-led evidence.

Ms. Lopez-Iglesias was permitted to introduce evidence relevant to her state of mind (fear of Obregon Castro), his propensity to commit the crime, and his credibility, including details of the "Z Bar Incident" (shooting), the assault on "Chips" (stabbing), various assaults she suffered from Obregon Castro, and his alleged gang membership (limited to her state of mind).

However, evidence of Obregon Castro's past arson/attempted murder charge (acquitted), claims of torturing "snitches" sexual assault, threats regarding Kyle Watts, a plan to shoot a pawn shop owner, and preliminary inquiry observers was deemed inadmissible due to low probative value outweighed by prejudicial effect.

Mr. Obregon Castro was also allowed to adduce evidence of Ms. Lopez-Iglesias's violence towards him, drug use, and participation in bank frauds to challenge her credibility, but not evidence of trafficking sex workers.

The judge emphasized the necessity of detailed limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of such evidence.

The Crown brought a motion to quash a subpoena issued by the accused for the prosecuting Assistant Crown Attorney.

The accused sought to call the Crown attorney as a witness on an abuse of process application, alleging she had made herself a material witness by relying on her own emails and factual assertions in her responding factum.

The court granted the motion and quashed the subpoena, finding that the stringent test for subpoenaing opposing counsel was not met, as the documentary evidence itself was sufficient and the Crown attorney's testimony was neither necessary nor material.

The applicant, currently on trial for sexual assault in the Ontario Court of Justice, sought an order of certiorari to quash the trial judge's dismissal of his mistrial application and an order of mandamus to permit him to re-elect a jury trial.

The mistrial application was based on the late disclosure of a police occurrence report.

The Crown moved to summarily dismiss the application, arguing it constituted an impermissible interlocutory appeal.

The Superior Court agreed with the Crown, finding that the trial judge's decision regarding the disclosure regime and the mistrial was within her jurisdiction, and therefore certiorari was unavailable.

The application was summarily dismissed.

The court sentenced the offender for a sexual assault committed against a co-worker who had driven him home after a work shift.

The assault involved persistent sexual advances, forced kissing, and digital vaginal penetration in the complainant's car, and the court treated breach of trust, degradation of sexual integrity, and the need for denunciation and deterrence as significant sentencing factors.

Although the offender had later been convicted of other sexual offences connected to the same workplace, the court held under the Coke principle that those later convictions could not be used as aggravating factors for this offence.

Applying the totality principle in light of the offender's existing consecutive penitentiary sentences, the court imposed a further consecutive sentence of 15 months, three years' probation, a lifetime SOIRA order, and a DNA order.

The appellant, an Uber driver, appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a passenger, arguing the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny and misapprehended evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the 60-day conditional sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit given the breach of trust.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or material misapprehension of evidence.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence that failed to reflect the serious breach of trust by a professional driver.

The sentence was increased to six months' imprisonment.