Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The moving party tenant sought summary judgment ordering the respondent landlord to indemnify it for the costs of litigating a personal injury claim arising from a slip and fall in the mall's common area.

The landlord and its snow removal contractor had previously settled with the plaintiff via a Pierringer Agreement.

The court interpreted the indemnification and insurance provisions of the commercial lease.

The court found that the tenant was required to, and did, maintain insurance for the common areas, which triggered a proviso relieving the landlord of its duty to indemnify.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced two identical actions, one of which was dismissed as abandoned.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim that they discovered the cause of action in September 2011 was inconsistent with their pleadings in the prior action and unsupported by evidence.

Applying the statutory presumption of discoverability, the court concluded the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the defendant, a lawyer, for outstanding loans.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant acted as her lawyer, breached his duty of care by acting in a conflict of interest, borrowed money from her, and failed to disclose material facts about the borrowers' insolvency.

The court found a solicitor-client relationship existed and that the defendant breached his duty of care.

The court held that expert evidence was not required to establish negligence in these circumstances.

Summary judgment was granted for the principal amounts of the loans, but the claim against LawPRO was dismissed as it was not a party to the proceedings.

The plaintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from transferring or encumbering assets connected to a rooftop solar energy project.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court accepted that there was a serious issue to be tried but rejected the argument that a modified property-rights injunction test applied.

The court held the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm because the responding parties had already undertaken not to assign, transfer, or encumber the project assets without a court order and any loss would be quantifiable in damages.

The balance of convenience also favoured refusing the injunction.

The motion was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.

The moving defendant sought to strike paragraphs of the statement of claim alleging intentional exploitation of confidential information and unlawful interference with economic interests.

Applying the Rule 21 plain and obvious standard, the court held the pleadings, read generously, alleged unauthorized acquisition and use of confidential information belonging not only to the plaintiff but also to third-party clients.

The court further held that this alleged conduct was capable of giving rise to a third-party cause of action in intrusion upon seclusion, thereby satisfying the unlawful act requirement for the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations.

The motion to strike was dismissed and costs were fixed at $2,000 payable by the moving defendant.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming incapacity to consent to treatment for schizophrenia under a community treatment plan.

The court refused to admit proposed fresh evidence, holding that the pregnancy-related testing and competing psychiatric letter failed the Palmer criteria for relevance, credibility, due diligence, and likely effect on the result.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board’s application of the statutory capacity test, the court held that the Board properly relied on corroborated evidence, including hearsay, and reasonably found that the appellant could understand treatment information but could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that revocation of the community treatment order did not extinguish the community treatment plan.

On a summary judgment motion arising from a failed real estate transaction, the court held that the purchaser breached an unconditional agreement of purchase and sale by failing to close.

Alleged misrepresentations concerning the feasibility of underground parking did not raise a genuine issue requiring a trial because the evidence showed any assurances came from the purchaser's own agent, not the vendor.

The court held the $100,000 payment was a true deposit, not merely part payment of the purchase price, and was therefore forfeitable upon the purchaser's default.

Relief from forfeiture was denied because the deposit, amounting to 6.67% of the purchase price, was not unconscionable.

Summary judgment was granted and the brokerage was ordered to release the deposit to the vendor.

The defendant moved to strike a self-represented plaintiff's wrongful dismissal claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action and on limitation grounds.

The court held the pleading was vague, uncertain, and failed to identify the essential elements of any recognizable breach of contract or wrongful dismissal claim.

Applying ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, the court further held that any claim arising from the alleged failure to contact the plaintiff after re-hiring was discovered in 2010 and the 2014 action was therefore statute-barred.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed with fixed costs.