Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The appellant appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding her refusal was unequivocal, misapprehended evidence, and improperly rejected her reasonable excuse defence based on a respiratory infection.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was intentionally delaying the investigation was reasonable and supported by video evidence.

The court also held there was no material misapprehension of evidence and the trial judge properly applied credibility assessment principles.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons.

The conviction was based on an incident in a grocery store checkout line, where the complainant alleged the appellant touched her inappropriately.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to address three material inconsistencies between the complainant's testimony and the store security video.

Because the trial judge did not provide cogent reasons explaining why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite these contradictions, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault after attacking a 'good Samaritan' who intervened in a bar fight to help an unconscious victim.

The offender kicked the victim to the ground and continued to assault him while he was in a fetal position, causing serious injuries including a torn ACL and fractured foot bones.

The Crown sought 18-24 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a non-custodial or intermittent sentence.

The court sentenced the first-time offender to 9 months imprisonment followed by 3 years of probation, balancing denunciation and deterrence with the offender's remorse, ADHD diagnosis, and rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, misapprehended his evidence, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference, there was no misapprehension of evidence, and the trial judge's approach to the complainant's inconsistencies was measured and fair.

The court also found no reversal of the burden of proof regarding the Agreed Statement of Fact.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and entering a dwelling house arising from an incident in which he entered a neighbour's apartment and engaged in non-consensual sexual touching.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge rejected the defence evidence based on speculation, applied uneven scrutiny to the complainant and the appellant, and misapprehended material evidence.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility analysis was grounded in the evidence and common sense, that no impermissible uneven scrutiny was demonstrated, and that the alleged errors were rejections of the defence evidence rather than material misapprehensions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a pastor of a Spiritual Baptist Church, was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, administering a noxious substance, fraud, and theft relating to four female complainants.

The Crown sought to admit the evidence of the complainants as similar fact evidence, which the court allowed, finding no collusion.

The court rejected the defence's application to call an expert on memory reliability.

The court found that the accused used his position of spiritual authority to manipulate the complainants, including inventing a spiritual medium called 'the Gorgan' to extort money and induce sexual activity.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault, administering a noxious substance, and fraud relating to three of the complainants, but acquitted of the charges relating to the fourth complainant and certain theft charges.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for multiple regulatory offences under the Environmental Protection Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a massive propane explosion at their facility that resulted in a worker's death and widespread environmental contamination.

The appellants argued the trial judge made numerous factual and legal errors, including rejecting their defence of officially induced error and finding a lack of due diligence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of strict liability principles.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeals, upholding over $5 million in fines due to the unprecedented magnitude of the damage and the appellants' reckless conduct.

The applicant sought to exclude a firearm found during a search, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) the warrant was deficient, breaching his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown conceded the redacted ITO was insufficient and proceeded with a "Step Six" Garofoli procedure.

The court reviewed the ITO, including redacted material via a judicial summary, and found a sufficient link between the applicant and the searched premises.

Applying the Debot criteria, the court found the confidential informant's tip compelling, credible, and sufficiently corroborated.

The court concluded there were reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant, no s. 8 Charter breach, and dismissed the application for exclusion of evidence.

The accused, charged with providing unauthorized immigration advice and breaching bail conditions, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 42 months for the first set of charges.

The court deducted time for defence-caused delay and exceptional circumstances, including the accused's conduct during the preliminary inquiry which caused it to spiral out of control.

The net delay fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court also found that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with multiple counts of fraud related to bank loans, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a conditional stay of proceedings pending the appointment of state-funded counsel.

He argued he was indigent and had been denied Legal Aid.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's extensive business background and education made him capable of representing himself, meaning his right to a fair trial would not be compromised.

Furthermore, the court found the applicant failed to prove indigence, noting inconsistencies in evidence regarding his separation from his wife, his failure to pursue his share of the matrimonial home proceeds, and his lack of adequate financial disclosure.

The applicant, Monique Savin, sought an order from the Superior Court of Justice to compel a trial of allegations including fraud, extortion, and criminal harassment against an employment lawyer, Allyson Fischer.

This application followed two unsuccessful private prosecution attempts before Justices of the Peace, who declined to issue process.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the Justices of the Peace's decisions.

The court reiterated that the only available remedy for such decisions is prerogative relief (mandamus) for jurisdictional error, not a rehearing of the merits.

Joel Stevenson was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a seven-year imprisonment sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence or, alternatively, four years with substantial credit for pre-sentence bail conditions, emphasizing the offender's Aboriginal heritage and the application of Gladue principles.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the offence, finding that deterrence and denunciation were paramount.

After considering the unique systemic and background factors affecting the offender, including intergenerational trauma from residential schools and personal history of abuse and incarceration, and balancing these with the seriousness of the offence and the principle of parity with a co-accused, the court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment.

An eight-month credit was awarded for harsh pre-sentence release conditions, resulting in a net sentence of four years and four months.

Zachary Barton was found guilty by a jury of multiple firearms offences.

He brought an application for a stay of proceedings or a new trial, alleging police failed to preserve or disclose exculpatory video evidence.

The court dismissed this application, finding the defence failed to establish the existence of the alleged video footage.

Subsequently, the court proceeded to sentencing, considering Barton's extensive criminal record, the seriousness of the offences involving a loaded prohibited firearm, and sentencing principles.

A global sentence of 10 years imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 6 years and 9 months.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA sample.

The applicant, Angelina Codina, sought a stay of charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in her criminal proceedings.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial was 40 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued the applicant's motion record was deficient due to missing transcripts of prior court appearances, which are required by the province-wide Practice Direction for s. 11(b) applications.

The court found the applicant failed to discharge her obligation to file all necessary transcripts, despite being explicitly instructed by a previous judge.

Consequently, the s. 11(b) application was dismissed without prejudice, with conditions set for its renewal, including the mandatory filing of all transcripts.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude a firearm found on his person during a search incident to arrest.

Police officers approached a parked vehicle to investigate a suspected Liquor Licence Act offence after observing open beer cans in plain view.

The accused argued his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights were breached by the investigation, his detention, and his subsequent arrest for drug offences after cocaine was found on the driver.

The court dismissed the application, finding the police lawfully investigated the liquor offence, the initial questioning did not constitute a detention, and the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused based on a constellation of facts.

The applicant challenged a search warrant for his home and vehicle, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds and improper use of the telewarrant procedure.

The court applied the Garofoli procedure for redacted Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (ITO) and the Debot criteria for informant tips.

The court found the informant's tip compelling and corroborated, despite some weaknesses in credibility.

It also found no material non-disclosure by the police and that the telewarrant procedure was properly used, as "impracticable" does not require urgency or impossibility.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, with the court noting that even if there was a s. 8 breach, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter following the Grant test.

The accused, Tryden Reis, was found guilty of aggravated assault, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and using a firearm during aggravated assault.

The Crown sought a sentence of five to six years, noting the four-year mandatory minimum for discharging a firearm with intent to wound under s. 244(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Reis challenged the constitutionality of this mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court applied the Nur/Lloyd two-step test, finding the mandatory minimum sentence was not grossly disproportionate, both generally and in the specific circumstances of the accused and reasonable hypotheticals.

The constitutional challenge was dismissed.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years imprisonment, concurrent for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

Credit for pre-sentence custody (45 days at 1.5:1, totaling 68 days) and house arrest (just under four months) was awarded, reducing the total sentence to five and a half years.

The charge of using a firearm during aggravated assault was stayed.

A DNA sample order and a lifetime weapons prohibition order were also made.

The accused was charged with three counts of attempted murder and one count of attempting to possess a prohibited firearm.

The court found that while the accused possessed the specific intent to kill, his actions regarding the attempted murder of the complainant's children did not progress beyond mere preparation, thus failing to establish the actus reus.

Consequently, he was found not guilty of attempted murder.

However, the court found that the accused's actions and inquiries to obtain a firearm constituted an attempt to possess a prohibited firearm, finding him guilty of that charge.

Following an eight-day jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in general damages for assault by a police officer, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $86,655.32.

The defendants argued that no costs should be awarded as the damages fell within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court.

The court, exercising its discretion under Rule 57.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, denied the plaintiff's request for costs.

The judge found the case was not complex, the award was not close to the Small Claims maximum, and the plaintiff failed to adequately assess the quantum of damages, making the Superior Court an inappropriate venue for the action.

The accused applied under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained via a search warrant, arguing the warrant was improperly issued due to insufficient grounds and improper use of the telewarrant procedure.

The court dismissed the application, finding the warrant was properly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds, the confidential informant's tip was sufficiently corroborated under the Debot test, and the telewarrant procedure was appropriately used as "impracticable" does not require urgency.

Even if there was a Charter breach regarding the telewarrant, the evidence would be admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.