Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The applicant, Ishmael Robinson, challenged his inclusion as a target in a wiretap authorization (Auth #1) under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code, seeking exclusion of intercepted communications under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He argued that the grounds in the information to obtain (ITO) were vague and stale.

The Crown contended that the grounds, viewed holistically, met the low threshold for naming individuals in an ITO.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the cumulative effect of the grounds established reasonable belief that the applicant's communications would assist the ongoing investigation, and the information was not stale given the large-scale nature of the criminal organization investigation.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, applied for bail.

The Crown alleged the applicant acted as the getaway driver for the suspected shooter.

The applicant proposed a release plan involving house arrest, electronic monitoring, and supervision by his father and sister.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed sureties inadequate given the applicant's history of breaching bail conditions.

The court ordered detention on both the secondary ground (substantial likelihood of reoffending) and the tertiary ground (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice).

Howard Burke and Devon Dinall were convicted by a jury of drug-related offences (cocaine trafficking) and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court determined the factual basis for sentencing, rejecting the defence's argument that marihuana trafficking was also involved.

Howard Burke, a repeat offender, was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for trafficking 2.320 kg of cocaine and concurrent three years for possession of $76,880 in proceeds.

Devon Dinall, a mid-level trafficker, was sentenced to three and a half years imprisonment for conspiracy to traffic 306g of cocaine, concurrent three and a half years for trafficking, and concurrent one year for possession of $15,560 in proceeds.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, considering aggravating factors like the volume of drugs and prior records, and mitigating factors like employment and personal challenges.

The applicants, alleged members of the 'Five Point Generals' criminal organization, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of Tracking Data Warrants, Transmission Data Recording Warrants, and Part VI wiretap authorizations.

Two applicants argued there were insufficient grounds to link them to specific phone numbers, while the others argued they should not have been named in the Information to Obtain (ITO) as the conditions under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code were not met.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds to believe the phone numbers were linked to the applicants and that there was sufficient evidence of association with the criminal organization to justify naming the other applicants in the ITO.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had excluded the refusal evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding multiple breaches of the respondent's rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) following his arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by misapprehending material evidence regarding the implementational component of s. 10(b), applying the wrong legal test to the strip search, failing to conduct the required temporal analysis for evidence obtained prior to a breach, and misapplying jurisprudence on the seriousness of a refusal offence.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused of first-degree murder and committing him only on second-degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by ignoring inferences favourable to the Crown and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court agreed, finding the preliminary inquiry judge erred by drawing an inference favourable to the accused regarding the interaction with the victim, and by failing to consider circumstantial evidence of planning, such as the accused's change of clothing and pre-arranged taxi escape.

The application was granted, the discharge quashed, and mandamus issued directing committal on first-degree murder.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking offences following a mass arrest operation, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of her ss. 7, 10(b), and 12 rights.

She claimed excessive force upon arrest, inhumane treatment during a lengthy wait in a police cruiser, and an unlawful strip search.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's testimony regarding pain and suffering to be fabricated and contradicted by video evidence.

The court held that the police conduct was reasonable under the circumstances of the mass arrests, and the strip search was justified as the applicant was entering the prison population.

The accused, a Brazilian national and refugee claimant, sought bail pending an extradition hearing to the United States on charges of human smuggling.

The Crown argued that the reverse onus provisions under s. 515(6) of the Criminal Code applied because the accused's prior criminal record in Brazil rendered him ineligible for refugee status, meaning he was not 'ordinarily resident in Canada'.

The court agreed that the reverse onus applied, but noted that even if it did not, the Crown had shown cause for detention.

The court found the accused posed a significant flight risk, a substantial likelihood of reoffending, and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The proposed surety was also deemed unreliable.

Bail was denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing ammunition while prohibited, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles of circumstantial evidence by failing to consider plausible alternative explanations for how bullets ended up in his jacket.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the appellant's alternative theories as speculative rather than reasonable possibilities based on the evidence.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof or provided insufficient reasons.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, brought an application under s. 8 of the Charter alleging that the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant for his mobile phone lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The phone was seized incident to arrest.

The reviewing judge applied the Garofoli standard and found that the ITO contained sufficient information, including the co-accused's extensive use of a mobile phone to facilitate the offences and the applicant's integral involvement, to provide reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found on the applicant's phone.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 32 months.

The central issue was whether a delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability following an adjournment necessitated by late Crown disclosure should be attributed to the defence.

The court held that the pre-Jordan principles in Godin no longer apply, and that periods where the court and Crown are ready but the defence is not must be deducted as defence delay.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for unlawful confinement and assault.

The trial judge had found an honest but mistaken belief in consent, leading to the acquittal.

The appeal court found that the trial judge misapplied the honest but mistaken belief defence by focusing on events after the alleged offence and misapprehending critical evidence.

Additionally, the trial judge's reasons for the acquittal were deemed inadequate, failing to explain the verdict based on the complainant's reliability.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered before a different jurist.

The offender was convicted of counselling to kidnap and extort his former lawyers, whom he blamed for financial losses.

He recruited an accomplice, purchased a shotgun and ammunition, and provided the accomplice with the lawyers' details and money.

The court found the targeting of justice system participants and the purchase of a firearm to be significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years and 8 months.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect.

The defence sought to call witnesses and introduce video surveillance to establish that another resident of the victim's building had animus, motive, and opportunity to commit the murder.

The court applied the McMillan test and found that the proposed evidence established a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime.

The application was granted, as the probative value of the evidence outweighed its slight prejudicial effect.

The Crown sought to admit utterances made by the accused, Najib Amin, during an undercover police operation in his first-degree murder trial.

The defence opposed admission, citing principles from R. v. Hart.

The court, applying the Hart factors as a framework, found the utterances admissible, concluding that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and that police conduct did not constitute an abuse of process.

The ruling specifically addressed four categories of utterances, finding them all admissible with one requiring a specific instruction to mitigate prejudice.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a summary conviction sentence, arguing that a change in immigration law (Tran v. Canada) made his original sentence, which led to deportation, disproportionate.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not shown a bona fide intention to appeal within the period, had not adequately explained the four-year delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court emphasized the principle of res judicata and that the applicant was no longer "in the judicial system" for the purpose of retroactively applying new legal interpretations.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in an unprovoked and fatal beating of a stranger.

Patrick Smith was convicted of second degree murder and assault, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 12-year parole ineligibility period.

Matthew Moreira was convicted of manslaughter and robbery, and was sentenced to a total of 13 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the offenders' backgrounds, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The accused, Matthew Moreira and Patrick Smith, brought an application to stay charges of second-degree murder, manslaughter, assault, and robbery, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the end of the second trial was 32 months and 16 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Crown argued that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically the complexity of the case and a mistrial declared during the first trial, which was deemed a discrete event.

The court found the case to be complex due to multiple accused, voluminous evidence, and challenging legal issues.

It also determined that the mistrial was an unforeseeable discrete event, and the Crown acted expeditiously to mitigate its impact.

Additionally, the court considered the transitional exception under *Jordan*, acknowledging that the system needed time to adapt to the new framework.

Consequently, the application to stay the charges was dismissed.

Ian Ohab was convicted of second-degree murder and pleaded guilty to indignity to a human body.

The victim, Melissa Cooper, was killed and dismembered by Ohab, who then disposed of her body parts.

The Crown sought a 25-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence proposed 15-18 years.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, Ohab's meticulous concealment of the crime, the dismemberment and disposal of the body, and his disturbing criminal record of violence against women.

Mitigating factors were minimal, with Ohab showing no remorse and continuing to deny the murder.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 22 years, plus a concurrent 5-year sentence for indignity to a human body.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, raising new s. 10(b) Charter arguments for the first time.

The Crown brought an application under s. 685 of the Criminal Code to summarily dismiss the appeal.

The court held that the Crown has jurisdiction to bring a s. 685 application in summary conviction appeals.

The court granted the application and dismissed the appeal, finding that allowing the new grounds would cause substantial prejudice to the Crown as there was no evidentiary record from the trial to evaluate the claims.