R. Lee

The accused, a Brazilian national and refugee claimant, sought bail pending an extradition hearing to the United States on charges of human smuggling.

The Crown argued that the reverse onus provisions under s. 515(6) of the Criminal Code applied because the accused's prior criminal record in Brazil rendered him ineligible for refugee status, meaning he was not 'ordinarily resident in Canada'.

The court agreed that the reverse onus applied, but noted that even if it did not, the Crown had shown cause for detention.

The court found the accused posed a significant flight risk, a substantial likelihood of reoffending, and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The proposed surety was also deemed unreliable.

Bail was denied.

The applicant, a single woman receiving a Canada Pension Plan (CPP) retirement pension, sought a declaration from the Superior Court that the CPP survivor pension provisions violate section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the ground of marital status, and sought an enhanced benefit.

The Attorney General moved to strike the application, arguing the Social Security Tribunal was the appropriate forum and that the applicant lacked standing.

The court found that the core issue fell squarely within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, which has the power to consider constitutional issues and provide appropriate remedies, even if it cannot issue a formal declaration of invalidity.

The court emphasized the principle of exhausting administrative remedies before resorting to superior courts.

The application was stayed, not struck, to allow the applicant to pursue her Charter arguments before the Minister and the Tribunal, with the possibility of returning to the Superior Court if the Minister refused to extend the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a conviction for pass off roadway contrary to the Highway Traffic Act, which was entered through default proceedings under the Provincial Offences Act.

The sole ground of appeal was that the certificate of offence was defective because it failed to indicate whether the time of the alleged offence (April 24, 2015, at 4:59) was in the A.M. or P.M., as a box on the certificate intended for this designation was left blank.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the omission was highly technical and could not have caused prejudice, as only two realistic times were possible and the context would make clear which was alleged.