Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought a Charter challenge against ss. 278.92, 278.93, and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

These provisions required the defence to disclose private records to the complainant and permitted the complainant to participate in the admissibility hearing.

The court found that the overbreadth of s. 278.92, the mandated disclosure of the accused's defence to the complainant, and the complainant's participation in the evidentiary process significantly impaired the accused's right to a fair trial and undermined the Crown's constitutional role.

The court declared ss. 278.92, 278.94(2), and 278.94(3) unconstitutional and of no force and effect under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

During a trial for first degree murder, the defence applied to exclude utterances made by one co-accused to a friend, arguing they were more prejudicial than probative to the other co-accused.

The Crown also sought to admit text messages extracted from the co-accused's phone.

The court ruled that the utterances were admissible, as their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and juries are presumed to follow instructions limiting the use of such evidence against a co-accused.

The court also ruled that the text messages were admissible, finding that the Crown had met the modest threshold for authentication under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act through direct and circumstantial evidence.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The statements primarily concerned the accused's anger towards the deceased and the accused allegedly stealing the deceased's apartment keys.

The court applied the framework from Bradshaw and Khelawon to assess substantive reliability, using corroborative evidence where appropriate.

The court admitted the statements made to the deceased's sister, a close friend, the building superintendent, and the property manager, finding them reliable.

However, statements made to the deceased's boyfriend and another friend were excluded due to reliability concerns and unclear declarant identity.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, the applicant co-accused brought a pre-trial motion to adduce evidence of the respondent co-accused's prior discreditable conduct through Crown witnesses.

The applicant sought to introduce this evidence to support a cutthroat defence and explain her state of mind.

The court reviewed various proposed items of evidence, ruling some admissible (such as prior violence towards the applicant and possession of a firearm) and others inadmissible (such as drug use, out-of-court statements, and speculative intimidation) based on relevance and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included the accused's prior possession of a firearm, threats made against the deceased, and participation in a prior shooting incident.

The court found that the evidence was relevant and material to the issues of identity, animus, and motive.

Applying the framework for prior discreditable conduct, the court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the evidence admissible with certain edits.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after it invited the trial judge to acquit the accused to avoid non-compliance with a disclosure order.

The trial judge had ruled that the Drug Recognition Expert's rolling log was relevant and subject to disclosure under Stinchcombe, but that section 320.36(2) of the Criminal Code prohibited its disclosure, rendering the section unconstitutional.

On appeal, the Superior Court upheld the finding that rolling logs are relevant and must be disclosed.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the Criminal Code; the amended provisions do not prohibit the disclosure of rolling logs in criminal proceedings.

As the rolling logs were still required to be disclosed, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for cases tried by indictment.

The court deducted a period of defence delay, bringing the net delay to 27 months.

The court found that the case did not take markedly longer than it should have, considering local conditions in the Toronto Region.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial on charges of carrying a concealed weapon and aggravated assault, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors.

The applicant had brandished a firearm during a domestic dispute, causing the complainant to flee down a staircase and break her ankle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge made no jurisdictional errors, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer the weapon had been concealed and that the applicant's actions were a significant contributing cause to the complainant's injuries with objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking cocaine, the accused brought an application to stay the verdict on the basis of entrapment.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's framework for dial-a-dope operations to determine if police had reasonable suspicion before providing the opportunity to commit the offence.

The court found that the undercover officer's initial exchange with the accused crystallized the requisite reasonable suspicion before the officer requested to purchase drugs.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual interference arising from allegations that he sexually touched his daughter during an overnight visit.

He argued the trial judge conflated credibility and reliability, failed to grapple with inconsistencies, misapprehended material evidence, and improperly relied on medical evidence as corroboration.

The appeal court held the trial judge gave adequate reasons, properly distinguished credibility from reliability, and was not required to address every alleged inconsistency.

Any misstatements were immaterial details, and the medical evidence was used only to anchor timing and support the general reliability of the complainant's account.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 8 Charter application.

The appellant contended the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for his residence lacked sufficient grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the amplified record and found the trial judge made no error in concluding the ITO contained reasonable and probable grounds that an offence had been committed and that evidence would be found at the appellant's residence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Mitchell Dubros, a private investigator, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal order for attempting to obstruct justice.

The charge arose from his alleged attempts to dissuade witnesses (Cynthia Mulligan, Pam Seatle, James Tumelty) from testifying in a criminal harassment case against Mike Bullard, by threatening to harm their reputations.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test for jurisdictional error.

It found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in committing the applicant to stand trial, as there was sufficient evidence that the applicant sought to dissuade Ms. Mulligan from testifying using threats and other corrupt methods.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights due to the police's failure to provide a Tamil interpreter.

The trial judge found no "special circumstances" requiring an interpreter, a decision upheld on appeal.

The Superior Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which considered the appellant's 30 years of residency in Canada, employment, ability to converse in English, and his actions indicating understanding of his rights, including attempting to contact duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving by drugs.

The trial judge had excluded the accused's urine sample, finding insufficient grounds for the demand as a 'non-Charter' issue, leading to acquittal.

The accused cross-appealed the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and drug evaluation.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred by treating the urine sample exclusion as a non-Charter issue, misapplying principles of reasonable and probable grounds, and improperly excluding the accused's statement from the Charter analysis.

The court concluded that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the demand and that, even if there was a Charter breach, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the cross-appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the initial arrest.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, Andre Cunningham, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges including attempted murder and firearms offences.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace made two material errors in principle during the initial bail hearing: misapprehending evidence regarding the applicant's alleged gang affiliation and misinterpreting the mother's testimony about identifying her son in surveillance video.

Despite these errors warranting a new de novo bail hearing, the court conducted its own assessment of the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong, the proposed surety plan inadequate given the applicant's history of non-compliance while living with sureties, and the gravity of the offences.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic but found it did not override the primary considerations for detention, especially without evidence of an outbreak in the facility or the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities.

Consequently, the applicant was ordered detained on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed on four grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge materially misapprehended two aspects of the appellant's testimony, which significantly impacted the judge's credibility findings.

The court found that these misapprehensions were sufficiently material to warrant a new trial.

The other grounds of appeal, concerning a Section 11(b) Charter violation, restrictions on cross-examination of prior sexual activity under Section 276 of the Criminal Code, and the Crown's re-election to proceed by summary conviction, were dismissed.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and "Over 80" charges.

The trial judge found a s. 8 Charter breach, excluded evidence, and acquitted the respondent, giving inadequate reasons and failing to apply s. 24(2) Charter principles.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons for breach and exclusion of evidence to be insufficient and legally erroneous.

A new trial was ordered before a different jurist, rather than entering a conviction, due to the lack of clarity in the trial judge's factual findings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving with excess blood alcohol and stunt driving.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, erroneously relied on the repealed presumption of identity under the Criminal Code, and erred in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no uneven scrutiny, holding that the presumption of identity continues to apply to transitional cases where the offence predated the legislative amendments, and concluding that the police fulfilled their informational and implementational duties under section 10(b) without steering the appellant toward duty counsel.

The applicant, Birhan Imam, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of attempted murder, alleging the preliminary inquiry judge applied an erroneous legal test for mens rea.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's reasons, finding that while a specific passage might appear ambiguous, when read in totality, the judge correctly identified and applied the "intention to kill" mens rea for attempted murder as established in R. v. Ancio.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The court also held that even if there had been a jurisdictional error, the committal would have been inevitable given the strong evidence of intent to kill, and thus, prerogative relief would have been declined due to lack of prejudice.

C.J. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault against his 16-year-old step-daughter, which occurred while she was sleeping.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less one day, while the defence proposed six months' custody.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, the breach of trust inherent in the step-father relationship, and the assault occurring while the victim was asleep.

Mitigating factors included C.J.'s lack of a prior criminal record, steady employment, and a guilty plea that spared the victim from testifying.

The court imposed a 16-month custodial sentence, along with a 20-year SOIRA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a 2-year probation order.