Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking disclosure of a complainant's youth police occurrence report in a human trafficking and sexual assault prosecution.

The court held that the Youth Criminal Justice Act did not permit accused persons to access a youth record where no charge had been laid, rejecting the line of authority permitting disclosure through s. 123.

The court further held that disclosure was not warranted under the Criminal Code third party records regime because the report contained nothing necessary to full answer and defence, apart from the fact of a proximate police interaction, which the Crown agreed to admit.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondents on charges of attempted murder following a gunfight outside a convenience store.

The preliminary inquiry judge had found insufficient evidence of intent to kill.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by impermissibly weighing circumstantial evidence, failing to prefer the inference most favourable to the Crown, and failing to consider the evidence as a whole.

The application was allowed, the discharge order was quashed, and mandamus was granted directing the committal of both respondents to stand trial for attempted murder.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including kidnapping and extortion, arguing there was no evidence identifying him as the perpetrator.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically the use of the applicant's details and file photograph during a foreign currency transaction with the victim's bank card.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the teller's standard practice of verifying identity against the file photograph provided sufficient evidence of identity to meet the threshold for committal.

The accused was charged with extortion and firearms offences.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, his jury trial was suspended, resulting in a delay beyond the 30-month ceiling.

The accused brought a s. 11(b) Charter application, arguing that the suspension of jury trials was an unconstitutional overreaction to the pandemic and seeking to call expert medical evidence to challenge the lockdown measures.

The Crown brought an application to summarily dismiss the accused's motion.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the Chief Justice's decision to suspend jury trials was an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework, regardless of whether it was the correct public health response, and that the accused's motion had no reasonable prospect of success.

The offender was convicted after trial of multiple firearms offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm and an overcapacity magazine.

The Crown sought a sentence of three to four years, while the offender sought two and a half to three years.

The court considered the offender's lack of prior violent or firearms record, his employment, and his compliance with bail conditions as mitigating factors, balanced against the gravity of gun crime.

The court imposed a sentence of three years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders.

The applicant sought a bail review after being detained on charges of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, while already on bail for previous drug offences.

The court found that proposing a new surety with GPS monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances, allowing for a de novo hearing.

However, the court ultimately denied release on both the secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the applicant's history of breaching bail conditions while residing with the proposed surety and the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash an order committing them to stand trial for attempted murder and related offences concerning an unidentified passenger in a taxi.

They conceded there was sufficient evidence to commit them regarding the identified passenger, but argued there was no evidence they targeted the unidentified passenger.

The reviewing court found that circumstantial evidence, including a plural racial slur and continued shooting after the identified passenger was hit, provided the requisite scintilla of evidence to support the committal.

The application was dismissed.

In a judge-alone sexual assault trial involving two co-worker complainants, the Crown sought admission of extrinsic similar fact evidence from two other incidents and also sought count-to-count use of the complainants' evidence.

Applying the similar fact framework from *Handy*, the court excluded the extrinsic incidents because their probative value did not outweigh prejudice, but allowed count-to-count use of the two charged incidents based on their persuasive degree of connection.

On the merits, the court found the accused's evidence concerning one complainant incredible and accepted that complainant's account beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction on one count.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt on the second count because of material credibility and reliability concerns affecting that complainant's evidence, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The Crown applied for an extension of time to serve and file a notice of application for certiorari to quash the respondent's discharge at a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown had served the notice on the respondent's former counsel, who failed to promptly inform the Crown that they were no longer retained.

The court found that the Crown acted with due diligence, as it was entitled to assume the former counsel was still acting, and that there was an arguable basis for the certiorari application.

The extension of time was granted.

The accused was charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm following a police takedown in a parking lot.

The police relied on information from two confidential informants to form reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The accused brought Charter applications under sections 7 and 9, alleging arbitrary detention and excessive force by police.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the police had sufficient grounds for arrest and did not use excessive force.

The court accepted the police evidence that the firearm was found in the accused's waistband and found the accused guilty of all charges.

The Crown applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on charges of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle where a bag containing two kilograms of methamphetamine was found.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences rather than drawing the inference most favourable to the Crown regarding joint possession, and by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence.

The application was granted, the discharge quashed, and mandamus issued directing committal for trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation involving a 9-year-old complainant.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge committed a 'Miller error' in applying the W. (D.) framework for assessing credibility by allegedly ignoring evidence that was neither accepted nor rejected.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and did not err in his credibility assessment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing the accused to stand trial for second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder.

The Crown argued that the act of pointing a gun at the victim's head during an attempted robbery constituted unlawful confinement, thereby elevating the offence to first-degree murder.

The reviewing court agreed, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by misunderstanding the elements of unlawful confinement and failing to consider the inference most favourable to the Crown.

The application was granted, the discharge was quashed, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused for first-degree murder.

On a Crown application in a jury trial for human trafficking and related offences, the court considered whether evidence of one accused's prior discreditable conduct toward a third party was admissible.

Applying the prior discreditable conduct framework, the court held the alleged baton assault had diminished probative value because the complainant did not link that assault to her decision to leave with the accused or to her fear for her safety.

The moral and reasoning prejudice of the physical assault evidence outweighed its probative value, so that portion was excluded.

However, surrounding narrative evidence, including the accused's conversation with the complainant, his statement about dealing with the third party, the verbal argument, the third party's distressed appearance, and her agreement that the complainant could leave, was admitted to explain procurement and the unfolding narrative.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce two pieces of evidence: an internet search conducted by an associate of the accused shortly after the shooting, and a video found on the associate's phone depicting the accused brandishing a firearm 11 days prior to the murder.

The court ruled the internet search inadmissible, finding its limited probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

However, the court admitted the video as prior discreditable conduct, concluding it was highly probative on the central issue of identity and its prejudicial effect could be mitigated by jury instructions.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion seeking disclosure of police occurrence reports and investigative notes relating to interactions between the complainant, the accused, and the police shortly after the alleged offence.

The Crown argued the materials were third-party records subject to the regime under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the records were intertwined with the allegations, constituted the fruits of the investigation, and did not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the court ruled the materials were first-party disclosure governed by Stinchcombe and ordered their production.

The applicant, a young person charged with second-degree murder and firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under sections 10(a) and 12 during his arrest.

The police executed a search warrant using a dynamic entry and a violent struggle ensued when the applicant resisted arrest, resulting in officers punching him multiple times to gain control and seize a loaded firearm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the section 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for arrest did not accrue until the applicant was safely detained, which was delayed by his own actions.

Furthermore, the court held that the force used by the police was reasonable and justified under the circumstances, resulting in no section 12 violation.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a photograph taken of him surreptitiously by a police officer while he was seated in a courtroom for an unrelated matter.

The accused argued the photograph violated his rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found no Charter breaches, noting there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public courtroom and no state compulsion involved.

However, the court exercised its residual discretion to exclude the photograph because the officer violated section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act, which prohibits taking photographs in a courtroom without judicial authorization.

In a youth prosecution for second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting at Dundas Square, the Crown brought a Leaney application seeking leave to adduce recognition evidence from several non-expert witnesses based on surveillance footage and images recovered from seized mobile phones.

The court applied the threshold admissibility principles governing recognition evidence, focusing on the witnesses' prior acquaintance and whether they were in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the persons depicted.

The court permitted recognition evidence from one investigating officer as to the accused and another individual, and from another officer as to a third individual, but excluded the proposed recognition evidence of three other witnesses for insufficient familiarity.

The ruling distinguished threshold admissibility from ultimate reliability, leaving reliability to the trier of fact.

The Crown brought an ex parte application for an order permitting the police to interview two lawyers regarding disclosures made to them by a now-deceased complainant about historical sexual assaults allegedly committed by the accused.

The lawyers had declined to speak to police without a court order, citing solicitor-client privilege.

The court granted the application, finding that the complainant's father, as Estate Trustee, had validly waived the privilege.

In the alternative, the court held that the privilege should be waived in the interests of justice, as the deceased no longer had an interest to protect and waiving the privilege would further the administration of justice.