Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed the Crown's appeal from an absolute discharge imposed on Jennel Christie for assault causing bodily harm.

The Court found the sentence demonstrably unfit, given the seriousness of the offence, the lack of consideration for public interest, and errors in the sentencing judge’s reasoning regarding employment and immigration consequences.

The Court substituted a nine-month conditional sentence with strict conditions, followed by one year of probation.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after the trial judge found multiple Charter breaches, including a pat down search by a male officer that involved touching under the respondent’s breast area.

The Superior Court found that the search was brief, professional, and not unreasonable in the circumstances, and that there was no breach of sections 7, 8, or 12 of the Charter.

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The court summarily dismissed George Georgiou’s application to stay or terminate the execution of a U.S. Final Forfeiture Order (FFO) against funds held in Ontario, finding the application manifestly frivolous.

The court held that it had no jurisdiction to strike down U.S. orders, and that all appeals and challenges to the conviction and forfeiture order had been exhausted in both the U.S. and Canada.

The court also rejected allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and denied a request for further disclosure, finding no evidentiary basis for such claims.

The applicant, Brandon Caleb, sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that the delay in bringing his case to trial violated his right under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reviewed the procedural history, including the complexity of the Project Venom prosecution, the joining and severing of accused, and the Crown’s management of the case.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court found that although the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded, the case was sufficiently complex and the Crown had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

Exceptional circumstances justified the delay, and the application was dismissed.

This motion concerned an application by the Crown to quash a subpoena issued by the defence to the lead Crown counsel, Monica Gharabaway.

The defence sought to compel Ms. Gharabaway's testimony in an abuse of process motion, alleging improper disclosure of mobile phone data and other evidence.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate that Ms. Gharabaway's evidence was material, relevant, or necessary, characterizing the subpoena as a "fishing expedition." The court emphasized the stringent test for compelling opposing counsel to testify and outlined a new procedure for issuing subpoenas to opposing counsel.

The application to quash the subpoena was granted.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for sexual assault charges, arguing a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from information sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 36 months, exceeding the *Jordan* ceiling of 30 months.

The court found that a significant portion of this delay (352 days) was solely attributable to the applicant's repeated requests for adjournments to secure legal representation or funding, including pursuing a *Rowbotham* application.

Subtracting this defence-caused delay resulted in a net delay of approximately 24 months, which falls below the *Jordan* ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, facing charges of fraud over $5000 for allegedly defrauding victims of $20 million, sought a bail review after being detained on primary and tertiary grounds.

He argued the initial justice erred in relying on his unwillingness to surrender from Indonesia and that new Charter applications and an enhanced release plan constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error in the initial decision and concluding that the new evidence and reshuffled sureties did not amount to a material change in circumstances.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge sentence imposed on the respondent for assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and carrying a concealed weapon.

The respondent had attacked a pregnant dental clinic staff member with a knife.

The sentencing judge had imposed a conditional discharge, largely due to the respondent's 126 days of pre-trial custody and mental health issues.

The Superior Court found the sentencing judge erred by not giving sufficient weight to the victim's impact, failing to acknowledge aggravating factors (planning, weapon use), and misapplying the pre-trial custody credit in the context of a conditional discharge.

The court determined the conditional discharge was demonstrably unfit, set it aside, and imposed a sentence of 189 days custody (deemed served due to pre-trial custody with enhanced credit) and varied the probation order to include reporting and counselling conditions.

The applicant, Aaron Stewart, brought a motion challenging the facial validity of a search warrant for his residence at 270 Church Street, Belleville, arguing it was deficient for failing to specify the unit to be searched in a multi-unit dwelling.

Police obtained the warrant believing it was a single dwelling, but discovered it contained two Airbnb units upon execution.

They confined their search to the applicant's unit (Unit A) and found drugs and currency.

The court found no Section 8 Charter breach, distinguishing the case from R. v. Ting and aligning it with R. v. Iraheta, as the police acted reasonably and confined their search to the target's unit.

Alternatively, if a breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under Section 24(2) of the Charter, considering the seriousness of the conduct, impact on the accused, and society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicant sought to extend time to file an application for certiorari and mandamus to judicially review a Crown Attorney's decision to stay a private prosecution for fraud against Bell Canada.

The Crown had stayed the prosecution due to a lack of reasonable prospect of conviction and public interest, viewing it as a civil matter.

The court dismissed the application, finding no abuse of process by the Crown and that the application lacked merit.

The accused, Allick Welcome, was convicted by a jury of sexual assault for removing a condom during consensual sex without the victim's knowledge ("stealthing").

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's emotional and financial impact and the breach of trust, and mitigating factors, such as the low risk of re-offence and the accused's expression of remorse.

A key consideration was the accused's immigration status, as a prison sentence exceeding six months would lead to automatic deportation without appeal.

The court imposed a conditional sentence order of two years less one day, including house arrest and ancillary orders, to allow the accused to appeal any removal order and to consider his family circumstances.

The Crown sought to admit a video-recorded statement made by the accused, Jennifer Sacobie, to police.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of Sacobie's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The court found that while the statement was voluntary, the police had seriously breached Sacobie's Charter rights by failing to inform her of her right to counsel upon detention and by continuing to question her despite her repeated requests for a lawyer.

The court further found that no "fresh start" occurred to sever the link between the Charter breach and the subsequent statement.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded it.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought a stay of proceedings due to a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

While both the Crown and defence contributed to the delay through inaction, the court found the Crown bore a higher onus to ensure the case stayed on track, especially after preferring a direct indictment.

Despite the defence's failure to bring the application in a timely manner, the court attributed the greater portion of the delay to the Crown, finding the ceiling breached, and reluctantly stayed the proceedings.

This case concerns a motion by the Crown and the Ministry of Children, Community, and Social Services to summarily dismiss a habeas corpus application brought by a youth accused of murder, M.J. M.J. was initially detained in an open custody facility, then transferred to a secure facility to facilitate an in-person bail review.

After being released on bail, M.J. continued her habeas corpus application, seeking Charter costs and damages for alleged unlawful detention.

The court granted the summary dismissal, finding that habeas corpus is not available for a person no longer detained and that claims for Charter damages and compensation should be pursued in civil courts, not joined with criminal habeas corpus applications.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, emphasizing judicial economy and the proper function of criminal courts.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from his conviction for assault with a weapon, entered following a guilty plea.

He argued his plea was uninformed regarding potential deportation consequences.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found the applicant lacked a bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed time, failed to properly account for the delay, and his counsel did not act diligently.

Furthermore, the court found the applicant's claims regarding his lack of knowledge of immigration consequences lacked credibility and contradicted the record from the plea hearing.

The application was dismissed.

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

Following a judge-alone trial, the defendant was found guilty of multiple serious offences including use of an imitation firearm, robbery, forcible confinement, and several counts of sexual assault with a weapon and with a co-accused.

The offences involved a planned, violent gang assault on a vulnerable victim.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence requested time served (equivalent to 5.5 years).

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the assault, the use of a weapon, the victim's vulnerability, and the defendant's lack of remorse, which indicated poor rehabilitation prospects.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's mental health and learning difficulties, family support, and credit for restrictive pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, deducting 5 years and 5 months for pre-sentence credit, leaving 4 years and 7 months to be served.

Ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, SOIRA registration, and a non-communication order were also made.

Duplicate counts were stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on "over 80" charges, where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach due to police delay in taking samples "as soon as practicable." The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by holding that s. 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code imposes a Charter-protected requirement for samples to be taken "as soon as practicable." The court clarified that this phrase relates to an evidentiary shortcut, not a Charter right.

Even if such a requirement existed, the police complied.

The court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis insufficient and incorrect, concluding that the seriousness of the state conduct was low, the impact on the accused's Charter rights was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The appellant challenged both conviction and sentence arising from a historic sexual exploitation prosecution involving a youth pastor and a 13-year-old complainant.

The court rejected the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, did not reduce the case to a credibility contest, and was entitled to rely on corroborative evidence from an independent witness in assessing credibility and reliability.

The court also held that the reliability analysis disclosed no reversible error and attracted appellate deference.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed on consent because the conditional sentence imposed exceeded the maximum custodial sentence available at the time of the offence, and the sentence was varied to time served with probation removed.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder, challenged a judicially authorized wiretap warrant, arguing it violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to alleged material omissions and misrepresentations in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

Specifically, he contended that the ITO failed to disclose his home address and house arrest status, which would have provided an innocent explanation for his mobile phone's location near the crime scenes.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's address was in fact present in the ITO, albeit not explicitly referenced in the mobile phone section, and that any omission was not deliberate.

The court concluded that even considering the omitted information, the totality of the evidence, particularly the coordinated movement and contact between the applicant's and a co-perpetrator's phones, provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.