Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him to a medium secure all-male unit at Brockville Mental Health Centre.

Brockville also appealed the disposition, arguing the Board failed to make sufficient inquiries about the suitability of the transfer given its waiting list.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the Board had sufficient information to make its disposition and properly considered the appellant's history, including the facts underlying a recent sexual assault acquittal, to determine the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The appellants brought a fresh evidence motion as part of their appeal, seeking to introduce affidavits from two rabbis regarding the exact time the Sabbath began on February 19, 1999.

The evidence was intended to undermine the credibility of a respondent who testified that he could not have finalized a lease arrangement on that Friday afternoon due to the approaching Sabbath.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, applying the Palmer test and concluding that even if the evidence were admitted, the minor discrepancy in the estimated time of the Sabbath would not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial judge's findings on credibility or the ultimate result.

In a supplementary endorsement following an unsuccessful appeal, the respondents requested an amendment to remove the appellant's Notice of Objection so they could proceed with an Application for a Certificate of Appointment of an Estate Trustee with a Will.

The Court of Appeal directed the appellant to either withdraw the Notice of Objection or move for directions under Rule 75.06 within 30 days, failing which the local registrar was authorized to remove the Notice.

The appellant union appealed an order of the Divisional Court regarding an arbitrator's decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Aston J. at the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court's order was set aside, the arbitrator's decision was quashed, and costs of $10,000 were awarded to the appellant.

The appellants, two Black lawyers, were aggressively asked for identification in a lawyers' lounge by a librarian who did not question anyone else.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario found this constituted racial discrimination.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the tribunal applied the wrong test and reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the tribunal's decision, holding that the Divisional Court erred by requiring a 'causal nexus' for discrimination and by confusing the legal burden of proof with the shifting evidential burden.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their solicitor negligence action against their former counsel.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as time-barred, finding that the statement of claim merely reiterated allegations the appellants had made three years earlier in their defence to the solicitors' action for unpaid fees.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's assessment and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant, an investment advisor, appealed a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The respondent, his former employer, had sued him for indemnity under his employment agreement after settling a claim brought by former clients.

The appellant argued the claim was time-barred under s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, as it was commenced more than two years after the respondent was served with the clients' statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 18 applies to all claims for contribution and indemnity, whether arising in tort or contract.

The action was dismissed as time-barred.

The parties separated in 1998.

The respondent commenced an action in 1999, and the appellant counterclaimed for spousal support and other relief.

The action was dismissed for delay in 2003.

In 2011, the appellant commenced a new application for spousal support and other relief.

The motion judge stayed the entire application, finding the spousal support claim was statute-barred under the former Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the spousal support claim was statute-barred, subject to the appellant's right to seek an extension under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, lifting the stay on the other claims for relief and referring them back to the motion judge, as only interim spousal support was before the court.

The appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sued her insurer.

After the limitation period expired, she sought to amend her statement of claim to explicitly plead an uninsured motorist claim, in addition to an underinsured motorist claim.

The Master allowed the amendment, finding the original claim sufficiently raised the issue.

The Superior Court judge reversed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the Master's order, holding that the original claim, read generously, reasonably communicated an uninsured motorist claim, and the amendment merely clarified it rather than asserting a new cause of action.

The appellant challenged a family law order setting aside a marriage contract, arguing the trial was unfair because of his hearing impairment.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge accommodated the self-represented appellant and that the record did not support any unfairness affecting the outcome.

The court further held it was open to the trial judge to conclude there had been inadequate financial disclosure and that the responding party did not understand the nature or consequences of the contract.

Fresh evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of understanding the hearing-impairment argument, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement and release, as well as the associated costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no surprise or prejudice to the appellants regarding the settlement issue and agreeing with the motion judge's reasons.

However, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding no basis for an award exceeding partial indemnity.

The costs order below was set aside and replaced, and costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a child protection judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the best interests of children require child protection matters to proceed expeditiously.

The court noted that permitting the appeal to proceed would delay final resolution contrary to policy imperatives, and that the appeal had very little merit.

The self-represented appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The Special Investigation Unit (SIU), a non-party to the civil action, appealed an order requiring it to produce an unedited copy of its investigation file, specifically the SIU Director's Report to the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in determining the report was relevant.

The court held that the information in the report was derivative of other sources in the file, and the Director's legal analysis and lead investigator's assessment were not relevant to any material issue in the action.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic cocaine and oxycodone, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, and failing to comply with probation orders.

He was sentenced to a global term of seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of parity with a co-accused's sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the differences in his offences compared to the co-accused.

The appellants, three physicians, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable in negligence for the delayed diagnosis and death of a patient from infective endocarditis.

The trial judge found the emergency room resident breached the standard of care by failing to review a SARS form containing critical clinical history, and held the supervising physician vicariously liable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the supervising physician, as vicarious liability was neither pleaded nor argued at trial.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the resident's breach of the standard of care and the trial judge's causation findings, concluding that the evidence supported the determination that a timely diagnosis would have prevented the patient's death.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the Crown's improper cross-examination rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the Crown improperly and repeatedly cross-examined the appellant about his co-accuseds' motives to fabricate their testimony.

The trial judge failed to provide an adequate correcting instruction and instead reinforced the improper questioning in his summary of the evidence.

As credibility and identification were central to the case, the court found an appearance of unfairness and inferred actual prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact that there was no consideration.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred regarding mitigation, as ongoing litigation alone did not justify the respondent's refusal to accept a recall to work, absent evidence of a poisoned workplace.

The Court declined to consider promissory estoppel as it was not raised at trial.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the notice period to eight months, with costs of the appeal awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision regarding the administration of an estate, and the respondent cross-appealed seeking the removal of the estate trustee.

The Court of Appeal varied the judgment to provide that all remaining funds be held back until the final passing of accounts, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as it was impractical to insert a new estate trustee on the eve of the passing of accounts.

The appellants appealed a decision setting aside a stay of proceedings granted by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the officer's conduct might have justified a finding of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not the only remedy available.

The court emphasized that a stay is a prospective remedy of last resort, and lesser remedies, such as disregarding the officer's testimony or addressing disclosure issues, were sufficient to remove any prejudice.