Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed her sentence, arguing it was harsh and excessive.

The sentencing judge had imposed a custodial sentence and a lifetime driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's appalling record for related offences and the danger she posed to the public.

However, the Court held that under s. 259(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, the driving prohibition had to be limited to three years.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the driving prohibition to three years, and dismissed in all other respects.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for uttering threats to cause bodily harm and to damage property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was supported by testimony and extensive audio recordings.

The court also refused leave to appeal the sentence of one month imprisonment and three years' probation, finding it fit.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, arguing he faced a serious risk of torture if returned to Arkansas due to solitary confinement and potential sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision to extradite without assurances was not unreasonable as the applicant presented no evidence to support his claims.

The appellants appealed their convictions for an armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellants' proximity to the getaway van shortly after the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge could infer the appellants were in the van, concluding they were the robbers was not the only rational inference.

Evidence showed at least three people were in the van, and DNA from other individuals was found inside.

The trial judge erred by failing to consider other possible combinations of perpetrators.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the standard of proof, subjected the complainant's evidence to a different standard of scrutiny, and failed to consider his mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided detailed reasons, properly scrutinized both parties' evidence, and correctly concluded there was no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that a special jury instruction was required for his post-offence conduct and that simple possession should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that possession was a continuing offence and there was no air of reality to the simple possession theory.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle by refusing a conditional sentence.

The appellant, Tarion Warranty Corporation, appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that allowed the respondent's appeal from convictions and sentences imposed at an ex parte trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred by allowing the appeal on grounds not raised by the respondent and without giving the appellant an opportunity to address concerns regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence.

However, because there were serious gaps in the evidentiary record regarding the admissibility of business records, the Court of Appeal declined to restore the convictions.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment of the appeal judge was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, assaulting a police officer, failing to comply with a recognizance, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended inconsistencies in the police officers' evidence and failed to properly address allegations of police collusion and fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies and reasonably concluded that the officers did not fabricate their evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the identification evidence of a police officer who identified him from a store video.

The officer had interacted with the appellant on the night of his arrest, taking photos and paying attention to his features.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the officer's prior acquaintance with the appellant, though not lengthy, was sufficient for admissibility, with its duration going to weight.

The court also found no unfairness regarding the photos and noted that minor inconsistencies in the officers' evidence were matters for the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

This was a sentence appeal from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness in sentencing because the trial judge imposed a sentence considerably above the Crown's submission without inviting further submissions and refused to allow the appellant to speak before sentence.

The Court of Appeal found it sufficient to resolve the appeal on those two issues.

Given the time already served and the appellant's continuing commitment to treatment, leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to time served, with probation terms remaining in force subject to any future variation application.

The appellant appealed a murder conviction arising from a circumstantial case centred on bloody palm prints found on a garage wall near the deceased's body.

He argued that an extract from his post-arrest police statement should have been admitted as a prior consistent statement to rebut alleged recent fabrication or, alternatively, under the spontaneous reaction exception recognized in Edgar.

The court held that the Crown's cross-examination alleged only that the appellant was lying because he was the perpetrator, not that some later event created a motive to fabricate, so the traditional exception did not apply.

The statement was also inconsistent with the appellant's trial account on the critical timing of the light switch and there was no evidentiary foundation to establish spontaneity or that it was made when first confronted with the accusation.

The court also rejected the complaint about instructions concerning an alternative suspect, finding no evidence connected that witness to the killing.

The young person appellant was arrested for possession of stolen property and gave a videotaped statement to police.

During the interview, the appellant began discussing unrelated and more serious offences, including break and enter and theft of marijuana.

The police continued questioning without re-advising the appellant of his right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that while the initial caution complied with the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the police violated the appellant's section 10(b) Charter rights by failing to re-advise him when his jeopardy increased.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered for the more serious charges.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of importing cocaine.

The respondent relied on the defence of duress, claiming he was forced at gunpoint in Jamaica to swallow cocaine pellets.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in his responses to jury questions regarding the 'reasonable person' standard and the 'safe avenue of escape' element of duress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's examples were extreme and his language could have been better, the jury would not have been confused about the essential legal standards.

The plaintiffs sued their investment advisor and his firm for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the handling of their investment accounts.

The court found that the advisor failed to comply with the 'know your client' rule, engaged in unsuitable short-term trading, and exercised unauthorized discretion, while the firm failed to properly supervise the accounts.

Although no fiduciary duty was owed to the more knowledgeable husband, fiduciary duties were owed to and breached regarding the wife and son.

The court rejected defenses of ratification and limitation periods (except for a late-added tax claim) due to the plaintiffs' lack of knowledge of the misconduct.

Damages were awarded for capital and opportunity losses, reduced by 30% for the plaintiffs' contributory negligence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action regarding the termination of a lease.

The trial judge found that the appellants failed to pay rent and lacked the financial ability to do so.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the respondents changed their evidence from discovery to trial without providing written notice as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the change in evidence regarding the exact date of termination was immaterial to the outcome, as rent was not tendered on either date.

However, the Court reduced the respondents' costs of the appeal due to their failure to provide proper notice.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence, which included a 'serious violent offence' designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The convictions arose from an incident where the young person robbed the victim of a cell phone and subsequently assaulted him, resulting in the victim's finger being severed on a chain-link fence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the risk of bodily harm was objectively foreseeable.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the preliminary threshold for a serious violent offence designation is automatically met when serious bodily harm is caused, with foreseeability remaining a factor at the discretionary stage.

The appellant was rendered a paraplegic during a soccer game organized by the Ontario Soccer Association (OSA).

He sued the OSA's corporate sponsors, alleging they had a duty to ensure adequate insurance coverage for players.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no relationship of sufficient proximity between the appellant and the corporate sponsors to ground a duty of care.

The respondent claimed it was owed $245,000 by the appellants.

The parties signed Minutes of Settlement and a Consent to Judgment in July 2008 with legal advice, but subsequently signed another document in September 2008 without legal advice.

The appellants argued the later document superseded the earlier ones, while the respondent disagreed.

The Court of Appeal held that the serious factual issues between the parties could not be resolved on a paper record and required a trial.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment below was set aside.

The appellant sought to exercise share options under the respondent's employee stock option plan and was required to execute an assumption agreement acknowledging receipt of the shareholders' agreement.

The respondent refused to provide the agreement, which the application judge found oppressive, ordering its production but allowing the redaction of Schedule A. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that Schedule A contained more than just shareholder identities and was integral to the agreement, making it unjust to compel the appellant to exercise options without seeing it.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment which declared the parties to be 50% beneficial owners of a property based on a trust agreement.

The appellant argued that money owing under a prior agreement allowed him to walk away from the agreements, that the motion judge erred in refusing an adjournment, and that the notice of motion was deficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge, noting the appellant agreed to proceed, and finding no prejudice from any deficiency in the notice of motion.