Robert A. Blair

The appellant pharmacists were shareholders and directors of a corporation convicted of income tax evasion related to undeclared volume rebates from drug companies.

The Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists found them guilty of professional misconduct for engaging in conduct relevant to the practice of pharmacy that would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful, dishonourable, or unprofessional.

On appeal, the Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Committee's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the appellants' participation in the tax evasion scheme reflected adversely on the profession and constituted conduct relevant to the practice of pharmacy.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which had made findings of criminal conduct against him based on undisclosed evidence.

The Board conceded it exceeded its jurisdiction and consented to its decision being quashed.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision and, finding exceptional circumstances including a ten-year delay and lack of clear evidence, refused to remit the matter back to the Board for reconsideration.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff brought a slip and fall action under the simplified procedure, capping his claim at $25,000.

The trial judge assessed damages at $34,933.14 but found the plaintiff 50% contributorily negligent, resulting in an award of $17,466.57.

The defendant appealed, arguing the 50% reduction should have been applied to the $25,000 cap rather than the assessed damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the abandonment of a claim in excess of $25,000 under Rule 76 applies only to the final judgment amount, not the assessed damages.

The Union applied for judicial review of an arbitration board decision that dismissed its grievances concerning contracting out and refused to issue a single employer declaration under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board did not deny natural justice by refusing further document production, and that its decisions on the single employer issue and the interpretation of the collective agreement were not patently unreasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke his appointment to an industry advisory committee.

The Minister revoked the appointment after learning the applicant was a member of the Hell's Angels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's exercise of discretion was not unreasonable and that the revocation did not violate the applicant's freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have quashed the decision, finding the revocation unreasonable given the applicant's good character, qualifications, and the fixed term of the appointment.

Following a successful appeal by the defendant insurer regarding the production of documents and claims of privilege, the parties submitted written submissions on costs.

The Divisional Court ordered no costs for the appeal, the application for leave to appeal, or the motion to quash.

Although the defendant was substantially successful on the issues of solicitor-client and litigation privilege, the court found that the defendant was largely the author of its own misfortune because its initial affidavit of documents lacked the particularity required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sued the defendant doctor for sexual assault.

Criminal charges against the defendant were stayed, but during the criminal proceedings, the defendant received a Crown Disclosure Brief, which included a statement he made to police that was ruled inadmissible due to a s. 10(b) Charter violation.

In the civil action, the plaintiff sought production of the Crown Brief.

The Divisional Court held that while the existence of the Crown Brief must be disclosed, its contents should not be produced until the Attorney General and relevant police service are notified and either consent or a court orders production.

Furthermore, the defendant's Charter-infringing statement to police was protected from production in the civil proceeding.

The plaintiff brought a civil action for damages for sexual assault against the defendant, whose criminal charges for the same allegations were stayed.

The plaintiff sought production of the Crown Disclosure Brief from the criminal proceedings, which included a statement the defendant made to police that was ruled inadmissible in criminal court due to a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The Divisional Court held that while the existence of the Crown Brief must be disclosed, its contents should not be produced without a screening mechanism involving the Attorney General and police to protect public interest.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the defendant's Charter-infringing statement to police was protected from production in the civil proceeding.

Following successful appeals regarding the application of the implied undertaking rule to medical reports, the appellants sought costs.

The respondents argued that no costs should be awarded because the appeals involved a novel and complex question of law with conflicting decisions.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that the parties were pursuing their own disclosure interests, and awarded costs to the appellants on a partial indemnity scale.

The court fixed the costs for the various stages of the proceedings, ordering that they be payable at the end of the actions to avoid prejudicing the respondents' access to justice.

The plaintiff sued his insurer for bad faith after it denied his claim for a dismemberment benefit.

On a motion for production, the motions judge ordered the insurer to produce legal opinions from its counsel and its entire claims file, finding that the bad faith claim overrode solicitor-client privilege and that litigation privilege was not established.

The Divisional Court allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that a bad faith claim does not destroy solicitor-client privilege for legal opinions.

The court also set aside the blanket order for the claims file, directing the insurer to deliver a further and better affidavit of documents properly particularizing its privilege claims.

The plaintiffs, comprising Canadian citizens and Yugoslavian residents, sued the Government of Canada for damages in tort and under the Charter relating to Canada's participation in the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the statement of claim, which was initially dismissed.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court allowed the appeal and struck the statement of claim in its entirety.

The court held that the executive decision to participate in the bombing was a matter of high policy and Crown prerogative, making the tort claims non-justiciable.

Furthermore, the Crown is immune from tort liability for military actions and pure policy decisions.

While the Charter claims were justiciable, the court found that state-to-state military action does not engage section 7 or section 15 of the Charter.

The plaintiffs were injured in motor vehicle accidents and commenced both accident benefit arbitration proceedings and tort actions.

In the tort actions, the defendants sought production of medical reports obtained during the arbitration proceedings.

The motions judges dismissed the requests, relying on the implied undertaking rule.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that neither the deemed undertaking rule nor the implied undertaking rule protected the medical reports from disclosure.

The reports were highly relevant to the tort actions, and the plaintiffs had waived their privacy interests by putting their medical conditions in issue.

The appeals were allowed and the plaintiffs were ordered to produce the reports.

The Minister of Revenue appealed a trial decision that allowed an automobile dealership to exclude its wholesale financial liabilities for new vehicles from its paid-up capital as 'current accounts payable' under the Corporations Tax Act.

The Minister also appealed the trial judge's award of solicitor and client costs to the dealership.

The Divisional Court dismissed the tax appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the legislation or assessment of expert accounting evidence.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the award to a party and party scale because there was no finding of reprehensible conduct by the Minister to justify solicitor and client costs.

The appellant contractor obtained a judgment against the owner and garnished funds held by an escrow agent.

The respondent, another judgment creditor, also garnished the funds.

The sheriff distributed the funds pro rata under the Creditors' Relief Act.

The appellant appealed, arguing the funds were impressed with a trust under s. 7(2) of the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the funds were trust funds, were not the property of the debtor, and were therefore not subject to pro rata distribution under the Creditors' Relief Act.

The applicant lawyer sought judicial review to stop the Law Society from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against him.

He argued that because the Law Society's Compensation Fund had already paid a claim to a former client based on a finding of his 'dishonesty', the disciplinary panel would be institutionally biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Law Society Act explicitly authorizes the overlapping functions of compensation and discipline.

Following established jurisprudence, the court found that the exercise of these dual statutory functions does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias unless the administrative body overextends its authority, which did not occur here.

The appellant appealed an order made under the Canada Business Corporations Act to the Divisional Court.

The court held that under s. 249 of the Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, not the Divisional Court.

The appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

Inco Limited was charged with discharging untreated mine effluent into a creek and failing to report the discharge under the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The Crown appealed the summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial on the basis that the trial court applied the incorrect test for water impairment.

Inco cross-appealed, arguing the charges should be stayed as an abuse of process because the environmental officer lacked statutory authority to conduct a warrantless inspection and violated the Charter rights of its employees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that the capacity to impair water quality must be assessed based on the nature and circumstances of the discharge.

The Court allowed Inco's cross-appeal, holding that while the corporation lacked standing to assert its employees' Charter rights, a new trial was required to determine whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence was committed before conducting the inspection, which would dictate whether a warrant was required.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments for a shopping mall for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to use a recent arm's length sale price as the best evidence of market value, and by applying a 'current value' approach rather than a 'market value' approach.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's treatment of the recent sale was a question of mixed fact and law and thus not appealable.

However, the Court found the Board erred in law by applying a 'current value' (unencumbered fee simple) approach, which was introduced by 1997 amendments not applicable to the years in question.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for redetermination based on the correct 'market value' test.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica with drugs hidden in her purse.

Her sole defence was that she was an 'unknowing mule'.

The trial judge instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt could not arise from an absence of evidence, and repeated this error when answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal held that this misdirection was a reversible error, as the jury likely misapprehended the correct standard of proof regarding the lack of direct evidence of the appellant's knowledge.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for importing heroin and argued that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence seized from a hotel room following a warrantless arrest that violated ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed no error of law in applying the s. 24(2) analysis and was entitled to conclude that, although the breaches were serious, their seriousness was somewhat blunted by the officer’s honest belief and the surrounding circumstances.

The court rejected arguments concerning search incident to arrest, the effect of discoverability, and the alleged failure to consider a pattern of Charter breaches.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.