Charles C. Mark

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that annulled the parties' marriage based on the law of Iran.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact.

The trial judge's credibility findings, which favoured the respondent over the appellant, were upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The moving party brought a motion pursuant to s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of Gans J. The Divisional Court considered the criteria for setting aside a Registrar's order, noting that the overriding consideration is what the justice of the case requires.

The court found that Gans J. was entitled to conclude there was insufficient evidence to relieve the appellant from the operation of the rules.

The motion was dismissed with costs payable from the estate and charged against the moving party's interest.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an Assistant Registrar's order that struck out her proposed appeal of a judgment regarding her late mother's will for failing to perfect the appeal in a timely fashion.

The court found that the appellant failed to provide sufficient sworn evidence explaining the delay, relying instead on an affidavit from a legal assistant based on information and belief, and unsworn representations from counsel.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the appellant had not met the prerequisites to be relieved from the operation of the Rules.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary spousal support payments owed under a separation agreement incorporated into a consent order.

He argued the motions judge should only have decided the procedural issue of whether to order a trial by viva voce or affidavit evidence, not the substantive merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge had a complete record, including financial disclosure, and was entitled to exercise his discretion to dismiss the requested relief on the merits.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's decision finding that the parties had reached a settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge's conclusion was amply supported by the email and voicemail correspondence between the lawyers and that she committed no reviewable error.

The appellant appealed an order regarding her interest in a property located on Roncesvalles Avenue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any interest the appellant had was compromised in minutes of settlement in July 2002, which resulted in a court order transferring the property to the respondents.

As no appeal was taken from that prior order, the appellant had no claim to an accounting of the proceeds of the sale.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay $400,000 in lump sum spousal support to his former common-law partner.

During their nine-year relationship, the respondent supported the appellant financially and emotionally through severe depression and substance abuse, suffering economic detriment while enabling him to achieve significant financial success.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made unassailable findings of fact regarding the respondent's compensatory entitlement and need.

The court also upheld the lump sum format, distinguishing previous case law because the award would not cause the appellant hardship and the economic advantages and disadvantages could be accurately identified.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion on the basis that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction because the matter was in the nature of a judicial review application.

The appellants argued the Superior Court had inherent jurisdiction to decline to approve a settlement by the Workers' Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision to compromise the action was an exercise of a statutory power of decision, and any challenge must be brought by way of judicial review before the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Master exceeded their mandate under the orders directing the reference by determining the nature of the basis for the amounts owing to the clients.

The lower court order was set aside and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The testatrix left the residue of her Canadian estate to her 'next of kin in equal shares'.

The application judge interpreted this to mean her Canadian relatives, excluding her surviving sister who lived in Germany.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary meaning of 'next of kin' is the nearest blood relation, which was the surviving sister.

The phrase 'in equal shares' was intended to apply if the sister predeceased the testatrix, leaving multiple nieces and nephews as the next of kin.

The residue was ordered to be paid to the estate of the surviving sister.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding alleged delays in stock trades.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to meet the evidentiary burden to show a genuine issue for trial.

The appellant relied on conclusory statements of fact and belief rather than presenting specific evidence of delay and consequent loss.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding restricted cross-examination as a collateral attack on the judgment.

Following a finding of liability for discrimination based on disability and reprisal, the Board of Inquiry determined the appropriate remedies.

The complainant, an independent contractor who was terminated after being diagnosed with ALS and falsely accused of theft, was awarded $20,000 for the infringement of his right to contract, $12,415 in special damages, and $20,000 for reprisal.

The Board declined to award legal costs, finding no statutory authority to do so under the Human Rights Code in these circumstances, and declined to order public interest remedies.

The complainant, an independent contractor diagnosed with ALS, alleged discrimination and reprisal by the respondents.

The Board of Inquiry found that the respondents treated the complainant differently due to his deteriorating health, including reducing his hours and removing his telephone.

The respondents terminated his contract, ostensibly for stealing propane, but the Board found they were wilfully blind to a plausible explanation because they wanted to terminate him due to his disability.

The Board also found the respondents committed reprisal by threatening criminal prosecution and initiating a Small Claims Court action against the complainant after he filed his human rights complaint.

The parties were given time to mediate a remedy.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The appellants submitted costs submissions, while the respondent provided no response.

The court fixed costs in the amount of $20,000 plus disbursements and G.S.T.

The Vernon companies hired Headline, an auctioneering firm, to sell assets.

Headline breached the agreement by failing to deposit over $100,000 into a joint account and breached its fiduciary duty by attempting to secretly sell assets to its own companies.

The Vernon companies subsequently refused to allow Headline to sell the remaining assets.

The Court of Appeal held that Headline's substantial breach of contract and fiduciary duty excused the Vernon companies from further performance.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of $5,000 in punitive damages against Headline for its high-handed and arbitrary conduct.

The applicant lawyer sought judicial review to stop the Law Society from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against him.

He argued that because the Law Society's Compensation Fund had already paid a claim to a former client based on a finding of his 'dishonesty', the disciplinary panel would be institutionally biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Law Society Act explicitly authorizes the overlapping functions of compensation and discipline.

Following established jurisprudence, the court found that the exercise of these dual statutory functions does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias unless the administrative body overextends its authority, which did not occur here.

The parties separated and signed a separation agreement containing a release of spousal support, alongside a consulting agreement providing the wife with income.

When the husband terminated the consulting agreement, the wife applied for spousal and child support.

The trial judge awarded spousal support for five years, finding the consulting agreement was disguised support.

The husband appealed the support and custody orders, alleging trial unfairness.

The wife cross-appealed the five-year limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the husband's appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the strict Pelech trilogy test for varying support agreements does not apply under the 1985 Divorce Act.

Instead, a material change in circumstances threshold applies.

The wife's ongoing childcare responsibilities and the termination of the consulting agreement constituted a material change justifying ongoing, indefinite spousal support.

The appellant sought to overturn an order of Juriantz J. The Court of Appeal found no grounds to interfere with the order below and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The endorsement contains no further factual or legal analysis.