Robert A. Blair

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration board decision that upheld the constitutionality of s. 58(5)(c) of the Employment Standards Act.

The provision denied severance pay to employees whose contracts were frustrated due to illness or injury.

The Divisional Court found that the provision discriminated against severely disabled employees, violating s. 15(1) of the Charter, and was not saved by s. 1.

The offending words were struck down, and the disabled employee was awarded severance pay.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The Crown conceded that evidence of the appellant's impending jail term should not have been admitted at trial.

However, the Court of Appeal found that the admission of this evidence did not cause any substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeals against both conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellants, the first wife and two adult children of the deceased, appealed a dependants' relief order under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased's son suffered from a progressively debilitating disease requiring significant future care.

The application judge awarded a $250,000 lump sum for the children's support and limited child support arrears to the date of death, balancing the son's needs against the deceased's moral obligations to his second spouse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that moral considerations are relevant to dependants' relief applications in Ontario and finding no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion regarding support, arrears, or costs.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by Justice K. Ross.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the sentencing and held that the sentence was fit.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility due to inconsistencies in her evidence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the inconsistencies and the fresh evidence was merely duplicative.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of the relevant evidence in the trial judge's thorough reasons and no error of principle in the sentence imposed.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by referencing a lack of evidence of effective community supervision without following the procedure set out in R. v. Nault.

The Court of Appeal noted the sentencing judge's approach was not in accord with Nault, but dismissed the appeal because the appellant was not a good candidate for a conditional sentence given his serious criminal record.

The sentence was found to be fit.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's conclusions.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagees coverage under a fire insurance policy after the mortgaged property was destroyed by fire.

The mortgagors had vacated the property, and the mortgagees took control of it but failed to notify the insurer of the vacancy.

The Court of Appeal held that while the vacancy exclusion did not apply to the mortgagees due to the mortgage clause, Statutory Condition 4 did apply.

The mortgagees' actions in taking control of the vacant property constituted a material change in risk within their control and knowledge.

Their failure to notify the insurer voided the policy.

The appeal was allowed and the actions dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and discharging a firearm with intent to wound, as well as his sentence.

He argued that Crown counsel's editorial comments and inflammatory language during cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's instructions to the jury adequately addressed the Crown's inappropriate comments.

The Court also found the verdicts were not unreasonable or inconsistent, and the trial judge did not err in principle in sentencing.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant brought an appeal against the sentence imposed by the lower court.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the matter to determine if the sentencing judge erred.

The court concluded that there was no error in principle in the sentencing of the appellant.

Consequently, leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions including being masked with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The Crown conceded that the masked with intent conviction was not supportable, and the Court of Appeal quashed it.

The appeals against the remaining convictions were dismissed as there was ample evidence to support them.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the original statement of a witness for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence demonstrated the appropriate level of reliability and the trial judge did not err in admitting it.

The appellant appealed an Order of Committal for Extradition.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no basis to interfere with the decision of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal finding that the respondents' homes were 'land lease homes' in a 'land lease community' under the Tenant Protection Act, 1997.

The respondents had purchased their homes and entered into 99-year land leases.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondents were 'owners' of their dwellings within the meaning of the Act, as the agreements shifted the primary obligations of ownership to them and explicitly stated the buildings remained their property during the lease term.

The court also confirmed that common use elements are not a prerequisite for a land lease community.

The appellant husband appealed an order that dismissed his application to terminate spousal support but varied the monthly amount downward following his early retirement.

He argued the application judge erred by allowing 'double dipping' into his pension, imputing income to him, and failing to make the variation retroactive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the exception to the rule against double dipping applied because the support was based on need and the respondent wife continued to experience economic hardship.

The court also found no error in the application judge's decision to impute notional income given the husband's ability to work, nor in the exercise of discretion regarding retroactivity.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent, who had been convicted in California of criminal harassment.

The extradition judge discharged the respondent on the harassment charge, finding the US failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the conduct underlying the California conviction corresponded to the Canadian offence of criminal harassment, as California law did not require proof that the victim reasonably feared for their safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the US appeal, confirming that the balance of probabilities is the correct standard under s. 29(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, that the victim's trial transcript was properly admitted, and that the extradition judge's conclusion was not unreasonable.

The appellant sought the extradition of the respondent, who had been convicted in California of criminal harassment.

The extradition judge discharged the respondent on the harassment charge, finding that the appellant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the conduct underlying the California conviction corresponded to the Canadian offence of criminal harassment, as the victim's testimony did not establish she reasonably feared for her safety.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that section 29(1)(b) of the Extradition Act imposes a balance of probabilities standard, the victim's transcript was properly admitted, and the extradition judge's conclusion was reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the equalization of net family property.

She argued that a 1979 agreement excluded the matrimonial home from the calculation and that the respondent's alleged lottery winnings should be included.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the agreement did not exclude the home and there was no evidence of lottery winnings.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to correct a conceded double-counting error regarding a vehicle, reducing the equalization payment by $10,500.