Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing 2.2 kilograms of cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in finding she knew the drugs were concealed in the lid of her suitcase.

The appellant contended the trial judge made erroneous inferences regarding the weight of the suitcase lid and failed to consider circumstantial evidence supporting her lack of knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence, including the physical exhibits, and that it was within the trial judge's purview to draw reasonable inferences from the strong circumstantial evidence of knowledge.

The appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had declared him a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender and imposed the sentence to ensure he would receive sex offender treatment while in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the disposition and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The respondents leased buses to a company that obtained a comprehensive business insurance policy from the appellant insurer.

The policy covered the respondents as an additional named insured.

After one of the leased buses was damaged, the insurer paid the repair costs but deducted unpaid premiums owed by the lessee.

The respondents successfully applied for an order that the insurer could not rely on s. 134(2) of the Insurance Act to withhold the unpaid premiums from the loss payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that s. 134(2) restricts recovery by deduction to amounts payable to the party responsible for payment of the premiums, not a third party.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the underinsured defendants.

The plaintiff's insurer, Zurich, was added as a defendant.

Zurich later discovered the defendant driver was delivering pizza for Pizza Nova at the time of the accident and issued a third party claim against Pizza Nova in its own name.

Pizza Nova appealed the dismissal of its motion to strike the third party claim, arguing that a subrogated claim must be brought in the name of the insured and that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 29.01 permits a subrogated insurer to issue a third party claim in its own name to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, and that the limitation period defence raised a triable issue based on discoverability.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in characterizing the case as a breach of trust based on the backdating of a certificate of exemption.

This erroneous assumption improperly influenced the sentencing judge's decision that a conditional sentence was inappropriate and likely affected the quantum of the sentence.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a summary conviction appeal court judge.

The appellant conceded that the appeal must be dismissed unless the court was prepared to overrule its previous decision in R. v. Hatfield.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to depart from the precedent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant and a co-accused were convicted of trafficking in heroin following a joint trial before a judge and jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by conflating his defence with that of his co-defendant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury to consider each accused separately and that the recharge clarified any potential confusion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no submissions were made.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank for $32,796.01.

The appellant argued that her cross-motion to dismiss the bank's motion should have been granted due to the bank's failure to attend cross-examinations on its amended affidavit of documents.

The appellant conceded that summary judgment was properly granted based on the documentation eventually provided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to set aside the judgment.

The court noted the bank's dilatory production but observed that the motion judge had already accounted for this by limiting prejudgment interest and denying the bank costs at first instance.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for robbery and breach of probation after the sentencing judge rejected a joint submission.

The joint submission proposed a 12-month sentence, less 2-for-1 credit for pre-trial custody, plus three years of probation.

The sentencing judge instead imposed one year in addition to pre-trial custody and two years of probation.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in applying the governing principles, as the joint submission was not unreasonable and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to accord with the joint submission.

The appellant leased truck trailers to a company that subsequently went bankrupt.

A priority dispute arose between the appellant and the bankrupt's secured creditor over the trailers.

The trailers were used in multiple jurisdictions but the debtor was located in Alberta.

The Court of Appeal held that although the lease was a 'true lease' not requiring registration under the Ontario PPSA, the choice of law provisions in s. 7(1) of the Ontario PPSA still applied.

Consequently, Alberta law governed the dispute.

Under the Alberta PPSA, the lease was deemed a security interest requiring registration, and because the appellant registered against the wrong entity, its interest was subordinate to the secured creditor's perfected security interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, acting as a representative plaintiff in a class action, appealed a decision regarding the Crown's obligation to pay administered funds to a veteran's estate upon death.

The appellant argued that clear statutory language was required to divest such funds, which was absent in the lapsing provisions of the Pension Act and Veterans Treatment Regulations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lapsing provisions clearly intended to prioritize spouses and dependants over estates.

The Crown's cross-appeal was allowed, with the court finding that section 55 of the Veterans Treatment Regulations remained intra vires after 1986, as subordinate legislation is not required to mirror its enabling statute exactly.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted an order on consent in accordance with the amended draft order filed by the parties.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the motions judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the decision and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice John H. Brockenshire dated June 12, 2000.

On consent, the Court of Appeal ordered that the order go as asked.

The appellants, a Michigan law firm and one of its members, appealed an order finding that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over the claims against them and that Ontario was the forum conveniens.

The plaintiffs, an Ontario transportation company and its president, sued the appellants for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a Michigan action.

The Court of Appeal applied the Muscutt factors and upheld the motions judge's finding of a real and substantial connection to Ontario, emphasizing the multiplicity of parties and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The Court also upheld the finding that Michigan was not clearly the more appropriate forum, dismissing the appeal.

The infant plaintiff sustained catastrophic injuries when he rode his bicycle down a ramp at an apartment building owned by the appellant Turret Realties Inc. and into the path of a vehicle driven by the appellant Anne Busk.

The trial judge found Turret 50% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act and the plaintiff 50% contributorily negligent, while dismissing claims against the driver.

Turret appealed on multiple grounds, including reasonable apprehension of bias, liability, and damages.

The plaintiff cross-appealed regarding contributory negligence, loss of interdependent relationship, and the refusal to award a management fee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal and allowed the cross-appeal in part, awarding a management fee of $302,989 and adjusting the tax gross-up accordingly.

The appellants, who were self-represented at trial, appealed the trial judgment on the grounds that the trial judge failed to grant an adjournment to retain counsel and failed to warn them that evidence from the counsel table was inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, noting the appellants never requested an adjournment and the trial judge repeatedly warned them about giving evidence from the witness box.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the payables for a group of bridal gowns and dismissed a motion to admit fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellants appealed an order striking their counterclaim, which sought punitive damages based on an independent actionable wrong akin to defamation arising from allegations in the respondent's statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that allegations in a statement of claim are absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis of such a counterclaim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motions judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed an October 2003 order, seeking to address issues including pension valuation and disclosure of employee benefits.

The Court of Appeal found that these issues related primarily to a February 2002 order from which no appeal was taken.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that it could not be used as a collateral attack on the earlier unappealed order.