Robert A. Blair

The appellant sued the respondent school board and its former director for defamation based on statements made during a television broadcast regarding her allegations of a teacher's sexual misconduct.

At trial, the jury found the statements defamatory and malicious, but true, resulting in the dismissal of the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's charge to the jury unfairly restricted the context of the words complained of, leading to a substantial wrong.

Despite the appellant's failure to object to the charge at trial, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial in the interests of justice.

The respondent, an Ohio corporation, obtained a consent decree and a contempt order against the appellant, an Ontario corporation, in a U.S. District Court for trade-mark infringement.

The respondent sought to enforce these non-monetary foreign orders in Ontario and was granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the motion for summary judgment.

The Court held that even if the rules for enforcing foreign non-monetary judgments were relaxed, the foreign orders in this case were too ambiguous in their material terms, particularly regarding their extra-territorial application, to be enforced by Ontario courts.

The respondent, a judgment creditor of a deceased's estate and his company, brought an action claiming relief under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge found that the transfer of the company's assets to other companies controlled by the deceased's widow, and the assumption of a mortgage, constituted oppression and ordered the appellants to pay the judgment debt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the mortgage, which was a legitimate charge against the company's assets.

The Court also held that the respondent, as a contingent creditor, did not have a reasonable expectation that the company would be managed to ensure his debt was paid in priority to others, including tax authorities.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant sued the Crown and the Conservation Authority for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation arising from an aborted land exchange.

The trial judge dismissed the contract claim but found the Conservation Authority liable for negligent misrepresentation, awarding reduced damages due to a failure to mitigate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal on damages and allowed the Conservation Authority's cross-appeal, finding that the appellant had not detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation and that the failure of a related sale transaction was not caused by the misrepresentation.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment regarding the calculation of net family property and equalization.

He challenged the trial judge's findings on the separation date, the inclusion of his truck and trailer, the order to sell the matrimonial home, and the valuation of Nortel shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual determinations and concluding that the sale of the matrimonial home was the only practical way to effect equalization.

The respondent's cross-appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to review his committal for trial on first-degree murder.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge impermissibly weighed evidence regarding specific intent, planning, and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, including poisoning allegations and the appellant's own statements, to support the committal.

The appellant, the sole shareholder of a bankrupt hotel, appealed a vesting order and an order approving the sale of the hotel's assets by a court-appointed receiver.

The appellant argued that the receiver failed to disclose the identity of the principals behind the purchaser, which tainted the sale process.

The purchaser brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was moot because the vesting order had already been registered on title under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal held that once a vesting order is registered on title without a stay, its attributes as a court order are spent and it becomes a conveyance, rendering any appeal from the order moot.

The Court also dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding that the identity of the purchaser's principals was not material to the receiver's sale process.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault carrying a weapon, arguing that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittals on related extortion charges and that the trial judge misapprehended a defence witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not violently at odds because there was confirmatory evidence of the assault, while the extortion charges lacked sufficient proof.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the defence witness's evidence.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment holding them liable for $75,000 on a guarantee, arguing they were no longer bound.

The respondent bank cross-appealed, seeking the full $150,000 amount of the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, finding that a letter signed by the appellants reestablished the full amount of the guarantee at $150,000, leaving no genuine issue for trial.

The appellants, who are police officers, brought a defamation action against the Toronto Star regarding articles about systemic racism and racial profiling by the Toronto Police.

The motions judge struck the claim, finding it plain and obvious that the articles could not reasonably be understood to refer to the appellants as individuals.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that defamation is a personal tort and the articles used general language without identifying any particular officer.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment in favour of the respondent, arguing the trial judge unfairly set aside formal admissions and relied on unpleaded doctrines of frustration and lack of consensus ad idem.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not set aside formal admissions, but rather distinguished between agreeing to purchase shares and actually purchasing them.

While the trial judge erred in referencing the doctrine of frustration, his conclusion was supported by his finding of an implied term governing the respondent's resignation from the partnership before purchasing shares.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached a fiduciary duty to a joint venture corporation.

The appellants managed a real estate development for the joint venture and allowed the property to go into power of sale, subsequently purchasing it for themselves.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that a fiduciary relationship existed and that the appellants breached their duty to avoid conflicts of interest.

The appeal was dismissed and the imposition of a constructive trust was affirmed.

The infant plaintiff allegedly suffered damages as a result of negligent surgery and follow-up treatment in Quebec while the plaintiffs were residents of that province.

The plaintiffs subsequently moved to Ontario and commenced an action in Ontario.

The defendants brought motions to stay the action on the basis that Ontario courts had no jurisdiction or that Ontario was not a convenient forum.

The motions judge granted the motions and stayed the actions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no real and substantial connection between the claim and Ontario, and concluding that Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The appellant mortgagor appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagee possession of a property.

The appellant argued that under the Land Registration Reform Act, the mortgagee was entitled to take possession at any time, meaning the ten-year limitation period commenced when the mortgage was signed rather than upon default.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the mortgagee only has the right of possession after notice and default, and therefore the limitation period begins to run upon default.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the motions judge, arguing that the judge erred in refusing an adjournment and in reaching his legal conclusion.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the exercise of the motions judge's discretion to refuse the adjournment, nor any reason to interfere with the legal conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it, awarding costs of $4,000 to the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order of the motions judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the decision arrived at by the motions judge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,500 plus GST.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding an exclusive supply agreement and awarding damages for its breach.

They argued that the trial judge erred in finding an exclusive supply agreement after concluding there was no consulting agreement, that the pleadings were deficient, and that the arrangement was merely an 'agreement to agree' due to missing terms like price.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the agreements were not so interrelated as to preclude finding a supply agreement, the pleadings were sufficient, and there was an implied term that raw materials would be provided at a reasonable price.

The court also upheld the trial judge's quantification of damages based on a 12-month period and a 15% profit margin.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their negligence action against a pharmacist and pharmacy as statute-barred under the one-year limitation period in s. 89(1) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the respondents failed to plead or provide evidence that the individual pharmacist was a member of the Ontario College of Pharmacists, which is required for the limitation period to apply.

Furthermore, there was a live issue regarding whether the corporate defendant could claim the protection of the limitation period, meaning summary judgment was improperly granted.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was entirely fit in the circumstances.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.