Robert A. Blair

The respondent was convicted of failing to stop at a red light based on evidence from a red light camera system.

At trial, the justice of the peace denied the respondent's request to summon the provincial offences officer who issued the certificate.

The appeal judge allowed the respondent's appeal, holding that such a summons should rarely be refused.

The municipality appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge applied too low a standard for issuing a summons under the Highway Traffic Act; the defence must show a reasonable and legitimate basis for examining the officer.

However, the Court of Appeal entered an acquittal because the photographic evidence was inadmissible, as the required date, time, and location information was superimposed in an unexplained code, failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of the regulation.

The young person appealed their convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of a person under the age of fourteen.

The convictions were based on the complainant's testimony regarding an incident during a sleepover.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in failing to consider the reliability of the complainant's testimony, noting inconsistencies in her statements and her initial belief that another child was the assailant.

The Court concluded the convictions were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning, his rolled-up charge on intent, his dismissal of a Corbett application, and the length of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions, the Corbett ruling, or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge, which was based on the finding that the underlying action had been lying dormant since 1996.

The Court of Appeal reviewed new court material not available to the motions judge, which demonstrated the action was not dormant.

The Court set aside the order in the interests of justice, allowing the respondent to renew its motion with full consideration of the delay.

The appellants appealed the judgment of Justice Spence of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the lower court's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $3,000 plus disbursements.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the respondents initiated the proceedings and no issue requiring a trial.

Costs were fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found the allegations in the statement of claim to be confusing, difficult to follow, and legally untenable, with some relating to the Federal Crown and decades-old criminal dispositions.

Finding no error in the motion judge's reasons, the Court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs of $1,000 to the respondent.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision finding that a dwelling rented to university students was not a lodging house under the municipal by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the premises constituted a 'single housekeeping unit' based on evidence of collective decision-making regarding rent, furnishings, utilities, room assignments, and housekeeping.

The appellant appealed his perjury conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to allow him to re-elect trial by judge and jury after a mistrial.

The appellant claimed a substantial change in the Crown's case justified overriding the Crown's refusal to consent to the late re-election.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no substantial change in the Crown's case and noting the attempted re-election was out of time without a satisfactory explanation.

In an addendum to its earlier reasons dismissing the appellant's appeal and allowing the respondent Conservation Authority's cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal addressed the respondent Crown's cross-appeal regarding trial costs.

The trial judge had declined to award the successful Crown its costs because it failed to communicate its change in position regarding a land exchange, which could have avoided the appellant's damages.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and dismissed the Crown's cross-appeal on costs.

The appellant gold mining company engaged in financial hedging transactions to protect against fluctuations in the spot price of gold.

The Minister of Finance assessed the net gains from these transactions as taxable 'proceeds' under the Mining Tax Act.

The trial judge upheld the assessment, finding a sufficient nexus between the transactions and the mine's output.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'hedging' is clear and unambiguous, requiring the fixing of a price for the actual output of a mine before delivery.

Since the appellant sold all its gold at spot prices and did not deliver any gold pursuant to the hedging contracts, the gains were not taxable under the Act.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of attempted murder and the sentence imposed for a manslaughter conviction arising from a barroom shooting.

The Court of Appeal allowed the acquittal appeal, finding the trial judge erred by leaving self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code to the jury when there was no air of reality to the claim that the intervening bystanders were committing an unlawful assault.

The trial judge also erred by failing to instruct the jury on s. 27, which permits bystanders to use force to prevent an offence.

A new trial was ordered for the attempted murder charge.

The sentence appeals by both the Crown and the accused were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges related to marihuana cultivation.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of a light bulb and fertilizer found in the respondent's possession, reasoning that they lacked a specific connection to the particular operation.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error, as the items were probative of knowledge when considered in context with the respondent's possession of keys to the basement where the marihuana was growing.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The young offender appealed their conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion and that she properly directed herself on the elements of the offence.

As the appeal did not raise a question of law alone, leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant pleaded guilty to his involvement as the central figure in a large-scale marijuana grow operation and was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision to prioritize general deterrence and concluding the sentence was demonstrably fit.

The appellant appealed an order regarding child support adjustments, arguing the application judge erred in finding no material non-disclosure of corporate income, failing to claw back corporate payments to the respondent's current spouse, and failing to average the respondent's income over three years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's findings on disclosure, the reasonableness of the spouse's remuneration, and the parties' agreed-upon mechanism for adjusting support.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, reducing the application judge's substantial indemnity costs award to partial indemnity, as the allegations of non-disclosure did not amount to egregious fraud-like conduct.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, which had dismissed his appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be moot and declined to exercise its discretion to hear it on the merits.

The court noted that the issues raised, including a question regarding a patient resisting appointed counsel, would be better addressed in a case with a live factual matrix.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly resolve important inconsistencies and contradictions in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's demeanour and absence of motive to fabricate instead of resolving the core inconsistencies in her story.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in considering matters relevant to his credibility that did not directly relate to the amount of alcohol consumed.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that evidence may be relevant to credibility even if it does not directly and expressly relate to alcohol consumption.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay the respondent caregiver benefits, compound interest, and to provide an offer for loss of earning capacity benefits (LECB) following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer had terminated caregiver benefits based on a Designated Assessment Centre (DAC) report.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondent remained substantially disabled from performing caregiving tasks and suffered a diminished earning capacity.

The Court also affirmed that the unpaid benefits were 'overdue' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, thereby attracting compound interest.

The appeal was dismissed.