Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a Justice of the Peace, which was previously dismissed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law, necessitating a new trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial but expressed hope that the Crown would not proceed given the nature of the charge and the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.D. principles and adequately explain the reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and had ample evidence to convict.

The Crown appealed the sentence, and while the Court agreed the sentence constituted an error in principle, it declined to set it aside as the sentence had already been fully served.

Both the appeal and cross-appeals were dismissed.

The parties separated after a ten-year traditional marriage.

The separation agreement provided for time-limited spousal support and child support.

The father's income subsequently increased substantially, and the parties' son moved in with the father while the daughter remained with the mother.

The father drafted an amending agreement reducing child support, which the mother signed without financial disclosure or independent legal advice.

The mother later applied to vary spousal and child support, seeking retroactive increases.

The trial judge increased support but declined to make it retroactive to the date the father's income increased.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, increasing the quantum of spousal support to reflect the mother's economic disadvantage and making the child support increase retroactive due to the father's financial non-disclosure and blameworthy conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

He argued he had already been acquitted of the offence and that the trial judge erred in finding he had care or control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second.

The Court held that the trial judge's conclusion that opening a passenger door to deposit a bag constituted a risk of danger was unreasonable, as there was no indication the appellant intended to resume driving.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong test and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the evidence of impairment, including the appellant's high rate of speed, abrupt stop, and slurred speech, and that the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault by a jury, arguing the verdict was compromised because the jury was not informed of sequestration until five hours into deliberations, and because they returned mixed verdicts on related charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility of coercion from the delayed sequestration notice and concluding the verdicts were not irreconcilable.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction on the burden of proof.

The plaintiff pedestrian was injured by a motor vehicle driven without the owner's consent.

She sought a declaration of entitlement to uninsured automobile coverage under the owner's insurance policy.

The insurer argued the claim should be directed to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund due to a policy exclusion for vehicles operated without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in finding the Insurance Act provided a complete code.

The policy's exclusion clause validly excluded coverage for the plaintiff, leaving her to resort to the Fund.

The respondents sued the City of Mississauga for damages and declaratory relief, arguing that the City's by-law regulating portable signs expired under the sunset provisions of the Savings and Restructuring Act, 1996.

The City argued that the regulatory portion of the by-law remained in effect despite the expiration of the licensing portion.

The motion judge declared that the by-law as a whole was a business licensing by-law and had expired.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the by-law was a comprehensive scheme for licensing businesses and regulating signs, and therefore expired in its entirety.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial was unfair because their counsel was discharged mid-trial, a mistrial was not declared, and the trial judge relied on the appellant's conduct in court outside the witness box to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to justify the removal of counsel, no error in proceeding after a two-week adjournment for the appellant to prepare to represent himself, and sufficient additional basis for the trial judge's credibility findings.

The respondents failed to pay property taxes on their family farm, leading the appellant township to initiate a tax sale under the Municipal Tax Sales Act.

After tenders were opened but before the tax deed was registered, the respondents offered to pay the full cancellation price.

The municipal treasurer refused, believing she had no discretion to cancel the sale once tenders were opened.

The application judge cancelled the tax sale, finding the treasurer failed to exercise her discretion under s. 12(6) of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that a municipal treasurer retains the discretion to cancel a tax sale at any time up to the registration of the tax deed.

The appellants appealed a decision granting the respondents relief from forfeiture and cancelling a municipal tax sale of their farm.

The respondents had failed to pay property taxes, and the township initiated a tax sale.

After tenders were opened but before the sale was finalized, the respondents offered to pay the full cancellation price.

The municipal treasurer refused, believing she had no discretion to cancel the sale once tenders were opened.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under subsection 12(6) of the Municipal Tax Sales Act, the treasurer retains the discretion to cancel a tax sale at any time up to the registration of the tax deed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a nine-year-old complainant.

He argued that the trial judge erred in permitting the complainant to testify under oath, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the evidence did not support a conviction under section 152 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's inquiry into the complainant's understanding of an oath, as no objections were raised at trial.

The court also held that the verdict was reasonable and that section 152, interpreted purposively, encompasses a request by an accused to permit him to touch a complainant's private parts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge's decision relied heavily on credibility assessments, ultimately rejecting the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

In doing so, the trial judge misapprehended a crucial piece of the appellant's testimony regarding the complainant's emotional state.

The Court of Appeal applied the test from R. v. Morrissey, finding that the misapprehended evidence played an essential part in the trial judge's reasoning process and adverse credibility finding.

Consequently, the conviction was not based exclusively on the evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the appeal regarding the proceeds of trafficking should be allowed, and an acquittal was entered on that count.

On the remaining counts, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing police identification evidence, including a 'drive-by' identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in law, did not give improper weight to the police officers' evidence, and properly relied on substantial corroborating evidence.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to decide a certiorari application regarding an interlocutory order for severance made by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that certiorari should not substitute for the lack of a statutory appeal from an interlocutory order.

The Court also found the anticipatory Charter breach claim premature, noting the trial judge is best positioned to decide severance.

The appellant appealed from a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision upholding his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the SCAJ's decision regarding conviction, as the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's evidence and gave adequate reasons.

On sentence, the Crown conceded the SCAJ erred in imposing a $2,000 fine alongside custody and probation, and in imposing a DNA order when the Crown had not appealed the trial judge's refusal to make one.

The fine and DNA order were struck, but the 100-hour community service order was upheld.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal as to sentence was allowed in part.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision on an interlocutory application in a criminal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no provision in the Criminal Code that permits appellate review of such a decision.

The appellant, a freelance author, wrote articles published in The Globe and Mail.

The newspaper subsequently placed these articles in electronic databases (Info Globe Online, CPI.Q, and CD-ROM).

The appellant sued for copyright infringement.

The Court of Appeal held that the databases did not constitute a 'newspaper or similar periodical' and did not reproduce a substantial part of the newspaper's collective work.

The court also found that the oral licence granted by the appellant did not convey a proprietary interest and thus did not need to be in writing.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown failed to explicitly establish that the police officer who administered the breath test was a qualified technician.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to infer the officer's designation from her testimony, her official capacity, and the certificate she produced, which created a rebuttable presumption that was not challenged.

The respondent was convicted of failing to stop at a red light based on evidence from a red light camera system.

The justice of the peace refused the respondent's request to subpoena the provincial offences officer who issued the ticket.

On appeal, the judge ordered a new trial, holding that such requests should generally be granted.

The municipality appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge applied too liberal a standard; the defence must establish a reasonable and legitimate ground to question the officer.

However, the Court found the photographic evidence inadmissible because the required date, time, and location information was in an unexplained code, failing to comply with the regulation.

The appeal was allowed, but an acquittal was entered.