Richard Horodyski

The appellant judgment creditor attempted to enforce a judgment through a sheriff's sale of the debtor's home.

The sheriff required mortgage discharge statements, which the respondent mortgagees refused to provide citing privacy concerns.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) prohibited the disclosure of the mortgage statements without the debtor's consent, as they constituted personal information and no statutory exemption applied.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting possession of their property to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding corroborating evidence and equitable estoppel, and upheld the motion judge's reasons.

The appellants held mortgages on a property that was destroyed by fire after being vacated by the owners.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claims under the standard mortgage clause, arguing that the vacancy was a material change to the risk under Statutory Condition 4 of which it was not notified.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Statutory Condition 4 conflicts with the standard mortgage clause, which explicitly preserves coverage despite any act or neglect of the mortgagor, including vacancy.

The appeal was allowed, and the insurer was precluded from relying on the statutory condition to void the mortgagees' coverage.

The appellant, a mortgagee in possession, sought to terminate a fixed-term residential lease on 60 days' notice pursuant to section 53(4) of the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Divisional Court's finding that section 51(2) of the Tenant Protection Act, which requires termination at the end of the fixed term, is paramount due to the primacy clause in section 2(4) of the Tenant Protection Act.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagees coverage under a fire insurance policy after the mortgaged property was destroyed by fire.

The mortgagors had vacated the property, and the mortgagees took control of it but failed to notify the insurer of the vacancy.

The Court of Appeal held that while the vacancy exclusion did not apply to the mortgagees due to the mortgage clause, Statutory Condition 4 did apply.

The mortgagees' actions in taking control of the vacant property constituted a material change in risk within their control and knowledge.

Their failure to notify the insurer voided the policy.

The appeal was allowed and the actions dismissed.

The appeal arose from a trial judgment rescinding an agreement of purchase and sale for vacant land marketed as a residential building lot when the vendors knew that obtaining a building permit was uncertain at best.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the purchasers reasonably relied on misrepresentations that the property was a building lot and that obtaining a permit would not be a problem.

The court rejected the argument that the statements concerned only a future event, holding that the representation related to an existing fact about the nature of the property.

Leave to appeal costs was granted on the cross-appeal, but the costs appeal was dismissed and the trial costs award on a party-and-party basis was left undisturbed.