Robert A. Blair

In the context of Air Canada's CCAA restructuring, the appellant sought leave to appeal an order approving an equity investment agreement with Trinity Time Investments Limited and denying an adjournment to consider a competing proposal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no error in the supervising judge's decision to approve the agreement, which contained a 'fiduciary out' clause allowing the board to consider superior proposals.

The court held that the test for leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings—requiring serious and arguable grounds of real and significant interest—was not met.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision which found that minutes of settlement did not contain all essential terms to constitute an enforceable agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the essential terms of the easement and licensing agreements were set out in the minutes.

The dispute over a $2,000 cost for committee of adjustment approval did not justify resiling from the agreement, as the respondents were obligated to assume this cost, or alternatively, it was a minor matter that could be resolved by a judge.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was granted in accordance with the minutes of settlement.

The appellants sold a book of business and list of customers to the respondent under a share purchase agreement that included a non-competition agreement.

The trial judge found that the non-competition agreement precluded the appellant from doing business with former customers for four years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that despite some ambiguity, the commercial sense of the transaction supported this interpretation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his reprisal complaint against his employer, the TTC.

The Board had consolidated the hearing of the applicant's reprisal complaint with a motion brought by the TTC to state a case for contempt against the applicant.

The Divisional Court held that consolidating the two proceedings violated the principles of fundamental justice and procedural fairness, as it forced the applicant to defend against quasi-criminal contempt allegations while pursuing his reprisal claim, leading to adverse inferences when he chose not to testify.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter remitted to a differently-constituted panel.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Town Council resolution that required a property owner's consent as a pre-condition to any heritage designation under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The applicants, a group of parishioners, had requested the designation of a local church to prevent its demolition by the Diocese.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Town's resolution was patently unreasonable.

By imposing a condition not found in the Act, the Town fettered its own discretion and aborted the statutory decision-making process.

The applicants sought judicial review of a municipal council's decision refusing to designate a historic francophone church under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The council had passed a resolution requiring the property owner's consent before considering any heritage designation.

The Divisional Court held that imposing such a condition was manifestly unreasonable and contrary to the purpose of the Act, which contemplates balancing public and private interests and does not make owner consent a prerequisite.

The application for judicial review was granted and the matter remitted to the council for reconsideration.

The mortgagees brought a motion to quash the mortgagor's appeal of an order fixing the amount required to redeem the mortgage.

The Divisional Court held that the underlying order was interlocutory, as it determined a procedural question rather than the substantive merits of the action.

Because the mortgagor had not obtained leave to appeal the interlocutory order as required by section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal was quashed.

The court granted the mortgagor a brief extension to move for leave to appeal.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's reduction of a fine imposed on the respondent for insider trading.

The respondent had traded shares of a junior mining company while possessing undisclosed material facts, avoiding significant losses.

The Court of Appeal held that the phrase 'by reason of the contravention' in s. 122(4) of the Securities Act does not require the Crown to prove the direct effect of the non-disclosure on the market price, but simply means the loss was avoided by virtue of the insider engaging in the impugned trading.

The Court also held that shares not beneficially owned by the respondent should not be included in the loss avoided calculation.

Despite correcting the legal interpretation, the Court upheld the $2,000,000 fine imposed by the appeal judge.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found him guilty of professional misconduct and revoked his certificate of registration.

The charges related to his conduct during a patient's unsuccessful resuscitation, his use of heavy sedation for nerve blocks, and his prescription of high-dose opioids for chronic pain patients.

The Divisional Court upheld the Committee's findings regarding the resuscitation and the use of sedation, finding them reasonable based on the evidence.

However, the Court set aside the findings related to opioid prescriptions and a toxic dose of Marcaine, concluding the Committee ignored crucial defence expert testimony and relied on a charting error.

The penalty of revocation was set aside as excessive and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted Committee.

The moving party sought to set aside an order of a single judge refusing leave to appeal a substantial costs award made by the Ontario Municipal Board.

The moving party argued that the costs award penalized them for exercising their right to a hearing de novo.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the single judge did not decline jurisdiction or apply a wrong principle in refusing leave to appeal, but rather considered the argument on its merits and rejected it.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder based entirely on circumstantial evidence, including hair comparison, DNA, identification, and after-the-fact conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting prejudicial hair comparison evidence and in instructing the jury on identification and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting type 2 hair comparison evidence without confirming DNA, failing to properly instruct the jury on the limitations of the hair evidence, improperly leaving worthless identification evidence to the jury, and erroneously instructing the jury that they could infer guilt from a concocted alibi and ambiguous after-the-fact conduct.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, Earthroots Coalition, sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to permit the improvement and use of a logging road crossing the Bob Lake Conservation Reserve.

The applicant argued the road use violated the Conservation Reserve Regulation, which prohibits commercial forest harvest and industrial uses in the reserve.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Divisional Court dismissed the application.

The court held that the regulation must be interpreted purposively within the broader legislative framework of the Public Lands Act and the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, making the Minister's decision to balance conservation with forest management objectives reasonable.

The appellant physician was convicted of sexually abusing a patient by the Discipline Committee.

At the hearing, the appellant sought production of the treating psychologist's notes, which were illegible.

The Panel dismissed the motion, stating it lacked jurisdiction and that the first stage of the O'Connor test was not met, but provided no further reasons.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Panel breached the duty of fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons for its decision, which was both incorrect on jurisdiction and inexplicable on the O'Connor test.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant investors appealed an order disqualifying their counsel and his merged law firm from continuing to represent them in a complex litigation against the respondent promoters.

The disqualification arose after the investors' law firm merged with another firm that had previously acted for the promoters in preparing the offering memorandum at the heart of the dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the merged firm failed to implement an ethical wall at the time the merger became effective, creating an irreconcilable conflict of interest and a risk of sharing confidential information.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for historical sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider inconsistencies and emphatic denials in the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, intelligible, and responsive to the issues raised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting that conditional sentences are rarely appropriate for the sexual violation of a vulnerable person by an adult in a position of trust.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary child support and rescind over $20,000 in arrears.

He argued that his income had severely diminished due to depression and that the motions judge erred in imputing an annual income of $40,000 based on his past work in family businesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to meet his onus of establishing a material change in circumstances.

The majority held that the motions judge was entitled to conclude that his income was difficult to discern and that a trial of an issue was not required.

The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sought judicial review of a decision by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Commissioner had ordered the Ministry to confirm or deny the existence of records relating to a settlement with an individual, interpreting s. 21(5) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as requiring a two-part test.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation was unreasonable and clearly wrong, as the plain language of s. 21(5) does not require the institution to prove that disclosing the mere existence of the record would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for trial on a sexual offence, arguing the committal was arbitrary and lacked evidence of the complainant's absence of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own statements provided ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the complainant was not consenting and could not consent to the sexual activity.

The appellant appealed his 38-month sentence for break and enter, arguing disparity with his co-accused's 23-month sentence, improper discounting of his guilty plea, and disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity justified by the appellant's worse record and additional charges.

The court also held the trial judge properly considered the timing of the guilty plea and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess stolen motor vehicles and four counts of possession of stolen motor vehicles.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the inference available from recent possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly conflated the issues of possession and guilty knowledge, and mischaracterized the defence's position by suggesting the appellant had offered an explanation for possession when he had denied possession entirely.

The appeal was allowed, the substantive possession and conspiracy convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.