Robert A. Blair

The appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle she co-owned with her father.

At the time of the accident, the vehicle was uninsured and the appellant was driving without her father's consent.

The trial judge found that both were owners under the Highway Traffic Act, but that the father and his insurer were not liable because the appellant drove without his consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 192(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, a co-owner in possession of the vehicle does not need the consent of the other co-owner for both to be held vicariously liable.

The appellants were convicted of second-degree murder and manslaughter in a gang-related shooting.

At trial, the francophone co-accused requested trials in different official languages, leading the trial judge to conduct a bilingual trial.

The trial judge also admitted out-of-court statements made by the deceased victim before his death under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the bilingual trial was permissible under the Criminal Code and did not violate the appellants' language rights.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's statements by improperly relying on extrinsic evidence and mere consistencies to establish threshold reliability.

The Court also found a significant error in the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt and the absence of evidence (the 'Miller' error).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and the sentence imposed.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because there was no evidence the complainant feared for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the complainant feared for her safety.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission for a global sentence of six months custody.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of the joint submission, noting the appellant's persistent behaviour and related criminal record made the joint submission contrary to the public interest.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

During a CCAA restructuring of Stelco Inc., the board of directors appointed two new directors who were associated with major shareholders.

Employee stakeholders, fearing the new directors would favour shareholder interests over employee interests in the restructuring, successfully applied to the supervising judge to have the directors removed based on a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, holding that the supervising judge lacked inherent jurisdiction or statutory authority under section 11 of the CCAA to remove duly appointed directors.

The Court further held that the administrative law concept of reasonable apprehension of bias does not apply to corporate directors, whose conduct is governed by fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule.

The appellants were committed to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They applied for certiorari to quash the committals, arguing a denial of natural justice because they were not permitted to make submissions on post-offence conduct evidence.

The reviewing judge found a denial of natural justice but dismissed the application, concluding the appellants suffered no prejudice as committal was inevitable.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that a reviewing judge has inherent jurisdiction to refuse certiorari where no prejudice occurs, and found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to support the committals.

The Liquidator of Shoppers Trust Corporation applied for directions regarding the distribution of unanticipated surplus funds of approximately $6 million.

The motion judge ruled that a previous order fixing an earlier interest calculation date precluded creditors from claiming interest up to the winding-up date, thereby allowing the surplus to be paid to a subordinated noteholder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in treating the motion for directions as a motion to vary and in failing to apply the fundamental insolvency principle of pari passu distribution.

The Court held that creditors are entitled to prove their claims for principal and interest to the date of the winding-up in priority to subordinated noteholders.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for constructive dismissal and finding him liable for competing with his former employer using confidential information.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's transfer to a new position did not constitute a material change or constructive dismissal.

The Court also upheld the finding of liability for breach of duty regarding confidential information.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The young offender appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on forensic evidence, opportunity, and prior discreditable conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give an alibi instruction and in her treatment of evidence regarding a prior threat to kill the victim.

The Court of Appeal held that an alibi instruction was not required as the evidence did not provide a complete alibi.

While the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the prior threat evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the circumstantial case against the appellant was overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence for sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence for a reasonable trier to convict in what was primarily a credibility case.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the sentencing judge erred in attributing the complainant's weight gain to the sexual exploitation without new evidence, but ultimately concluded the sentence imposed was fit and appropriate.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a nursing home manager, was convicted of assaulting elderly residents.

Two of the complainants died before trial, and the trial judge admitted their videotaped statements to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying on striking similarities between their statements and those of other residents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals.

The majority held that under the Supreme Court's decision in Starr, corroborative evidence from other complainants regarding different events cannot be used to establish threshold reliability when the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding an oppression motion and a bank's application.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to address the issues and arguments he was required to decide, including the factors regarding the oppression remedy and whether the bank had valid security in priority to a judgment creditor claim.

The order was set aside and the issues were returned to the Commercial List for determination.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 12-month sentence for breach of probation.

The probation order required him to complete a seven-month residential treatment program.

He checked into the facility on the day of sentencing but left the next day and never returned.

The appellant argued he had the entire 18-month probation period to complete the program.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably interpreted the condition as requiring immediate commencement, consistent with the joint submission at sentencing.

The 12-month sentence was upheld due to the appellant's history of disregarding court orders.

The appellants, a stockbroker and two brokerage firms, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligence and breach of contract resulting in the respondents' investment losses.

The trial judge found the broker engaged in unauthorized trading and the firms failed to supervise him or warn the clients.

The respondents cross-appealed the dismissal of their claims for loss of opportunity and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on liability, apportionment, mitigation, and costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against a discount brokerage firm for damages based on misrepresentation and negligence.

The appellant suffered significant losses after purchasing shares on margin and facing margin calls when the share value dropped.

He argued the respondent breached a duty to warn him about the risks of margin accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the respondent satisfied its duty to warn through the various documents provided to the appellant before he purchased the shares.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action in Ontario against McDonald's and Simon Marketing Inc. alleging wrongdoing in relation to promotional contests.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action on the basis that the claims had been finally disposed of in an Illinois class action settlement.

The motion judge refused to stay or dismiss the action, finding that the notice given to the Canadian members of the plaintiff class in the Illinois action was so inadequate as to violate the rules of natural justice.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that before enforcing a foreign class action judgment against Ontario residents, the court must ensure the foreign court had a proper basis for jurisdiction and that the interests of Ontario residents were adequately protected.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding that the notice given to the non-resident class members was inadequate, and therefore the Ontario courts should not recognize and enforce the Illinois judgment against the plaintiff and the non-attorning Canadian class members.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for surrender to the United States on charges of conspiracy, credit card fraud, and money laundering.

He argued the extradition judge erred by committing him for the general offence of fraud rather than specifying separate offences for each alleged instance, and that there was insufficient evidence for some instances and for the money laundering charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Authority to Proceed complied with the Extradition Act, the judge's findings were clear, and there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for both the fraud and money laundering offences.

The appellant was convicted of driving over 80 after registering breathalyzer readings of 229 and 235.

At trial, the defence adduced a toxicologist's report estimating the appellant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the offence was between 0 and 95 milligrams, depending on his elimination rate.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court rejected this as evidence to the contrary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the amended s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, evidence must show the blood alcohol level was below the legal limit, and evidence that merely straddles the limit is insufficient to rebut the presumption of identity.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment which found that an agreement between the parties was conditional on the respondents receiving funding from another project.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the release was not an acknowledgment of debt, but rather an agreement to pay a ceiling amount to limit liability if future funding was received.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding a mortgage dispute involving s. 22 and s. 36 of the Mortgages Act and a tax issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's comprehensive reasons and findings of fact were open to him and there was no basis to interfere.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence against her former solicitor.

The solicitor had acted for the appellant on a mortgage transaction while also acting for the borrowers on a related commercial loan.

The trial judge found that the solicitor's retainer was limited to the mortgage transaction, that he had warned the appellant about the risks of the wider loan, and that the appellant had rebuffed his concerns.

The Court of Appeal found no overriding and palpable error in the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.