Robert A. Blair

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a prolonged campaign of extreme intimate-partner violence and intimidation, arguing that the Crown improperly re-litigated facts underlying a prior acquittal and that courtroom security measures for a protected witness created unfair prejudice.

The court held that the fraud exception to issue estoppel applied because the earlier acquittal had been procured through threats and intimidation causing false testimony, and it rejected the mistrial ground after finding the judge's instruction cured any prejudice from the security presence.

On sentence, the court upheld the denunciatory basis for an order under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code but varied the parole ineligibility period because only Schedule I or II offences under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act could be used in the calculation.

The respondent dentist sued his former lawyer for deceit and breach of a barter arrangement after the lawyer falsely claimed for years that the dentist's actions were proceeding to trial.

The trial judge awarded $20,000 for deceit due to office disruption and $15,467.65 for unpaid dental services under the barter arrangement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the deceit damages, finding no evidence of actual financial loss, but upheld the damages for the barter arrangement.

Trial costs on a substantial indemnity basis were reduced from $55,000 to $40,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him personally liable to the respondent bank for conversion of funds.

The bank's cross-claim had been pleaded solely in conspiracy to defraud, which the trial judge dismissed.

However, the trial judge found the appellant liable on the unpleaded grounds of conversion and piercing the corporate veil, based on a presumptive indirect benefit as a shareholder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it is fundamental to the litigation process that lawsuits be decided within the boundaries of the pleadings.

The Court also noted that piercing the corporate veil requires evidence of improper conduct akin to fraud or deceit, which was absent here.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was wholly inadequate.

At the sentencing hearing, there were critical factual disputes regarding the respondent's intoxication and whether she acted in self-defence, but neither counsel requested a Gardiner hearing to resolve them.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's version of events, including that her capacity was seriously compromised and she acted in self-defence using excessive force.

The Court of Appeal held that in these highly unusual circumstances, the sentence, while at the extreme low end of the range, was not wholly inadequate and did not reflect an error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably concluded the complainant's evidence was confirmed by another witness in critical respects, and that variations in testimony were collateral or explained by intoxication.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of a serious inconsistency in the appellant's evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning regarding the Crown's principal witness was inadequate.

The witness, who had a criminal record and received conditional immunity, testified that the appellant shot the deceased.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions properly identified the witness as requiring special scrutiny, highlighted the characteristics bringing his evidence into question, cautioned the jury about relying on his unconfirmed evidence, and appropriately addressed confirmatory evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a mental health centre.

The Board found he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to a substance abuse problem that rendered him aggressive and violent.

The Court of Appeal found no errors of law and held the Board's decision was reasonable.

The appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed, as the evidence pertained to his pending annual review and did not show the Board erred in its original decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that had overturned his acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in concluding the trial judge improperly treated the arresting officer's notes as evidence or required them to confirm oral testimony.

The trial judge properly used the absence of an important fact in the notes regarding the origin of the odour of alcohol to assess the officer's credibility.

The trial judge's finding of reasonable doubt regarding the officer's reasonable suspicion was restored.

The appellant appealed a condition of his probation order.

The Crown conceded that condition r(8) of the probation order was not a reasonable condition.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and deleted the condition.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding an impaired driving charge.

At trial, the defence expressly conceded there were no Charter issues and did not object to the admissibility of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant attempted to argue that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, affecting the presumption in s. 258(1)(c).

The Court of Appeal held that this Charter argument was not open to the defence given their position at trial, and the non-Charter argument was answered by the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Rilling.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of inconsistent verdicts.

He had admitted participation in all charged offences but relied on the defences of duress and necessity, which applied equally to all crimes as part of a single transaction.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury must have reached an unjustifiable compromise, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after his common-law wife drowned when his truck went into a river.

The Crown alleged he staged the accident to collect life insurance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on his out-of-court statements, reasonable doubt, after-the-fact conduct, and the admission of photographs from an unrelated accident.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge committed reversible error by characterizing the appellant's exculpatory statements as 'excuses' that carried less weight than 'admissions', thereby reversing the burden of proof and denigrating the defence of accident.

The trial judge also erred in his instructions regarding the appellant's failure to contact the police.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to call his wife as an alibi witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that trial counsel had reasonable grounds for not calling the witness and that the appellant failed to establish prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence of two years less a day was within the appropriate range for the calculated and cold-blooded offence.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned, noting that even if it had not been abandoned, it would have been quashed because an appeal of an interlocutory order lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The primary insurer defended an action arising from a motor vehicle accident and sought equitable contribution for defence costs from the excess insurer.

The excess insurer was not notified of the claim until four and a half years after the accident and was not plainly at risk until shortly before trial.

The application judge ordered the excess insurer to pay a proportionate share of the defence costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that an excess insurer's obligation to contribute to defence costs is premised on the existence of a duty to defend, which only arises upon notice of a claim.

Given the late notice and the fact that the excess insurer did not sit back and benefit from the primary insurer's work, it was not fair or equitable to require contribution.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The appellant, an Estate Trustee, appealed an order finding him in contempt of court for filing his materials to pass accounts two weeks late.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt order, finding that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to address the criminal burden of proof and ignoring evidence of the appellant's efforts to comply.

The Court reiterated that contempt powers should be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the conduct is wilful, deliberate, and contumacious beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellants defaulted on a mortgage held by the respondent, who subsequently attorned rents, took possession of the property, and sold it under a power of sale.

The respondent sued for the deficiency, while the appellants counterclaimed for damages, alleging improper procedures and mismanagement.

The trial judge dismissed the deficiency claim and awarded the appellants reduced damages.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the respondent's right to take possession and sell the property but found the trial judge erred in valuing the property based on an internal memorandum and failed to properly assess whether the respondent breached its duties as a mortgagee in possession.

The matter was remitted for a new trial on the issues of mismanagement, valuation, and the deficiency claim.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced to eight years in prison.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misapplied the Carter analysis for co-conspirator hearsay by assessing his credibility at the second step and failing to scrutinize the reliability of the hearsay evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding ample direct evidence of the appellant's participation in the conspiracy, no error in the trial judge's application of the Carter framework, and that the eight-year sentence was fit given the appellant's active role and personal circumstances.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed its application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of certain records requested by a former client of the Children's Lawyer.

On judicial review, the Commissioner defended her decision on a new ground, arguing the Children's Lawyer was not acting as Crown counsel.

The Children's Lawyer challenged the Commissioner's standing to raise this new argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court properly exercised its discretion under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to grant the Commissioner full standing to ensure a fully informed adjudication.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment, finding that there were significant contested issues of fact regarding compliance with a Separation Agreement, waiver, and fundamental breach.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge.