Robert A. Blair

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of section 8 of the Charter and excluding evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge had excised misleading information from the Information to Obtain (ITO) and concluded the remaining facts could not support the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that even after removing the misstatements, there remained sufficient reliable evidence connecting the respondents and the searched premises to the robbery to justify issuing the warrant.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out their statement of claim against the Law Society of Upper Canada under Rule 21.

The appellants alleged the Law Society was liable in negligence for failing to take appropriate action against lawyers who acted for other parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim was precluded by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada due to a lack of proximity between the appellants and the Law Society.

The moving parties, officers and directors of the Gandi Group, sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order in CCAA proceedings.

The motion judge had limited their indemnity claims to specific corporate entities, subordinated one claim to a major creditor, and characterized the indemnity claims as 'equity claims' under the CCAA, thereby subordinating them to unsecured creditors.

The Court of Appeal applied the Stelco test and denied leave to appeal, finding the issues were either factual, not of significance to the practice, or lacked prima facie merit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marihuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient grounds for the search warrant of his residence and that his section 8 Charter rights were violated because a Quebec search warrant was endorsed in Ontario without the proper record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the endorsing justice had sufficient information to carry out her statutory duty and that there was ample evidence in the Information to Obtain to link the appellant's drug activities to his residence.

The appellant appealed a bankruptcy court judge's refusal to annul his bankruptcy or stay it pending the outcome of his damages action against the Canada Revenue Agency in the Federal Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the bankruptcy judge.

The Court noted that the CRA exercised its statutory right to vote down the appellant's proposal, and the Federal Court action would not affect the legal validity of the bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision granting certiorari to quash a committal for trial for manslaughter and committing him for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing evidence and preferring inferences favourable to the accused.

However, the Court found the application judge erred by directly committing the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a mandamus order was issued remitting the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge to commit the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

The appellant parent appealed an order dismissing his appeal to the Superior Court from a decision granting the Children's Aid Society permanent wardship of his two children.

The Superior Court had dismissed the appeal for delay because the appellant failed to perfect the appeal by obtaining transcripts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the paramount concern for the children's need for stability and permanency.

The Court also found the appeal had virtually no prospect of success, as the trial judge's findings of inadequate parenting skills were fatal and there was no evidence of bias or inadequate assistance of counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the verdicts were unreasonable, that the trial judge erred in allowing cross-examination regarding another file involving abuse allegations, and that he suffered prejudice because the complainant's doctor did not testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were reasonable and well-founded, the trial judge properly assessed credibility, the cross-examination issue was first raised by the defence and not relied upon by the trial judge, and the defence had waived the need for the doctor's testimony.

The respondent employee was laid off for a cumulative duration of 35 weeks within a 52-week period.

Upon reaching this statutory maximum under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, the employee brought a claim for common law damages for wrongful dismissal.

The employer appealed the trial judge's award of damages, arguing that the ESA and common law operate independently and that a statutory termination does not constitute a common law dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a statutory termination under s. 56(1) of the ESA is a termination for all purposes, displacing the common law and entitling the employee to claim common law wrongful dismissal damages.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and failing to stop for police.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a sentence of 10 months less time in custody.

The sentencing judge purported to accept the joint submission but refused to credit the appellant's 84 days of pre-sentence custody, effectively imposing a longer sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred by rejecting the joint submission without finding that it was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 84 days.

The appellants were committed for trial on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They applied for certiorari to quash the committal, which was dismissed by the Superior Court of Justice.

On appeal, the appellants argued there was insufficient evidence of an agreement to murder the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary hearing judge properly concluded there was some evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the appellants agreed and intended to murder the victim.

The appellant failed to appear for his appeal and provided no documentation to support his claim of illness.

Duty counsel had no contact with the appellant.

As the appellant failed to take any steps to move the appeal forward despite case management directions, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on a charge equivalent to conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

He argued that the evidence only demonstrated an attempt to enter into a conspiracy and that the extradition judge improperly relied on expert evidence to find an agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that wiretap evidence and the appellant's subsequent arrest for importing cocaine supported an inference of an ongoing agreement, and that the expert evidence was properly used to interpret coded conversations.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on a charge of murder, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with community living privileges.

He sought a conditional discharge and travel privileges to India.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's ongoing threat to public safety, the risk of relapse, and concerns regarding medication compliance while travelling.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a police officer charged with breach of trust for allegedly providing confidential police documents to a criminal organization.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused, finding a reasonable doubt based on the accused's explanations for his cellphone contact with a gang member's spouse and the possibility of third-party theft of the documents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by assessing the evidence in a piecemeal fashion rather than considering the totality of the evidence, and by failing to account for key evidence that undermined the defence's theory.

The respondent was charged with speeding and sought a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter on the day of trial.

The justice of the peace refused to hear the motion because the respondent had not served notice on the Attorney General of Ontario.

On appeal, the provincial offences appeal court held that notice was not required because the prosecution was conducted by a municipality, and granted the stay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the term 'Government of Ontario' in s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act includes municipalities, and therefore notice to the Attorney General of Ontario is required when seeking a Charter remedy in a Provincial Offences Act prosecution.

The appellants, guarantors of a corporate debt, appealed a summary judgment enforcing their guarantee and dismissing their counterclaim for conspiracy.

The debt and guarantee had been assigned to the respondents, who sued for the shortfall after the debtor's assets were sold in insolvency proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the guarantee permitted assignment without consent and there was no evidence to support the appellants' claim that the assets were sold below fair market value due to a conspiracy.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved substantial but not total success, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellants did not seek costs, and the court determined the respondents were not entitled to costs.

Consequently, the court made no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for relief from forfeiture regarding two commercial leases.

They argued the application judge erred by not considering that relief is generally granted for monetary arrears and whether the default could be cured.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting relief from forfeiture is a discretionary remedy and an exception.

The application judge properly considered the appellants' delay in proceeding and their failure to pay rent, which amounted to seven months' arrears, despite the landlord's offer to accept payment without prejudice.

The City of Guelph appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed a property standards repair order regarding a deteriorated backyard swimming pool and ordered the City to share repair costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a backyard swimming pool is not a 'dwelling' under the Municipal Act, meaning City officials did not require a warrant to enter the property.

The Court also held that the appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to order cost-sharing and erred in finding a reasonable apprehension of bias against the municipal official who issued the repair order.

The original repair order was restored.