Sandra Louise McNeely

The appellant law firm appealed an order dismissing its motion to set aside a requisition obtained by the respondent client under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act for the assessment of legal accounts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the accounts were interim and the requisition was properly made within one month of the delivery of the final account.

The court also upheld the motions judge's exercise of inherent jurisdiction to permit the assessment and his refusal to order security for costs.

Application concerning entitlement to proceeds of a life insurance policy where the insured had first designated a sibling as revocable beneficiary and later designated a spouse and child in a will.

The will was subsequently revoked by operation of law upon the insured’s later marriage.

The court held that the beneficiary designation contained in the will constituted a “declaration” under the Insurance Act that revoked the earlier designation.

When the will was later revoked by marriage, the revocation did not revive the earlier beneficiary designation, leaving no valid beneficiary designation in effect.

Accordingly, the proceeds of the life insurance policy were payable to the estate.

The appellant, a retail tenant, appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claim against its landlord for failing to provide additional parking spaces.

The trial judge found a breach but concluded the appellant failed to prove the breach caused a loss, as expert evidence showed vacant spaces were available during peak periods.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the trial costs order, finding the trial judge erred in using non-Rule 49 offers to offset time spent on an unsuccessful defence.

The Court awarded the respondents $200,000 in trial costs and $30,000 in appeal costs.

The appellants, guarantors of a corporate debt, appealed a summary judgment enforcing their guarantee and dismissing their counterclaim for conspiracy.

The debt and guarantee had been assigned to the respondents, who sued for the shortfall after the debtor's assets were sold in insolvency proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the guarantee permitted assignment without consent and there was no evidence to support the appellants' claim that the assets were sold below fair market value due to a conspiracy.

Two tenants of a shopping plaza appealed the dismissal of their applications regarding parking covenants in their respective commercial leases.

Good Life Corporation argued its lease guaranteed unlimited access to all parking spaces and prohibited the landlord from granting exclusive spaces to other tenants.

Royal LePage argued its lease entitled it to 30 exclusive parking spaces.

The Court of Appeal held that Good Life's lease only guaranteed general access to the parking lot, but prohibited the landlord from reducing the number of available spaces by granting additional reserved spaces to other tenants after the lease commenced.

The Court also held that Royal LePage was only entitled to 6 reserved spaces, not 30.

Both appeals were allowed in part to issue declarations clarifying these rights.

The plaintiff applied for leave to appeal a decision setting aside a default judgment and a vesting order.

The plaintiff argued there was a denial of procedural fairness because the motion judge did not hear oral argument on setting aside the default judgment, and that the decision conflicted with established case law regarding vesting orders under the Land Titles Act.

The Divisional Court denied leave, finding no breach of fundamental fairness given the full written arguments submitted, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, and no conflicting decision as the plaintiff was not an innocent third party.