Scott Worsfold

The applicant sought a declaration that four of his properties, rented to groups of university students, were not being used as 'Lodging House Type 1' under the municipality's zoning by-law.

The municipality argued that because the properties were rented to five or more individuals sharing kitchen and bathroom facilities, they constituted lodging houses.

The court found that the properties functioned as single housekeeping units rented to cohesive groups under single leases, rather than individual lodging units.

The court granted the declaration and further ordered the municipality to remove unsubstantiated references to the properties as 'Possible Lodging Houses' from its public website, criticizing the municipality's use of the website to pressure landowners.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation brought a motion on consent to cancel and replace a previous order with values provided in minutes of settlement.

The Assessment Review Board granted the motion, finding it advisable to cancel the previous decision to finally resolve the proceedings for the 2009-2016 taxation years and avoid a multiplicity of further proceedings.

The City of Guelph brought a motion to reinstate property assessment appeals that had been withdrawn by the property owner, Globe Realty Holdings Ltd., after the City had served notice that it would be requesting a higher assessment.

The parties resolved the issues in dispute on consent.

The Assessment Review Board ordered the appeals reinstated and set a procedural schedule for productions, discoveries, and a further pre-hearing conference.

Residential subdivision developers commenced an action alleging that a municipality overcharged development charges between 2004 and 2008 and sought damages.

The municipality brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of a preliminary question of law concerning the legality of development charges imposed under the Development Charges Act, 1997, a municipal by-law, and subdivision agreements.

The court held the motion was not brought promptly within the meaning of Rule 21.02, as it was filed years after the pleadings and after the trial record had been set down.

In any event, the court found the legality of the municipality’s “top up” charge based on indexed development charges was not plain and obvious and required determination at trial after full evidence and argument.

The applicant municipality sought an order of mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a mistrial declared by a Justice of the Peace in a careless driving trial.

The respondent defendant had appeared by agent and remained outside the courtroom during the prosecution's case, prompting a nonsuit motion on the issue of identity.

The Justice of the Peace refused to allow the prosecution to file a certificate of offence to prove identity alongside viva voce evidence and declared a mistrial.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace committed a jurisdictional error by declaring a mistrial instead of ruling on the nonsuit motion, and erred in law by refusing to admit the certificate of offence.

The application was allowed, the mistrial quashed, and mandamus issued directing the trial to continue.

The unsuccessful appellant in an OMB appeal sought to be excused from paying costs, arguing he was acting as a public interest litigant.

The court rejected this argument, finding the litigation did not involve an issue of public significance extending beyond the immediate parties.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable, the court found the respondents' requested amounts excessive and awarded $10,000 to the primary respondent and $5,000 to each of the other two respondents.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) that dismissed his appeal concerning a proposed development.

The OMB had dismissed the appeal on the basis that the moving party failed to present apparent land use planning grounds.

The moving party argued the OMB erred in law by equating 'land use planning grounds' with 'evidence from a land use planner' and by finding he had not tendered a land use planning opinion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's assessment of the evidence was a question of mixed fact and law, not a pure question of law.

The Court also found no reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB's decision, as the evidence provided by the moving party was insufficient to demonstrate legitimate land use planning concerns.

The applicant sought leave to appeal several convictions under a city by-law.

Her previous motions to extend the time to appeal had been dismissed.

She brought another motion to set aside the convictions but failed to appear on time due to a traffic delay, resulting in the motion being dismissed.

The Court of Appeal accepted her explanation for the delay but dismissed the application for leave to appeal, noting the motion was well beyond the time for appealing, earlier attempts were unsuccessful, and there was no fresh evidence to warrant interference.

The City of Guelph appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed a property standards repair order regarding a deteriorated backyard swimming pool and ordered the City to share repair costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a backyard swimming pool is not a 'dwelling' under the Municipal Act, meaning City officials did not require a warrant to enter the property.

The Court also held that the appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to order cost-sharing and erred in finding a reasonable apprehension of bias against the municipal official who issued the repair order.

The original repair order was restored.