Robert A. Blair

The appellant purchased eight condominium units from the respondent developer, four of which were custom-designed for use as a head office.

A dispute arose over the adequacy of the common elements, specifically the exterior doors, windows, and HVAC system, to meet the custom design requirements.

The appellant sued for specific performance or damages.

The respondent successfully moved at the Divisional Court to strike the claim on the basis that section 23(1) of the Condominium Act, 1998 grants exclusive standing to the condominium corporation to sue regarding common elements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the word 'may' in section 23(1) is permissive.

It grants the corporation standing to sue on behalf of owners for common issues but does not deprive an individual unit owner of the right to pursue contractual or unit-specific claims relating to common elements immediately pertaining to their unit.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred by failing to explain its rejection of a conditional discharge in its reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety was reasonable.

The Court held that while it would have been better for the Board to explicitly explain its rejection of a conditional discharge, the omission was not a reversible error as there was no air of reality to such a disposition on the evidence.

Two first party insurers paid statutory accident benefits to their insureds and made requests for loss transfer from second party insurers.

The second party insurers refused to pay, and the first party insurers initiated arbitration proceedings.

The second party insurers argued the claims were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period for loss transfer claims begins to run the day after the first party insurer makes a demand for loss transfer, not from the date the second party insurer definitively refuses to indemnify.

The appeals by the first party insurers were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Ontario Securities Commission order that imposed significant administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) for failing to report insider trades and failing to adequately supervise trading.

The appellants argued that the AMP provision of the Securities Act, which allows fines up to $1 million per infraction, violates s. 11(d) of the Charter because its magnitude constitutes a true penal consequence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionality of an administrative penalty is assessed based on the actual penalty imposed, not the theoretical maximum.

The court found the fines were proportionate to the regulatory goal of deterring non-compliance in capital markets and did not amount to a penal sanction.

The court also upheld the Commission's findings regarding the appellants' failure to supervise and its consideration of the public interest in determining the sanctions.

The appellant was convicted in two separate trials of assault causing bodily harm, criminal harassment, and drug trafficking offences.

He received a 5-year sentence for the assault and an 8-year sentence for the drug offences, resulting in a global sentence of 13 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the second sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the totality principle.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence for the drug offences was reduced to 5 years consecutive, resulting in a global sentence of 10 years.

The young person appealed their conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appellant relied on s. 34(1), but the trial judge only addressed s. 34(2).

The Court of Appeal found an air of reality to the s. 34(1) defence, noting the trial judge made no finding that the appellant intended to cause grievous bodily harm and the findings did not establish disproportionate force.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence for robbery.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended circumstantial evidence regarding identification and erred in principle during sentencing by departing from a probation officer's recommendation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the circumstantial evidence matching the appellant's clothing and appearance to the perpetrators.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle and was entitled to weigh the appellant's poor behaviour in pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his sentence for setting fire to a police cruiser during the G20 riots.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount and the trial judge adequately considered the appellant's personal circumstances.

However, the Court struck out the restitution order because the trial judge failed to inquire into the appellant's ability to pay, noting his addiction and sporadic employment.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent insurer for breach of the duty of good faith.

The motion judge had found the action was barred by the one-year limitation period in the standard automobile policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the cause of action did not arise until the insured's liability was finally ascertained by judgment.

Furthermore, the court held that a claim for breach of the independent duty of good faith is not a claim under the insurance contract, and is therefore subject to the general six-year limitation period rather than the one-year statutory condition.

The appellants appealed a judgment, arguing only one point regarding fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence would not have changed the result.

The amount in the fresh evidence was consistent with the internal allocation of payments found by the motion judge and did not affect the finding that interest was being paid on all three loans, which defeated the limitations defence.

The moving parties brought motions to quash appeals from an order of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the appeals were from interlocutory orders.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to the Dewan motion, finding the order appealed from did not finally dispose of any defences, and quashed that appeal.

For the Condominium motion, the Court found that most paragraphs of the order were interlocutory, except for one paragraph that removed a defence at trial, making it a final order.

The Condominium motion was allowed in part, quashing the appeal except for the final order paragraph.

The appellant was engaged in a blasting operation that sent fly-rock onto neighbouring private property, causing damage.

The appellant did not report the incident to the Ministry of the Environment and was charged with failing to report the discharge of a contaminant under s. 15(1) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The appellant argued that reporting was only required if the discharge caused non-trivial harm to the natural environment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'adverse effect' includes property damage as an independent trigger for liability, regardless of whether the natural environment itself is harmed.

The appellants appealed three orders relating to a drainage dispute.

They challenged a finding of deliberate and wilful disregard of a prior order, the denial of an adjournment request, and the decision to proceed with a contempt motion rather than transferring the matter to the Drainage Referee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three appeals, finding ample evidence of non-compliance, no error in the exercise of discretion to deny the adjournment, and no error in addressing the contempt motion.

Costs of $12,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim and the judgment against him regarding mortgage arrears.

He argued that he did not receive a demand letter, was entitled to notice under the Family Law Act, and that his counterclaim should not have been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was aware of the arrears, his existence was unknown when the action commenced, and the counterclaim disclosed no cause of action.

The appellant City purchased asset-backed commercial paper notes that subsequently collapsed in value.

The City sued the respondents for negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment more than two years after purchasing the notes but less than two years after the notes matured and defaulted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's summary judgment dismissing the claims as statute-barred.

The Court held that for negligent misrepresentation inducing a transaction, damage occurs when the plaintiff enters into the transaction and receives something less valuable than represented, not when the full extent of the loss is monetized.

The limitation period was not suspended by a standstill agreement or by the involvement of an investors committee.

The police responded to a suspected break and enter at an apartment and discovered a large quantity of marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia.

The appellant, who was present in the apartment, was arrested and his cellphone was seized.

While at the police station, an officer answered a call on the appellant's cellphone from an unknown person seeking to purchase drugs and identifying the appellant by name.

At trial, the judge admitted the evidence of the call as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting the single call, as it amounted to an implied assertion that the appellant was a drug dealer and was therefore hearsay.

The call did not meet the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, nor did the trial judge consider whether its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent sought costs for a previous motion where the appellant was ordered to pay $15,000 into court as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs for the motion, despite the respondent's reference to a previous offer to settle.

No order as to costs was made.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing her claim against the respondent bank regarding a student loan.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to provide any evidence she had paid the loan, noting a previous Federal Court judgment and the appellant's own correspondence acknowledging the debt.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge regarding a claim for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order requiring the respondent to pay the full amount of the claimed trust funds into court adequately secured the appellant's claim pending resolution of the contractual dispute.

Furthermore, the motion judge correctly found no evidence to support a claim for punitive damages, leaving nothing further to litigate regarding the breach of trust.