Robert A. Blair

The appellants failed to appear for their appeal, providing only a vague allusion to emergency dental surgery.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appeal appeared to be moot and that continuing the matter would unnecessarily increase costs.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned without costs.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault, raising issues regarding pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code and the trial judge's consideration of the victim's severe injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the pre-sentence custody issue was not clearly raised below and the appellant was being released on parole that day.

The court also held that the sentence was entirely fit given the seriousness of the assault and the severity of the injuries.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy sought to appeal a Superior Court decision that found no operational conflict between the Highway 407 Act's vehicle permit denial provisions and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act's discharge provisions.

The Superintendent had not been a party to the lower court proceedings. 407 ETR moved to quash the appeal for lack of standing.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Superintendent does not have an automatic right to appeal as a non-party, the court has jurisdiction under s. 193(e) of the BIA to grant leave to appeal in exceptional circumstances.

Finding that the Superintendent was deprived of notice below and raised issues of systemic importance, the Court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board, which found him incapable of refusing psychiatric and nourishment treatment.

The appellant argued the Board applied the wrong legal test or was unreasonable in its conclusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the test from Starson v. Swayze and that there was ample evidence to support the finding that the appellant's delusion rendered him unable to appreciate the consequences of his decision.

The Registrar appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Licence Appeal Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had revoked the registration of a real estate brokerage due to its involvement in mortgage fraud transactions, but allowed the principal broker to retain his registration subject to conditions.

The Registrar argued the Tribunal erred in its application of the test for revocation under section 10 of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, applied an incorrect standard of proof, and made erroneous findings of fact regarding the broker's knowledge of the fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's reasons were sufficient, it did not apply a quasi-criminal standard of proof, and it was open to the Tribunal to find the broker's past conduct did not warrant revocation despite findings of wilful blindness.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

The trial judge had found that as the operator of the vehicle, the appellant had prima facie de facto possession of its contents unless there was evidence to the contrary.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error in law, as it impermissibly transferred the burden of proof to the accused and created a rebuttable presumption not found in common law or statute.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal in CCAA proceedings.

The appellant, Computershare Trust Company of Canada, was ordered to pay costs of the appeal to the respondent Crystallex International Corporation in the amount of $110,688.00, and to the respondent Tenor Capital Management Company, L.P. and Affiliates in the amount of $80,000.

Both amounts are inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The respondent was found passed out in the back seat of a parked van with the keys in the ignition.

He was convicted at trial of having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent might wake up and drive was based on speculation.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding of a risk of danger was supported by ample circumstantial evidence and the summary conviction appeal judge erred by substituting his own view of the evidence.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their claim for statutory rescission of a franchise agreement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the notice of rescission was provided more than two years after the franchise agreement was entered into, pursuant to s. 6(2).

The appeal was dismissed, as it was plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was fully aware of and took account of the relevant factors, and found no error in the sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence excessive and held that the trial judge erred by relying on unsworn, uncontested statements from the appellant's father regarding the appellant's need for drug treatment.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence in the terms of the joint submission was substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking crack cocaine.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The trial judge was unable to identify the appellant from surveillance photographs but relied on the opinions of police officers who identified the appellant in court.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in relying on the officers' opinions, as they had no special knowledge or advantage over the judge in comparing the photographs to the appellant.

The in-dock identification was inherently frail, and the verdict could not be supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The respondent applied for a police records check and discovered it included a withdrawn assault charge.

After the police service refused to remove the reference, the respondent successfully brought an application before the Superior Court under Rule 14.05 to have the reference removed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the police service's appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction.

The court found that the police service's decision was an administrative decision subject to the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and therefore the challenge had to be brought by way of an application for judicial review to the Divisional Court, not via a Rule 14.05 application.

The plaintiff was injured when she was dragged by a car and then struck when the driver reversed.

The driver's insurer denied coverage, arguing the driver's actions were intentional and thus excluded under s. 118 of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify the driver and his parents, and awarded full indemnity costs to the insureds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the driver's intent, as the evidence showed the harm was not intentional.

The court also upheld the duty to defend and the costs awards.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The summary conviction appeal judge had held there was insufficient evidence that the approved instrument analyzed the breath samples, rendering the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly relied on circumstantial evidence—specifically the instrument's readings—to infer that an analysis had occurred.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by failing to apply the applicable statutory presumption and by exceeding the permitted standard of appellate review.

The appellant lawyer represented two clients in unsuccessful applications to quash a municipal by-law.

The application judge ordered the lawyer to personally pay 40 percent of the respondent municipality's costs under Rule 57.07(1), finding his conduct and lack of preparation caused unnecessary costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the lawyer's appeal and set aside the personal costs order, holding that the application judge erred in principle by failing to distinguish the lawyer's conduct from his clients' instructions, particularly where solicitor-client privilege was not waived, and by using hindsight to evaluate strategic decisions.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law requiring all new exterior commercial signs to be bilingual in French and English.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that one appellant lacked standing as he did not reside or operate a business in the municipality.

For the second appellant, the Court found the by-law was intra vires the municipality's power to pass by-laws respecting social well-being under the Municipal Act, 2001.

Although the by-law infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter by compelling the use of a language, the Court held the infringement was justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect and promote the equality of the French and English languages.

The appellant, a left-wing political blogger, sued the respondents for defamation after one of the respondents posted a comment on a right-wing blog describing the appellant as 'one of the Taliban's more vocal supporters'.

The action was brought under the simplified procedure.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the words were not capable of being defamatory, lacked the sting of libel in the context of a political blog, and constituted fair comment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the novel issues surrounding internet defamation in the political blogosphere required a full factual record and were not appropriate for summary judgment, particularly under the simplified procedure where cross-examination is limited.

The appellant Noteholders appealed orders approving a bridge loan, a $36 million DIP financing facility, and a Management Incentive Plan (MIP) for the respondent debtor under the CCAA.

The debtor's principal asset was a $3.4 billion arbitration claim against Venezuela.

The Noteholders argued the DIP financing, which could outlast the CCAA protection period and granted the lender a 35% interest in the arbitration proceeds, was effectively an arrangement requiring creditor approval.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the supervising judge reasonably exercised his broad discretion under s. 11.2 of the CCAA to approve the financing necessary to pursue the arbitration, and that the financing did not constitute a plan of arrangement.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport with cocaine dissolved in wine bottles.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the knowledge requirement and in admitting opinion evidence from a border services inspector regarding her ticket purchase.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding the inspector's testimony about cash payments and short-notice bookings was inadmissible, highly prejudicial opinion evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.