Robert A. Blair

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently received Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and Hospitals of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOP) disability benefits.

The defendants brought a motion to determine whether these benefits were deductible from any tort award for loss of income or loss of earning capacity under s. 267.8(1)2 of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge ruled they were not deductible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the benefits fall within the private insurance exception at common law, and the statutory addition of 'loss of earning capacity' did not clearly and unambiguously change this rule.

Furthermore, the benefits were paid in respect of the plaintiff's disability, not 'in respect of the incident' as required by the statute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a declaration that a release in a settlement agreement with her former employer did not bar her claim for long-term disability benefits against the insurer.

She argued the release violated the Employment Standards Act by effectively waiving her right to benefit coverage during the statutory notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the employer had maintained coverage as required by the Act, and the appellant was free to compromise her claim for benefits.

The Court also upheld the finding that the insurer, as a third-party beneficiary, could enforce the release.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and the hearing judge issued a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code, directing that he be taken forthwith to a designated hospital.

The hospital appealed, arguing that it had not consented to the order as required by s. 672.62 because no bed was immediately available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the hospital's consent is a mandatory precondition that includes having the capacity to safely admit the patient.

The Court also held that the consent requirement does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as it accords with the principles of fundamental justice by ensuring treatment orders are executed safely and balancing the needs of the accused with broader societal and medical realities.

The appellant, a chronic bank robber, committed nine 'note pass' bank robberies while unlawfully at large on a temporary absence pass.

He was serving the remaining nine years of a previous 12-year sentence.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14-year sentence consecutive to the remaining nine years, resulting in a global sentence of 23 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the 14-year sentence was appropriate on its own, the global sentence of 23 years violated the totality principle and was unduly long and harsh.

The sentence was varied to 11 years concurrent, to be served consecutively to the remaining nine years, resulting in a global sentence of 20 years.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment regarding a debt and share pledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's retention of shares did not extinguish the underlying debt, given his undertaking to return the shares once the principal debt was paid in full.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings regarding notice of a guarantee.

The self-represented appellant appealed a trial judgment following a jury verdict, arguing the trial judge erred in several evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of a video and Building Code extracts, the admission of a psychiatric report, and the redaction of an occupational therapist's report.

She also argued the jury verdict should have been set aside and that transcript errors infringed her right to a bilingual trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings, ample evidence to support the jury's verdict, and that the transcript errors did not affect the jury's appreciation of the evidence or deprive the appellant of any grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding an estate and corporate accounting dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fact-driven appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion regarding the amount allowed for mortgage costs.

Costs of the appeal were agreed at $10,000.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed her application to vacate a condominium lien for water damage repairs and granted the condominium corporation's application to enforce a single-family use restriction and order the removal of interior door locks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence that the leak originated in the appellant's unit and that the occupancy and locks violated the condominium's Declaration.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence and upheld the application judge's full indemnity costs award.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a noting in default.

The appellants had delivered but not filed a statement of defence, and waited over a year before retaining counsel to bring the motion to set aside, just days before the scheduled undefended trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate a continuing intention to defend, provided an incredible explanation for the delay, and failed to bring the motion expeditiously.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought long-term disability benefits for a disability allegedly arising in 1990, despite their insurance policy having been cancelled that same year for non-payment of premiums.

The action was commenced in 2005.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, finding the limitation period had expired and the individual appellant was not saved by the incapacity provision in s. 7 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no medical evidence demonstrating the appellant lacked the capacity to commence the action.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for damages against the respondent municipality.

The appellant and a friend had driven down a dead-end rural road, got stuck on a hydro right-of-way, and abandoned their vehicle in extreme cold, resulting in severe frostbite injuries.

The appellants argued the municipality breached its standard of care by failing to post 'No Exit' and checkerboard signs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the road conditions were not potentially dangerous to reasonable drivers and that the appellants would have ignored the signs regardless.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that she and her husband fraudulently conveyed their matrimonial home to her alone to defeat creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the husband had acquired a beneficial interest when the property was previously transferred into joint names to secure a mortgage, and that the subsequent reconveyance to the appellant alone was intended to defeat creditors.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding interest, reducing the rate from 1% per month to the Courts of Justice Act rate of 3.3% per annum, and changing the start date.

The appellants' farm property was expropriated by the respondent, and the parties settled compensation at $1.3 million, with costs to be assessed under s. 32 of the Expropriations Act.

An assessment officer awarded costs, but a Superior Court Justice reduced the amounts on appeal, finding them unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court Justice erred by conducting a rehearing and substituting her own view of what was reasonable instead of applying the proper deferential standard of review.

The assessment officer's awards were reinstated.

The moving parties brought a motion to set aside an order requiring them to post security for costs of their appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a summary judgment dismissing their action against the responding parties.

The moving parties argued the summary judgment order was made without jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in their position and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the responding parties.

The appellants were sued by a credit union for monies owed under a credit facility after an employee stole $30 million.

The appellants counterclaimed against the regulators, FSCO and DICO, seeking contribution and indemnity on the basis that they negligently failed to oversee the credit union.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the counterclaim, finding that FSCO is not an entity capable of being sued, DICO is protected by statutory immunity, and the appellants had no tenable claim for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act because they were not tortfeasors.

The appellant, Friends of Lansdowne Inc., appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a City of Ottawa by-law approving a public-private partnership for the redevelopment of Lansdowne Park.

The appellant argued the by-law provided an illegal bonus to the developer, breached procurement rules, and was passed in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the development plan, viewed as a whole, did not confer an obvious advantage or illegal bonus.

The Court also held that any breach of procurement policies was a technical irregularity that did not vitiate the by-law, and the appellant failed to establish bad faith by the City Council.

The plaintiff school board sued the appellant and his son after the son allegedly set fire to a school.

The claim against the appellant was for negligent supervision.

The appellant's homeowner's insurer refused to defend him, relying on an exclusion clause for bodily injury or property damage caused by any intentional or criminal act or failure to act.

The motion judge held the insurer had no duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the exclusion clause only applies to intentional or criminal failures to act, and that the negligence claim against the appellant was not derivative of the son's intentional tort.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay the respondents' litigation based on an arbitration clause in their shareholder agreements.

The respondents argued the parties never reached an agreement on the contents of a schedule, meaning no arbitration agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and stayed the litigation, noting that the respondents had not sought a declaration that the agreements were void ab initio, the agreements contained severability clauses making the arbitration clauses separate contracts, and under the Arbitration Act, an arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction.

The litigation was stayed except with respect to three companies that were not parties to any shareholder agreement.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application for a declaration that the respondent insurance company had a duty to defend a third party claim.

The claim involved property damage allegedly caused by pollution from dry cleaner tenants at the appellants' shopping plaza.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the claims asserted were either outside the scope of coverage or fell within the policy's pollution and owned-property exclusions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youth sentenced as an adult, appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a stabbing on a city bus.

The appellant, who was the initial aggressor in an attempted robbery, argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave self-defence under ss. 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claims.

The court held it was unreasonable for the appellant to believe the victim's resistance was an unlawful assault under s. 34(2), and there was no evidence the appellant attempted to retreat as required by s. 35.