Richard Litkowski

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision finding that failing to properly wear a seatbelt under s. 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act is a strict liability offence, rather than an absolute liability offence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, finding that the classification of the offence is a question of law alone that is of interest to the public at large.

The court also appointed amicus counsel to ensure both sides of the issue are argued.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking a person and receiving a financial benefit, arguing the trial judge failed to give an appropriate Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant and failed to adequately identify the defence's position in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning functionally sufficient and noting that the trial judge had properly incorporated the defence's written position into the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to properly wear a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found the offence to be one of absolute liability and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the court considered two issues: whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arose from the trial judge's premature pronouncement of guilt, and whether section 106(2) creates a strict liability or absolute liability offence.

The court dismissed the bias argument but found that section 106(2) is a strict liability offence, not absolute liability.

The Crown consented to a stay of proceedings rather than proceed with a new trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for second degree murder.

The appellant was alleged to be a party to a murder during a home invasion robbery by facilitating entry, though he was not present during the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found there was no admissible evidence at the preliminary inquiry that the appellant had the subjective foresight that the principal offender would kill the deceased.

The appeal was allowed, the committal for second degree murder was quashed, and a committal for manslaughter was substituted.

The trial judge failed to call on the Crown for closing submissions before acquitting the respondent on two charges and convicting on a third.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give the Crown an opportunity to be heard was a fundamental procedural error amounting to an error in law.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals and convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The defendant, an unlicensed taxicab driver, was charged with trespassing at Toronto Pearson International Airport contrary to section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Trespass to Property Act after entering the airport on September 30, 2009, despite having been served with a written non-entry notice on September 19, 2009.

The central legal issue was whether the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not fall within the traveller or employment exemptions to the non-entry ban, or whether the burden rests on the defendant to prove on a balance of probabilities that he fell within such exemptions.

The court held that section 47(3) of the Provincial Offences Act places the burden on the defendant to prove the exemptions apply.

The defendant failed to produce evidence of travel documents or compliance with employment requirements, and was convicted.

The appellant, a caregiver, was convicted of fraud after emptying the elderly complainant's savings account of over $126,000.

The complainant provided a videotaped statement to police but died before trial.

The trial judge admitted the statement under the principled approach to hearsay.

On appeal, the appellant argued the statement lacked threshold reliability and that its admission violated trial fairness, relying on European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statement was sufficiently reliable given the oath, video recording, and corroborating bank records.

The 21-month custodial sentence was also upheld due to the serious breach of trust.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of breach of probation following the trial judge’s granting of a directed verdict motion at the close of the Crown’s case.

The trial judge held that the Crown was required to adduce evidence negating a potential Family Court order permitting contact, treating that exception as an essential element of the offence.

The appeal court held this was an error in law, finding that such exceptions operate as potential defences that must only be negatived by the Crown once raised to the level of an air of reality.

Because the Crown had nonetheless pleaded the exception and led evidence addressing it, the directed verdict should have been denied as there was a prima facie case.

The acquittal was set aside and the matter ordered to resume before the trial judge at the point where the directed verdict had been granted.

The appellant appealed his sentence of five years' imprisonment for robbery and related offences, arguing it violated the parity and jump principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the appellant's circumstances and criminal record differed significantly from his co-accused, and the jump principle did not apply due to the dramatic increase in the seriousness of his crimes.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to quash a restitution order, as the Crown conceded the stolen funds had been fully recovered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was fully aware of and took account of the relevant factors, and found no error in the sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a cautionary charge regarding his flight from the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of flight was relevant to link the appellant to the apartment, and the risk of it being used for consciousness of guilt did not require a caution.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was entirely warranted on the facts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued the trial judge erred by providing insufficient reasons, misapprehending evidence, and reversing the burden of proof regarding his explanation that illness and cold conditions prevented him from providing a sample.

The appeal court held the trial judge’s reasons were adequate and demonstrated proper credibility analysis.

The court further found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof when assessing both the elements of the offence and the defence of reasonable excuse.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against a young complainant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the appellant's credibility by relying on his brief answers to specific questions, misapprehended material evidence regarding the complainant's prior inconsistent statements, and improperly asked the appellant to comment on the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant broke into the 76-year-old complainant's apartment, sexually assaulted her, and stabbed her multiple times.

He was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, attempted murder, and other offences, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Crown had withdrawn its dangerous offender application after the appellant refused a psychiatric assessment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the life sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that the egregious circumstances of the offences and the need to protect the public justified the maximum sentence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, primarily challenging the length of the custodial term.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant had already served the jail sentence.

Given the appellant's record and the serious nature of the offences, the court declined to reduce the driving prohibition and found the five-year probation period to be entirely appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The trial judge properly concluded the proposed sentence was contrary to the administration of justice, as the appellant committed the current offence against the same victim while serving an intermittent sentence for a previous offence against them, making specific deterrence an overwhelming consideration.

The appellant appealed the period of parole ineligibility imposed as part of her sentence, which was the product of a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the period of parole ineligibility was not clearly unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusing to provide a suitable breath sample following a three-vehicle collision at an intersection.

The Crown alleged the accused was speeding, driving erratically, and ran a red light while impaired by alcohol.

The accused denied consuming alcohol and claimed he entered the intersection on an amber light.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts based on credible police and civilian witness testimony, rejection of the accused's testimony as unreliable, and evidence of impaired judgment and alcohol consumption.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to two years less a day, plus two years of probation, after serving 599 days of pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give reasons for departing from the usual two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody under the law prior to the Truth in Sentencing Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in principle, removing the usual deference.

However, upon reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court found the ultimate sentence imposed was fit and dismissed the appeal.

Sentencing decision for an offender convicted of multiple firearms offences arising from possession of a loaded .38 calibre revolver in a Toronto neighbourhood known for gang activity.

The offender, a repeat firearms offender subject to existing prohibition orders and probation, fled police and discarded the loaded weapon in a residential yard during pursuit.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in response to gun violence while considering mitigating factors including youth, community support, and evidence of remorse and rehabilitation potential.

Applying the totality principle and consecutive sentencing for breaches of firearm prohibition orders, the court imposed a global sentence of eight years’ imprisonment with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody.