Richard Litkowski

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following a fatal beating.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge made errors in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a statement allegedly made by one appellant, which was crucial to determining his intent.

For the other appellant, the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on how to apply the concept of reasonable doubt to his exculpatory statements and to eyewitness identification evidence that excluded him as the primary attacker.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, grandparents and legal guardians of the victims, appealed their convictions for second degree murder and forcible confinement, as well as their respective parole ineligibility periods of 22 and 20 years.

The victims, a five-year-old boy and his six-year-old sister, were subjected to prolonged starvation, abuse, and confinement in a squalid room, resulting in the boy's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge properly inferred the requisite mens rea for murder from the prolonged course of conduct and correctly rejected the defence's expert evidence on diminished capacity.

The court also upheld the admission of police statements and found the confinement vastly exceeded any lawful parental authority.

The sentence appeals were dismissed, with the court affirming that the extreme cruelty and inhumanity of the offences justified the lengthy parole ineligibility periods.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on first degree murder, in her jury instructions regarding the timing of the victim's injuries, and in failing to give a limiting instruction on post-offence conduct.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the victim while forcibly confining him.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the Arcuri test for a directed verdict, nor in the jury instructions when read as a whole.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of possessing and accessing child pornography after the trial judge excluded his statement to police due to voluntariness concerns and found the Crown failed to prove knowledge and control of the files found on his computer.

The summary conviction appeal court judge overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's mother's evidence regarding his cognitive limitations and in failing to infer guilty knowledge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to accord proper deference to the trial judge's factual findings and misapprehended the trial judge's permissible use of the mother's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his alleged sexual assault on the victim's best friend and the victim's ante mortem statements expressing hostility toward him.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a witness's relationship with an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admission of the bad character and hearsay evidence, concluding the probative value outweighed any prejudicial impact.

The application to admit fresh evidence was denied as it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the principle in Browne v. Dunn to discount his evidence and in finding him evasive during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a breach of the Browne v. Dunn principle, as the complainant was not cross-examined on significant contradictory details later testified to by the appellant.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, in his treatment of the complainant's age and the mistake of age defence under s. 150.1(5) of the Criminal Code, and by misusing evidence of sexual overtures to another young girl.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's evidence, correctly concluded the appellant did not satisfy the test under s. 150.1(5), and did not misuse the impugned evidence as general propensity evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break, enter and theft, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance, as well as his global sentence of 44 months.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge on identification evidence, restricted cross-examination on the Sophonow report, misdirected the jury on inferences from a cell phone call, and failed to grant two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The court also upheld the sentencing judge's discretionary decision to deny two-for-one credit based on the appellant's history of disobeying court orders.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for extradition to the United States for offences corresponding to providing property or services for terrorist purposes and participating in terrorist activity.

The appellant argued the extradition judge erred in inferring he had the requisite knowledge and intent to assist the LTTE, a designated terrorist group.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's use of false documentation to procure military software and equipment at the behest of an LTTE operative, supported the inference of knowledge or wilful blindness.

The court also rejected the argument that the extradition judge erred by refusing to weigh competing inferences, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Ferras does not require such weighing.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States on terrorism-related charges, sought judicial interim release pending the release of the court's reserved judgment on his appeal from a committal order.

The applicant had been on bail without incident for over two years.

The respondent opposed release, citing the public interest and the proximity of a potential surrender.

The court granted the application, finding no enhanced risk of flight and concluding that the public interest did not warrant detention given the applicant's compliance with previous release terms.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault involving a teenage boy whom he lured to his hotel room and drugged before assaulting.

The appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, made inappropriate comments to the complainant, and improperly restricted cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and that the trial judge's compassionate comments did not demonstrate bias.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed given the serious aggravating factors of luring and drugging a young victim.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of fraud, personation, and conspiracy, receiving a sentence of 21 months in jail and three years' probation.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and noting the trial judge appropriately prioritized denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds while considering mitigating factors.

The appellants, a father and stepmother, appealed their convictions for the first and second degree murder of their five-year-old daughter, respectively.

The stepmother also appealed her 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that post-offence conduct (including dismemberment and concealment of the body) was properly admitted as evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant a judge-alone trial without Crown consent under s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, affirming that the statutory requirement for a jury trial in murder cases should only be overridden in the clearest of cases where standard safeguards are insufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The stepmother's sentence was upheld due to the horrific nature of the crime and her egregious post-offence conduct.

The respondents were convicted of extortion with a firearm and other offences, which carry mandatory minimum sentences.

The trial judge gave the respondents credit for time spent on strict pre-trial bail (house arrest), reducing their sentences below the statutory minimums.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while time spent in pre-sentence custody can be credited against a mandatory minimum sentence, time spent on strict bail does not constitute a 'punishment of imprisonment' under the Criminal Code and cannot be used to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering threats and assault, as well as his sentence of two years' imprisonment.

He argued the conviction for uttering threats was unreasonable because his father, the target of the threats, testified he was not afraid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting other witnesses testified the appellant was loud, upset, and had been drinking, and the trial judge found the father was minimizing his evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not unfit given the appellant's history and criminal record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, possession of stolen property, and possession of burglary tools, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his sections 8 and 9 Charter application and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the police had grounds for an investigative detention based on a radio broadcast describing the suspects and their vehicle.

The court also upheld the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest after an officer observed cartons of cigarettes in plain view in the vehicle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 6.5 years imprisonment for breaking and entering, dangerous driving, possession of a stolen vehicle, and other related offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his prior record, ignored mitigating factors, and imposed a disproportionate sentence that offended the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record of 33 prior break and enters and three prior police chases.

The court found the sentence was at the upper end of the range but fit and did not offend the totality principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in her use of the complainant's prior consistent statements, shifted the burden of proof, and subjected his evidence to a higher level of scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not use the statements for the truth of their contents, properly assessed credibility, and gave exemplary reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and accepting the complainant's evidence.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault on a 15-year-old boy.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, party liability, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for a specific witness.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine a witness on prior inconsistent statements under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking proper credit for pre-sentence custody.

With the Crown's consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the trial judge's order, noting that with proper credit, the appellant's statutory release date would have been November 12, 2006.