Richard Litkowski

The appellant appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and his 17-year period of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on party liability, which could have provided an alternative route to a manslaughter verdict.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in law by not leaving party liability with the jury, as there was an air of reality to the appellant's secondary involvement.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso, finding the error was harmless and did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The jury had the option to convict of manslaughter if they doubted the appellant's intent, but chose to convict of murder.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction on grounds including an inflammatory Crown opening, failure to repeat a W.D. instruction for a jury question, misstating expert psychiatric evidence, and errors in the provocation charge.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions adequately addressed the Crown's opening and the jury's questions, and that the charge on provocation and expert evidence was fair.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating credit for pre-sentence custody.

Following the release of the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the parties agreed the appellant was entitled to 45 months' credit rather than the amount initially granted.

The Court of Appeal varied the sentence to 15 months to reflect the correct pre-sentence custody credit against the agreed-upon five-year total sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and a forfeiture order, arguing that errors and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants invalidated them.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the drafting errors were innocent mistakes.

Even assuming negligence, the Court held that the warrants could have issued based on the totality of the circumstances, including post-tip surveillance and prior police knowledge, after excising erroneous information and including omitted details about the confidential informant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault and unlawful confinement for his role in a home invasion and robbery, and was sentenced to 18 months in custody.

He appealed the sentence, seeking an 18-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the custodial sentence fit and adequately reflective of mitigating factors, including his lack of a prior record and minor role in the offences.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing at a nightclub.

At trial, he claimed he acted in self-defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that excluded prejudicial portions of his police statements, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct and exculpatory statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly reweighed the probative value of the police statements after the defence put the officer's conduct in issue, and that the jury instructions on post-offence conduct and reasonable doubt were sufficient.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding it violated the Liquor Licence Act by serving underage and intoxicated patrons, resulting in a five-day licence suspension.

The appellant argued it had exercised due diligence through staff training.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the staff failed to properly check identification or assess intoxication, thereby failing to establish due diligence.

The court also upheld the five-day suspension as a reasonable penalty.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 13 years for attempted murder and breaches of firearms prohibition and recognizance orders.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider his youth, first-time custodial status, and rehabilitative prospects, and that the sentence was outside the acceptable range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that denunciation and deterrence are paramount for gun violence in public places, particularly as the appellant shot at a security guard multiple times while under prohibition orders.

The appellant appealed convictions for attempting to disarm a police officer, assaulting a police officer, assaulting a police officer to prevent arrest, and two counts of breach of probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest contrary to the principles in R. v. W.D., and that the judge shifted the burden of proof by drawing adverse inferences from the absence of defence evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, rejected the appellant’s testimony with reasons, and then considered whether the remaining evidence left a reasonable doubt.

The judge’s comments regarding the absence of corroborating evidence merely observed the evidentiary record and did not shift the burden of proof.

The convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge unfairly commented on his evidence and failed to relate the evidence to the elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's caution regarding the appellant's after-the-fact theory was fair and the review of the evidence was sufficient.

The Court also noted the lack of objection at trial and the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault involving a teenage complainant.

The trial judge found that the appellant had cultivated a relationship of trust with the vulnerable youth, provided drugs and gifts, and engaged in grooming behaviour culminating in sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence supported the finding that the appellant occupied a position of trust and that a deliberate course of grooming conduct could amount to an invitation to sexual touching for the purposes of the sexual exploitation offence.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s credibility assessments and found no reversible error arising from the limited adverse inference relating to cross‑examination.

The convictions were affirmed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the search warrant for his residence was improperly granted and violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Information to Obtain contained sufficient evidence, including compelling firsthand observations from a reliable informant, for the issuing Justice to reasonably grant the warrant.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after the victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat in the appellant's home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding joint involvement, the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness, the W.(D.) instruction, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge could have given a joint party liability instruction, the failure to do so did not result in a miscarriage of justice and was cured by the proviso.

The court also found the Vetrovec, W.(D.), and post-offence conduct instructions were sufficient.

The sentence appeal regarding the 13-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's police statement.

The trial judge found the statement involuntary because the police offered an improper inducement, suggesting the complainant would only get psychiatric help if the accused confessed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct contextual test for voluntariness under Oickle and Spencer, and his factual findings were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding there was no air of reality to wilful blindness and the trial judge failed to refer to any evidence supporting it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The respondent was charged with failing to wear a seat belt contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the Justice of the Peace convicted the respondent, ruling that the offence was one of absolute liability.

On appeal, the Ontario Court of Justice found the offence to be one of strict liability and entered a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence is one of strict liability, which affords the driver a due diligence defence, as there is no clear legislative intent to rebut the presumption of strict liability for public welfare offences.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in handling contradictions between the complainant and her mother regarding disclosure, and failed to reconcile other inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the contradictions and inconsistencies in the context of historical allegations and a reluctant complainant, and noted there was independent corroborating evidence.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the accused, who was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found that the accused's section 7 Charter rights were violated due to excessive force and mistreatment by police officers while in custody.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding a Charter breach and correctly exercised his discretion under section 24(1) to grant a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample to an approved roadside screening device under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the trial judge improperly relied on his silence to reject his credibility and erred in finding the police had articulable cause to stop his vehicle for suspected distracted driving.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge impermissibly linked the appellant’s pre‑trial silence to credibility findings, contrary to established appellate authority.

The court also found that the police lacked objectively discernible facts establishing articulable cause for the traffic stop, rendering the detention arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter.

Given the Charter breach and resulting investigative opportunity for unrelated offences, the court vacated the conviction and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari, which sought to quash his committal for trial on four firearms offences.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence at the preliminary inquiry to support the conclusion that the appellant had possession of a shotgun found in his bedroom shortly after it was fired outside his residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error, as there was circumstantial evidence—including the size of the gun, the apartment's configuration, and the appellant's control over his bedroom—from which a jury could reasonably infer his knowledge, consent, and control over the firearm.

The appeal was dismissed.