Patrick J. Monahan

The appellant, Amtim Capital Inc., appealed the dismissal of its claim against Appliance Recycling Centers of America (ARCA) for alleged underpayment due to improper allocation of head office expenses.

The trial judge found Amtim failed to discharge its onus of proving ARCA breached the agreements or that the expense allocation was not in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, including the refusal to draw adverse inferences against ARCA for alleged disclosure deficiencies, noting Amtim's failure to pursue further production motions or utilize contractual access rights.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for negligence, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional interference with economic relations against an accountant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by prematurely dismissing the action and erroneously rejecting the appellants' accounting expert's testimony.

The expert's reports, though not explicitly using "standard of care," clearly opined on the impropriety and negligence of the respondent's accounting actions, which was relevant to the claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal, and ordered a new trial before a different justice due to a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on child pornography charges.

The lower court had excluded evidence, finding the search warrant invalid due to an expired commissioner of oaths stamp on the Information to Obtain (ITO) and a misleading description of the videos.

The Court of Appeal found that the expired stamp was a curable facial defect, as extrinsic evidence confirmed the commissioner's valid appointment.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the affiant's description of the videos, despite minor inaccuracies, was sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for child pornography, and that the videos themselves met the statutory definition.

The appeal was allowed, the evidence admitted, and a trial ordered.

S.S.S. was found guilty of sexual assault and inviting a person under 14 to touch him for a sexual purpose, committed against a child complainant (2-4 years old) on three occasions in 2003-2004.

The court considered aggravating factors including abuse of trust, multiple incidents in the victim's home, and profound harm to the complainant.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, continuous employment, and family support.

The court rejected a conditional sentence as unfit, citing R. v. Friesen for the need for denunciation and deterrence in child sexual assault cases.

A sentence of three years imprisonment was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

The appellant, Losani Homes (1998) Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that found their employment termination clauses void but upheld the validity of a fixed-term employment contract for the respondent, Kim Kopyl.

Losani Homes argued that the invalidity of the termination clauses, per *Waksdale*, should also void the fixed-term clause, converting the contract to one terminable on reasonable notice with a duty to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the invalidity of termination clauses does not affect a fixed-term clause, distinguishing *Waksdale* and reaffirming *Howard v. Benson Group Inc.* The Court held that the employee was entitled to compensation for the unexpired portion of the fixed term without a duty to mitigate.

The appellant, convicted of attempting to import cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, appealed the dismissal of his entrapment claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the police agent (PA), whose uncorroborated testimony was central to establishing reasonable suspicion for police intervention.

The court highlighted the PA's extensive criminal history, admitted lies, and substantial financial compensation ($400,000 plus monthly fees) as factors requiring a more rigorous credibility analysis.

It also found that the appellant's later eagerness to participate in the scheme did not corroborate the PA's claim that the appellant initiated the criminal activity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered solely on the entrapment issue.

The appellant, Ekum-Sekum Incorporated (Brantco Construction), appealed a trial judge's finding that equitable set-off was available to the respondents, Lanca Contracting Limited et al., arguing that the respondents did not come to court with clean hands.

The Court of Appeal found that the two construction contracts were related, making equitable set-off available.

The trial judge had properly exercised discretion, recognizing both parties' contract breaches but not finding unclean hands.

The appellate court also upheld the trial judge's finding that a claimed breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act was not proven, as funds were adequately accounted for.

The appeal was dismissed, as the appellant failed to establish a palpable and overriding error of fact or an extricable error of law.

The appellant, Roger Wain Foreshaw, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising six grounds of appeal.

Key issues included the trial judge's prohibition of cross-examination on a witness's record suspension, the absence of a Mayuran instruction regarding an alleged confession, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule, alleged misstatements of evidence in the jury charge, errors in the third-party suspect instruction, and a finding of no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in prohibiting cross-examination on the record suspension, this error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions on the other grounds, affirming the conviction.

The appellant, Caleb Burgler, appealed his sentence for criminal negligence causing death, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting his unsuccessful rehabilitation attempts and not considering his drug addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that drug addiction is not a general mitigating factor for such crimes and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the appellant's efforts and ongoing addiction in assessing reoffending risk and public protection.

The court also upheld the probation terms and weapons prohibition as within the sentencing judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house and his sentence of two years less a day incarceration.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's finding on identity, which was based on circumstantial fingerprint evidence.

The appellant argued a speculative possibility that his fingerprints were on the jewelry box prior to the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that speculative possibilities do not need to be disproven.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge failed to consider rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion, given the serious nature of the offence, its impact on victims, and the appellant's criminal record.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Richard Jackman, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and attempted extortion, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the rejection of his not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR) defense, the consideration of treatability at the dangerous offender designation stage, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal tests, reasonably rejected the NCR defense, properly considered treatability in the dangerous offender analysis, and reasonably imposed an indeterminate sentence given the appellant's poor prospects for treatability and risk to the public.

The appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, appealed the dismissal of her defamation, conspiracy, and negligence claims against four defendants (Dr. Angus Maciver, André Picard, Carly Weeks, and Alheli Picazo) under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act), and the associated costs order totaling over $1.1 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the claims were strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

The court affirmed that the "fair comment" defence was prima facie available to Picard, Weeks, and Picazo, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate "serious harm" causally linked to the defendants' expressions, which would outweigh the public interest in protecting free expression.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, distinguishing the case from general guidance due to its complexity and the number of defendants.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address invited the jury to engage in impermissible reasoning, specifically by linking the absence of a motive to fabricate with the reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing improperly invited the jury to equate the complainant's good relationship with the appellant and lack of motive to fabricate with the reliability of her evidence.

The court held that a corrective instruction was required, and its absence compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against the provincial government for its response to COVID-19 in long-term care homes, asserting claims in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter s. 7.

The motion judge certified the negligence claim against the Minister of Long-Term Care (MLTC) but struck the other claims.

This appeal and cross-appeal challenged that decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appellants' appeal (seeking to certify the struck claims) and the respondent's cross-appeal (seeking to decertify the negligence claim against the MLTC), thereby upholding the motion judge's original certification decision.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, alleging the trial judge erred in treating similar fact evidence and analyzing the complainant's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the grounds raised did not constitute errors of law alone, which is the only basis for a Crown appeal of an acquittal.

The court affirmed that weighing evidence or assessing credibility, unless based on ungrounded stereotypical assumptions, are not errors of law.

This appeal concerned a severe brain injury sustained by Megan Desrochers in an ATV accident.

The trial judge found Patrick McGinnis liable for negligence, with 10% contributory negligence by Megan, but dismissed claims against Grant and Catherine McGinnis.

Patrick appealed his liability.

The Desrochers cross-appealed the dismissal of claims against Grant and Catherine, both in tort and under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick's appeal, upholding his liability.

It also dismissed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Catherine's tort liability.

However, the Court allowed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Grant's liability under HTA s. 192(2), finding that "negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle" includes the negligent transfer of care and control of the vehicle to an unfit person.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender him to the United States for trial on charges of sexual exploitation of children and interstate communication-extortion.

The applicant argued the surrender was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, and violated his Charter rights under sections 7 and 6, and that the Minister unreasonably declined to seek assurances regarding potential civil commitment in the U.S. The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding it reasonable and entitled to substantial deference.

The Court concluded that the potential sentence disparity and civil commitment process in the U.S. did not render the surrender unjust, oppressive, or a violation of Charter rights, and that the Minister's decision to not seek assurances was also reasonable.

The appellant, Michael Cady, appealed his convictions for possession of property obtained by crime and laundering proceeds of crime.

His wife had defrauded her employer of over $1 million, depositing funds into a joint account.

The trial judge found that the appellant either knew the funds were illegally obtained or was wilfully blind to their origin, citing several "red flags" including his wife's prior fraud conviction, bankruptcies, and the couple's lavish spending inconsistent with their declared income.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of wilful blindness, stating it was not inconsistent with the appellant's claim of deferring to his wife's financial management, especially given his admission of suspicion.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal arose from a dispute among siblings concerning the care and property of their nonagenarian mother.

The appellant challenged the application judge's decision, which declared the mother incapable, validated existing powers of attorney, and ordered the appellant to account for funds held on a resulting trust.

The appellant alleged procedural unfairness, including failure to consider his materials, denial of an adjournment, and improper dismissal of his counter-application, and sought leave to appeal the costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error or procedural unfairness, and denied leave to appeal costs, affirming the application judge's discretion.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the defence of a third party and accident, arguing there was no air of reality to the former and the latter was inadequate, thereby undermining his primary defence of identity.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period, alleging misapprehension of evidence regarding aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the defences, which had an air of reality and did not prejudice the appellant's primary defence.

The court also found no reversible error in the parole ineligibility period, concluding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and the sentence was proportionate.