Patrick J. Monahan

The appellant, Marguerite Crete, appealed a motion judge's declaration that a snow removal provision in her lease was not inconsistent with the Residential Tenancies Act, making her responsible for snow clearing in areas exclusively used by her.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the snow removal provision was not inconsistent with the RTA, despite finding errors in the motion judge's interpretation of certain RTA sections.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the tenant's responsibility for snow clearing in exclusively used areas.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, reversing a Divisional Court decision that had quashed an umpire's assessment of actual cash value (ACV) for a fire-damaged business premises under section 128 of the Insurance Act.

The Court found that the Divisional Court erred by giving undue weight to market value and by failing to defer to the umpire's reasonable assessment.

It clarified that "actual value" means the value to the insured, which can exceed market value, and that repair estimates are relevant to ACV.

The umpire's pragmatic approach in choosing between parties' proposed ACV amounts was upheld as non-arbitrary, reinforcing the deferential standard of review for such appraisals.

Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. (GRE) appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice requiring it, as a non-party, to produce financial documents for the valuation of shares held by a deceased in estates litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motions judge's discretionary decision.

The court found the documents relevant to the estate's valuation and the validity of the deceased's will, and that it would be unfair to proceed to trial without them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's application of the Rule 30.10 test, emphasizing deference to the lower court's discretion and the effectiveness of the established Confidentiality Protocol in addressing GRE's concerns about privacy and business interests.

The moving party, Glenn Bogue, brought three panel review motions before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, seeking review of single judge orders.

Two motions related to his appeal of a Law Society of Ontario license suspension, and the third concerned litigation over his mother's property.

The court dismissed all motions as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.02, finding that the moving party repeatedly failed to advance his appeals and misused the panel review procedure.

Additionally, the court revoked his existing fee waivers pursuant to section 4.10 of the Administration of Justice Act.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment that awarded the respondent $600,000 in damages and set aside the transfer of the appellants’ matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found that one appellant failed to return funds obtained from the respondent for a joint venture that never materialized and subsequently fraudulently conveyed the matrimonial home to his wife for nominal consideration to avoid a breach of trust claim.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the amount owed, fraudulent intent, and the wife's payment of good consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings, including the presence of multiple badges of fraud.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault, alleging a W.(D.) error and misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no W.(D.) error as the trial judge's partial rejection of the complainant's choking evidence did not undermine her overall credibility for the sexual assault.

The court also rejected the speculative argument that the complainant had a motive to fabricate due to embarrassment over her Snapchat locator, finding it unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant, E.M., sought leave to appeal a 30-month imprisonment sentence for sexually assaulting his intimate partner, requesting a conditional sentence or a shorter term of incarceration.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the sentencing judge's discretion.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to sentencing decisions and found the sentence proportionate and not demonstrably unfit, despite the appellant's guilty plea and remorse.

The appellant, Alexander Lambert, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's Browne v. Dunn instruction and instructions on the state of mind required for murder.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge overemphasized aggravating factors and underemphasized mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the Browne v. Dunn instruction, the murder intent instructions, or the sentencing judge's discretion in weighing factors for parole ineligibility.

The appellant, David Holden, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000 and money laundering, and his 12-year sentence, in relation to a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge impermissibly inferred guilt from fabricated evidence.

The sentence appeal challenged the application of aggravating factors and sought a reduction due to COVID-19 incarceration conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the conviction and upholding the sentence as fit given the extensive aggravating circumstances, including the large scale of the fraud, its devastating impact on victims, and the appellant's history of similar offenses.

The appellant, Jorge Berganza-Zaldana, appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography.

Police found child pornography on a digital backup of his phone on a desktop computer.

The appellant argued the Crown failed to prove knowledge and intent, suggesting the backup was created automatically and without his knowledge.

The trial judge, relying on circumstantial evidence and *R. v. Villaroman*, found the only reasonable inference was that the appellant intentionally created the backup with knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable and supported the conviction, upholding the application of the circumstantial evidence standard.

The appellant, Haleigh Hutchinson, appealed the length of a 10-year driving prohibition imposed after pleading guilty to dangerous driving causing death.

The collision occurred when the appellant was driving significantly over the speed limit, resulting in the victim's death.

The sentencing judge imposed a conditional sentence, a probation order, and a 10-year driving prohibition.

The appellant argued the judge erred in principle by relying on a benchmark case (R. v. Frickey) and by failing to consider a pre-sentence license suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court affirmed that deterrence and denunciation are paramount sentencing objectives in dangerous driving cases and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the overall sentence.

The court found the distinctions from Frickey were not material enough to warrant a shorter prohibition and that the judge's discretion regarding credit for the pre-sentence suspension was not erred.

The appellant, Cassandra Lorenne Ross, appealed a summary judgment order concerning the division of proceeds from a jointly held property with the respondent, Phillip Edward Glenn Surridge, following their separation.

The original motion judge found unjust enrichment in favour of the respondent, who had made all property payments, and denied the appellant's claim for occupation rent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings on unjust enrichment, the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment, and the lack of donative intent.

The court also upheld the denial of occupation rent due to insufficient evidence and the respondent's entitlement to reimbursement for property improvements.

The appellant, J.Y.L., appealed his conviction for historical sexual offenses involving a complainant, D.H., arguing that the trial judge erred by not determining the physical possibility of the assault as described and by focusing solely on credibility over reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence despite minor inconsistencies, especially given the significant passage of time since the incident.

Following an appeal where a new trial was ordered, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement regarding the costs of the first trial.

The parties had agreed on appeal costs but not on trial costs.

The Court agreed with the respondent's submission that the disposition of the costs of the first trial should be left to the trial judge hearing the new trial, as that judge would be in the best position to determine the issue.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissing her two actions against the respondent, alleging misapprehension of evidence, erroneous refusal of an adjournment, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, concluding that the appellant failed to raise a genuine issue requiring a trial and did not establish any error in the exercise of discretion, bias, or procedural unfairness.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a parking agreement's rate calculation clause and the determination of new parking rates.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by deeming the clause unambiguous despite fundamental undefined terms, and by improperly relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence while rejecting expert evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the Court re-interpreted the clause, establishing the monthly parking rates based on the appellants' expert evidence.

The appellant, Grandfield Homes (Kenton) Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that denied its request for a trial on damages beyond forfeited deposits in a failed residential real estate transaction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the claim for additional damages was not sufficiently pleaded in the notice of application or supporting evidence.

The court emphasized that relief sought must be precisely stated in pleadings and that counsel's confirmation during cross-examination that additional damages were not sought in the application was binding.

The court also agreed that ordering a separate trial on damages would result in an unnecessary bifurcation and multiplicity of proceedings, causing potential prejudice to the respondent.

The moving parties sought to review an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion for a stay of two interlocutory orders from a Superior Court case management judge.

The interlocutory orders had vacated pre-trial and trial dates and allowed a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the review motion, finding no factual or legal errors by the motion judge, who correctly applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The panel also noted that the stay motion was moot as the vacated dates were long past and the disputed motions had already been heard and were under reserve.

The Bank of Nevis International Limited (BONIL) appealed the dismissal of its action against Mark Kucher and BNI Holdcorp Ltd. The motion judge had dismissed BONIL's action, determining that Nevis, not Ontario, was the proper forum based on an exclusive jurisdiction clause and, alternatively, forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal dismissed BONIL's appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the forum selection clause applied to Mr. Kucher despite him not being a direct party to the agreement, and that Nevis was the more appropriate forum.

This appeal concerned a dispute over commercial rent arrears, specifically whether a binding rent relief agreement was in place during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issues for trial due to alleged inconsistencies and an incomplete record.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's factual findings, including that the rent relief offer had expired before acceptance and that no waiver or promissory estoppel applied.

The appeal was dismissed.