Patrick J. Monahan

This appeal concerned the limitation period for an underinsured motorist claim.

The appellant insurer sought summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred, asserting that a demand for indemnification was made in April 2016.

The motion judge, relying on *Schmitz v. Lombard General Insurance Company of Canada*, found that the first valid demand for compensatory damages was made in February 2019, thus the limitation period began running in February 2019, making the action timely.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere with the factual findings or the application of *Schmitz*.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for manslaughter and robbery, appealed his designation as a high-risk accused (HRA) under s. 672.64(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's discretionary decision, considering the appellant's extensive history of severe mental disorder, repetitive violent behaviour against strangers, and treatment resistance.

The court found the trial judge's conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood of the appellant using violence that could endanger the life or safety of another person was reasonable and supported by the evidence, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order that increased the respondent father's parenting time to a 50/50 schedule.

The appeal raised issues including whether a material change in circumstances was required to vary a final order containing a review term, the admission of hearsay evidence, the amendment of pleadings at trial, and the consideration of the children's best interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that a review term in a final parenting order can negate the need for a material change in circumstances if properly justified and delimited.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on evidence, pleading amendments, and the children's best interests, and denied the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence.

The appellant, having initiated parallel spousal support proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice and divorce/equalization in the Superior Court of Justice, appealed the dismissal of her spousal support claim.

The initial dismissal was due to improper use of resources and jurisdictional issues.

The Superior Court appeal judge remitted the matter back to the Ontario Court of Justice for submissions on jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found this disposition failed to promote the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, which is to deal with cases justly and efficiently.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lower appeal order, and transferred the spousal support application to the Superior Court of Justice to be heard concurrently with the equalization and divorce claims, imposing a stay on the Ontario Court of Justice application.

Costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant landlord appealed a judgment finding it in breach of a commercial lease, granting specific performance, and awarding damages to the respondent tenant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings, interpretation of the lease, grant of specific performance, or assessment of damages, noting the appellant failed to present expert evidence to challenge the damages methodology at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Cory Joseph Marsh, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the complainant's out-of-court demeanor evidence and provided insufficient reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's out-of-court demeanor as admissible circumstantial evidence alongside other confirmatory evidence, and that the reasons for conviction, though brief, were sufficient for appellate review given the straightforward nature of the case and the agreed statement of facts.

This appeal addresses the application of the open court principle to court-approved settlements involving minors or persons under disability, as required by Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants sought sealing orders for motion records related to these settlements, arguing that such motions, heard in writing, are not subject to the open court principle, or that the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, privacy interests, and solicitor-client privilege justify sealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, affirming that the open court principle applies to written proceedings and that neither parens patriae nor solicitor-client privilege provides a freestanding basis for sealing orders.

The court found that the appellants did not meet the Sherman test for a sealing order, as the privacy interests were not at serious risk of undermining dignity, and the protection of minors/disabled persons and solicitor-client privilege were not seriously jeopardized by public access.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application seeking an accounting of her late mother's estate.

The application judge had dismissed the application on two grounds: that a 2019 consent order concluded the matter, and that further litigation would constitute an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decision, upholding the interpretation of the consent order and the finding of abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

This appeal involved cross-appeals concerning the recognition of an Omani foreign divorce and the Superior Court's jurisdiction over parenting issues for the parties' child.

The Court of Appeal upheld the recognition of the Omani divorce, finding that the applicant had attorned to the Omani court's jurisdiction by voluntarily participating in the proceedings on the merits.

The court also upheld the Superior Court's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over parenting matters, determining that the child was habitually resident in Ontario at the relevant time, and that the Omani divorce order did not oust this jurisdiction.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, L.G., appealed his conviction for gross indecency and sexual assault, which occurred in 1985-1986 when the complainant was 14.

The appellant claimed the sexual activity in 1987 was consensual.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence due to inconsistencies with his police statement and implausibility, and found the defence witnesses' testimony incredible due to suspected collusion or tainting.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's consistent evidence, which was corroborated by independent, non-contentious details.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not reverse the burden of proof in assessing defence evidence and did not err in considering circumstantial evidence as confirmatory, as it was more consistent with the complainant's account.

The appellant, H.S., appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault against his ex-girlfriend, raising three grounds: the trial judge's dismissal of an application to reopen the case to cross-examine the complainant on an alleged inconsistency in her Victim Impact Statement (VIS), the dismissal of a s. 276 application to introduce evidence of their sexual relationship, and a flawed credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistency in the VIS, upholding the s. 276 ruling as the evidence lacked probative value beyond prohibited inferences, and affirming the trial judge's credibility assessment as entitled to deference.

The appellants (Crown) appealed a Divisional Court order that declared the Math Proficiency Test (MPT) unconstitutional for infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter due to disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates, and found it not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred by relying on incomplete and preliminary data (July 2021 Data) to conclude a disproportionate adverse impact.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing more complete data (December 2021 Data), determined that the MPT did not have a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized candidates' entry to the teaching profession, nor did it reinforce existing disadvantages.

The appeal was allowed, and the Divisional Court's order, including the declaration that s. 18(1)(c) of the OCTA was unconstitutional, was set aside.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a 1975 cost-sharing provision in a Subdivision Agreement between a developer's assignee (appellant) and a municipality (respondent).

The appellant sought payment for infrastructure costs from the municipality, arguing that the provision was triggered by a new subdivision on adjacent lands.

The application judge found that the cost-sharing obligation was only triggered if the adjacent lands derived a benefit from the appellant's infrastructure, and no such benefit was proven.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, agreeing that the agreement, when read holistically and with commercial sense, required a benefit to be conferred for the cost-sharing to apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to exclude evidence obtained during a border search, finding that a border services officer violated the respondent's ss. 7 and 10 Charter rights.

The trial judge determined that the officer had formed a particularized suspicion, engaging the respondent's Charter rights, and applied the R. v. Grant test to exclude the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, deferring to the trial judge's fact-driven findings, particularly on the officer's credibility, and finding no reversible error in the s. 24(2) analysis.

The appellant, Joshua Rodrigues, appealed his conviction for unreasonable verdict and his sentence regarding a victim fee surcharge.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge used illogical reasoning to reject the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were detailed, comprehensive, and not illogical or inconsistent with the evidence.

The appeal against sentence, specifically concerning the $1,800 victim fee surcharge, was allowed on consent, and that portion of the sentence order was set aside.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment order for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) of a cottage property.

The sellers (appellants) asserted the APS had terminated, refusing to close.

The buyers (respondents) sued and obtained specific performance.

The appellants argued the APS terminated on November 5, 2020, due to a consent to sever condition, or on December 22, 2020, due to a "finality clause" and Planning Act non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that the severance condition was satisfied or waived by the sellers' lawyer's representations and the sellers' subsequent conduct.

The court also upheld that the sellers could not rely on the "finality clause" as they were in breach of their obligation to diligently obtain necessary consents under the Planning Act.

The transaction had already closed, and the property transferred to the buyers.

The appellant, Dmitri Davidov, appealed his conviction for importation and conspiracy to import cocaine, and sought leave to appeal a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly using inconsistencies between the appellant's pre-trial police statement and trial testimony to infer guilt, rather than solely for credibility assessment.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming and the conviction inevitable.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal the non-communication order was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the order was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion to protect witnesses.

The moving party, Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550, brought a motion to quash an appeal by the Del Ridge defendants.

The appeal concerned a motion judge's order that denied variations to previous relief regarding expert reports and denied a motion for a stay of the underlying action based on the non-disclosure of a Pierringer Agreement.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence aspect of the order to be interlocutory, but the denial of the stay related to the Pierringer Agreement to be a final order, thus appealable to the Court of Appeal.

Given the interrelatedness of the issues, the court decided to hear both aspects of the appeal together.

The motion to quash was denied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their defamation action under an anti-SLAPP motion, which arose from the respondent briefly sharing a Facebook post alleging theft of charitable funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to demonstrate sufficient harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court emphasized the lack of evidence of actual harm beyond a legal presumption and the brief duration of the impugned post.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for damages related to an oil spill caused by a corroded oil filter.

The appellant argued that the respondent's oil burner technician (OBT) breached the standard of care by failing to replace the filter, citing manufacturer instructions for annual replacement, the Ontario Installation Code for Oil-Burning Equipment, and a duty to 'tag out' the filter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the OBT was not obligated to replace the filter if it was in good condition, that manufacturer instructions were recommendations rather than requirements under the Code, and that the 'tag out' requirement did not apply as the OBT deemed the filter in good working order.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial judge's factual findings.