Patrick J. Monahan

The appellants, estates and family members of victims of the downing of Ukrainian Airlines flight PS752 by Iran, sought to enforce a default judgment against Iranian properties and bank accounts in Canada.

The motion judge dismissed the enforcement, finding the properties enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, ruling that the Canadian Executive's determination, via a s. 11 certificate under the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, that the Iranian property retains diplomatic status is conclusive and not subject to judicial review based on the property's current "use" for diplomatic purposes, even after diplomatic relations were severed.

The court affirmed the Executive's exclusive prerogative in foreign relations and diplomatic immunity matters.

The appellant, S.T., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's findings regarding the appellant's sobriety were unreasonable and erroneous, and the trial judge's finding of partiality in a defence witness was not supported by evidence and led to an erroneous rejection of their testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material, reversible error.

The court held that the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's intoxication was within their purview and did not require expert evidence.

While the finding of witness partiality was problematic due to lack of opportunity for the parties to respond, it was deemed not material to the overall assessment of evidence or the trial's outcome, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, K.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, having abandoned his sentence appeal.

The incident involved conflicting accounts of a sexual encounter.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony, finding it contradicted by text messages, and accepted the complainant's evidence as logical, consistent, and supported by other evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, affirming the high degree of deference owed to credibility findings on appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing child pornography, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that s. 8 of the Charter was not engaged when his wife voluntarily turned over computers containing evidence to the police, and by failing to find a s. 8 breach due to delayed reporting of the seizure.

The Court of Appeal found that s. 8 was engaged when police took control of the computers, constituting a seizure.

While the seizure of Computer 1 was found to be lawful under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code, the delay in filing the report to a justice for Computer 1 was a Charter breach.

The court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breaches were not serious and the evidence was reliable and essential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Payman Khanlari, appealed a summary judgment order that found him liable for unjust enrichment.

He argued that he was treated unfairly as a self-represented litigant and that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment due to credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument regarding unfair treatment, noting the appellant's familiarity with legal proceedings.

However, the court found that the motion judge erred in quantifying the unjust enrichment by not accounting for payments admittedly made by the appellant to the respondent.

The appeal was allowed to vary the judgment amount.

The appellants sought orders under sections 134 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, alleging various incidents and an ongoing failure by the respondents to reasonably respond to inquiries.

The appeal court was asked to overturn findings of fact made by the application judge.

The court found that all of the application judge's findings were reasonably open on the record and, therefore, dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant, Leslie Watson, moved to review and set aside a prior order from a Motion Judge that required her to provide $15,000 in security for costs for her appeal.

The original security for costs order was based on Rule 61.06(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant lacked sufficient assets to pay costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion, affirming the Motion Judge's application of the test and assessment of the overall justice of the case, and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of $5,000 for the motion.

The Crown appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting a developmentally disabled woman.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to properly apply the Friesen principles, which dictate that sexual offences against vulnerable individuals akin to children are inherently wrongful and require substantial sentences.

The sentencing judge mistakenly reduced the respondent's moral culpability by considering factors such as the absence of overt sexual objectification and "generous" treatment of the victim.

The Court found the original sentence demonstrably unfit and increased it to six years, ordering the respondent's reincarceration despite his recent release on day parole.

The moving parties sought to review and set aside a chambers judge's order that dismissed their motion for an extension of time to review a previous order.

This previous order had also dismissed a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an action that was originally dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal, applying the standard of review for a panel review of a chambers judge's decision under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, found no legal error or misapprehension of evidence by the chambers judge.

The court concluded that the request for an extension of time was properly denied at each stage and dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal originating from an application under the Land Titles Act, as appeals under that Act lie to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant, R.S., appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation and his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's decision to allow the Crown to amend the indictment to include "position of trust" and the reliance on circumstantial evidence to establish a trust relationship.

The sentence appeal contested the lifetime Sexual Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order and the mandatory victim fine surcharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no irreparable prejudice from the indictment amendment and no error in the trial judge's assessment of the trust relationship.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, varying the SOIRA order to 20 years and setting aside the victim fine surcharge, as conceded by the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in credibility assessments of a key defence witness, reversing the onus of proof in assessing circumstantial evidence, misinterpreting expert evidence, and failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding another witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings.

The court emphasized deference to trial judges' credibility assessments and affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the circumstantial evidence test, concluding that the defence's alternative theory was speculative and did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for theft, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order with community privileges, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Board found that an absolute discharge would pose a significant public safety threat due to likely medication non-compliance and substance abuse leading to decompensation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable.

The court rejected arguments that the Board failed to consider the appellant's improvements or misapprehended evidence regarding substance use, emphasizing that appellate review is limited to reasonableness and does not involve reweighing evidence.

Fresh evidence regarding recent decompensation reinforced the Board's conclusion.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the global sentence of 15 months' imprisonment for drug trafficking and breach of undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, clarifying that the sentencing judge's finding was factual and that addiction was properly weighed against aggravating factors, including the commercial motive, repeat offending, and breach of release conditions.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding it within the appropriate range and that a conditional sentence was insufficient for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant, Alexsander Budimirovic, appealed his conviction for two counts of fraud and one count of attempted fraud.

The appeal raised four grounds: the trial judge's failure to give a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning between counts, error in admitting videotaped hearsay statements (Hockett Statements) for their truth, failure to caution the jury about relying on the Hockett Statements without corroboration, and refusal to grant an adjournment after the appellant discharged his counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's instructions on propensity reasoning, the admissibility of the Hockett Statements based on procedural reliability, the adequacy of the caution regarding the statements, and the proper exercise of discretion in refusing the adjournment.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and making sexually explicit materials available to a child.

The appeal challenged these convictions on grounds of the trial judge's misapprehension of the complainant's evidence regarding her mother's presence during the alleged sexual touching, and the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and ordering a new trial on those counts, finding that the trial judge had materially misapprehended key evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

However, the conviction for making sexually explicit material available was upheld.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the entire appeal, arguing that the trial judge correctly applied the common sense approach to child witnesses and that reasons were sufficient.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an 8.5-year sentence for five counts of driving while disqualified.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record, including numerous prior driving offences and a previous 10-year sentence for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The current offences were committed while the appellant was on parole and subject to multiple driving prohibitions, including a lifetime ban, and involved the use of a fraudulent driver's licence.

The Court of Appeal considered arguments regarding proportionality, parity, the jump principle, and the totality principle.

The court found no errors in principle by the sentencing judge, emphasizing the appellant's incorrigibility and the increased maximum sentence for driving while disqualified.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental illness, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition maintaining his detention at a high-security psychiatric facility.

The appellant argued the ORB failed to consider all statutory factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, recognize a treatment impasse, and exercise its inquisitorial and supervisory powers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision reasonable.

The court held that the ORB properly considered all relevant factors, reasonably declined to find a treatment impasse given the facility's ongoing efforts to find treatment options, and adequately fulfilled its supervisory responsibilities.

The appellants appealed an approval and vesting order that authorized a receiver to sell a property in receivership.

One of the appellants, a second mortgagee, sought to redeem the first mortgage or be recognized as a successful creditor bidder, arguing an absolute right to redeem under the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motions judge's decision that the right to redeem is qualified once a court-approved sales process has been undertaken in a receivership.

The court emphasized balancing the right to redeem against the integrity of the court-supervised sales process, finding no error in the motions judge's conclusion that the sales process was fair and the balance favoured its integrity.

The appellant, A.I.B., appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault, and the dismissal of his application to re-open the trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis and the refusal to re-open the trial based on new legal developments and alleged inconsistencies in the victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or the application of the Palmer test for re-opening the trial.