Marc Rosenberg

The respondent contracted to provide fundraising services to the appellant Indian band for a fee of 15 percent 'including GST'.

The appellant, being tax-exempt under the Indian Act, argued that the phrase meant it was entitled to a discount equivalent to the GST a non-exempt client would pay.

The application judge rejected this interpretation, finding the contract unambiguous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the phrase simply referred to the GST the appellant had to pay, which was zero, and did not imply any discount from the 15 percent fee.

The Special Investigation Unit (SIU), a non-party to the civil action, appealed an order requiring it to produce an unedited copy of its investigation file, specifically the SIU Director's Report to the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in determining the report was relevant.

The court held that the information in the report was derivative of other sources in the file, and the Director's legal analysis and lead investigator's assessment were not relevant to any material issue in the action.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 24 months' imprisonment and probation for multiple counts of robbery, unlawful confinement, and related offences arising from an armed robbery at a grocery store.

The appellant argued his sentence was disproportionate compared to similar cases.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not manifestly unfit, noting the serious aggravating factors including planning, multiple perpetrators, and the use of an imitation machine gun.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant municipality appealed a no-fault remediation order issued by the Ministry of the Environment under s. 157.1 of the Environmental Protection Act following a fuel oil spill that migrated onto municipal property.

The appellant sought to introduce evidence before the Environmental Review Tribunal to prove that others were at fault for the spill, relying on the 'polluter pays' principle.

The Tribunal excluded this evidence as irrelevant to the environmental protection objective of the Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Tribunal's decision, confirming that evidence of third-party fault is irrelevant to whether a no-fault order should be revoked.

The appellants appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact that there was no consideration.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred regarding mitigation, as ongoing litigation alone did not justify the respondent's refusal to accept a recall to work, absent evidence of a poisoned workplace.

The Court declined to consider promissory estoppel as it was not raised at trial.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the notice period to eight months, with costs of the appeal awarded to the respondent.

In an addendum to a previous appeal decision, the Court of Appeal accepted a joint submission regarding the time to pay a $10,700 fine imposed in lieu of forfeiture.

The offender was granted two years to pay the fine following her latest date of release from custody in relation to her current and pending sentences.

A five-year-old child was injured in a single-vehicle accident while a passenger in her father's uninsured vehicle.

The child sought coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of her mother's automobile insurance policy.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the father's vehicle was excluded from the definition of 'uninsured automobile' because the father was the spouse of the named insured.

The motion judge found that 'the insured' in the exclusionary clause referred only to the person making the claim, meaning the child was entitled to coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, finding it consistent with the purpose of the Insurance Act to internalize driving costs and the principle that ambiguities in insurance coverage should be resolved in favour of the insured.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision regarding the administration of an estate, and the respondent cross-appealed seeking the removal of the estate trustee.

The Court of Appeal varied the judgment to provide that all remaining funds be held back until the final passing of accounts, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as it was impractical to insert a new estate trustee on the eve of the passing of accounts.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a collateral mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the limitation period did not begin to run until a demand was made.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $7,500.

The appellants appealed a decision setting aside a stay of proceedings granted by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the officer's conduct might have justified a finding of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not the only remedy available.

The court emphasized that a stay is a prospective remedy of last resort, and lesser remedies, such as disregarding the officer's testimony or addressing disclosure issues, were sufficient to remove any prejudice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and cross-appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity scale fixed at $45,000.

The appellant and other responding insurers were awarded additional costs fixed at $20,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, arguing he faced a serious risk of torture if returned to Arkansas due to solitary confinement and potential sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision to extradite without assurances was not unreasonable as the applicant presented no evidence to support his claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that a special jury instruction was required for his post-offence conduct and that simple possession should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that possession was a continuing offence and there was no air of reality to the simple possession theory.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle by refusing a conditional sentence.

The appellant, Tarion Warranty Corporation, appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that allowed the respondent's appeal from convictions and sentences imposed at an ex parte trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred by allowing the appeal on grounds not raised by the respondent and without giving the appellant an opportunity to address concerns regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence.

However, because there were serious gaps in the evidentiary record regarding the admissibility of business records, the Court of Appeal declined to restore the convictions.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment of the appeal judge was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, assaulting a police officer, failing to comply with a recognizance, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended inconsistencies in the police officers' evidence and failed to properly address allegations of police collusion and fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies and reasonably concluded that the officers did not fabricate their evidence.

The parties made costs submissions following an appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties, the Court of Appeal ordered that there be no costs awarded for the motion for leave to appeal or the appeal.

This was a sentence appeal from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness in sentencing because the trial judge imposed a sentence considerably above the Crown's submission without inviting further submissions and refused to allow the appellant to speak before sentence.

The Court of Appeal found it sufficient to resolve the appeal on those two issues.

Given the time already served and the appellant's continuing commitment to treatment, leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to time served, with probation terms remaining in force subject to any future variation application.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment regarding a lien registered against the respondent's unit for unpaid common expenses.

The Court of Appeal held that under section 85 of the Condominium Act, a separate lien arises upon each default, meaning late registration only invalidates liens arising more than three months prior to registration.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the appellant failed to provide adequate written notice for the subsequent liens, as notice of an expired lien cannot cover subsequent defaults.

The appellant pleaded guilty to charges arising from a violent home invasion where he and an accomplice forced their way into a residence, bound the victim, stole property, and discharged a firearm while fleeing.

He was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh evidence of severe medical issues suffered while in custody, including a stabbing and an allergic reaction requiring a permanent tracheotomy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the nine-year sentence was at the low end of the range and that the paramount considerations of denunciation and general deterrence for such a serious offence overshadowed the appellant's medical condition, which should be managed by the Parole Board and penitentiary authorities.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

During the investigation, an undercover police officer posed as an Obeah spiritual advisor and obtained incriminating statements from two of the appellants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the undercover operation violated their Charter rights to freedom of religion and equality, constituted a 'dirty trick', and that the statements were protected by common law religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants' participation was motivated by a desire to obstruct the justice system rather than sincere religious belief, and that the police conduct did not shock the conscience of the community.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding an in camera hearing and the refusal to sever the trial of the third co-accused.