Christopher Joseph Bittle

The defendant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding damages to a purchaser of a used vehicle that had been misrepresented as having all‑wheel drive.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to properly consider mitigation and in calculating damages.

The court held that the respondent had taken reasonable steps to mitigate her losses while pursuing rescission through OMVIC and later trading the vehicle in for another.

However, the trial judge erred in including the entire financing cost of the vehicle in the damages calculation.

The appeal was allowed in part and damages were recalculated to reflect the unused value of warranty costs, a deduction for use of the vehicle, and the trade‑in value received.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming the respondent failed to accommodate his post-concussion syndrome by requiring him to work alone, which led to his termination.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's medical restrictions did not state he could not work alone, and there was no evidence linking his difficulties during the shift to his disability.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the respondent's counterclaim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The respondent had alleged fraudulent misrepresentation regarding a fuel-saving device but failed to file responding evidence on the summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by relying on unsupported pleadings and misapprehending when the limitation period commenced.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the counterclaim.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a collateral mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the limitation period did not begin to run until a demand was made.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $7,500.

Following a successful foreclosure claim on a mortgage in default, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis pursuant to the mortgage terms.

The plaintiff claimed $47,075 in legal fees, while the defendant argued for approximately $21,000 on a partial indemnity basis and challenged several bill of costs entries.

The court considered the complexity of the litigation, including limitation issues and the time gap between the debt, mortgage, and enforcement proceedings.

Although the court accepted that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate, it found portions of counsel’s preparation time for discovery and trial excessive.

The court fixed costs at $35,000 on a substantial indemnity basis plus disbursements and HST.

The corporate respondent requested that the human rights application alleging sexual harassment and disability discrimination be dismissed as untimely.

The respondent argued that the last incident occurred in February 2011 when it informed the applicant of the steps taken to address her concerns, making her March 2012 application out of time.

The applicant argued that her resignation in March 2011, prompted by the respondent's failure to accommodate her disability and protect her from a poisoned work environment, was the final incident.

The Tribunal found that the events culminating in the applicant's resignation constituted a series of incidents within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code, and therefore the application was timely.

The applicant alleged discrimination by his union and several employers regarding work opportunities and accommodation of his disability.

At a summary hearing, the applicant conceded that allegations against several employers and the personal respondent were untimely or should be removed.

The Tribunal found the remaining allegations against the union were filed outside the one-year limitation period without a good faith explanation for the delay, and dismissed them.

However, the Tribunal found the applicant's allegation that Plan Group failed to accommodate his disability up to the point of undue hardship had a reasonable prospect of success, as a factual nexus existed and a full evidentiary record was required to determine if the duty to accommodate was met.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment dismissing a counterclaim on the basis that it was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002 and disclosed no reasonable cause of action against individual plaintiffs.

The court held that the evidentiary record did not establish when the counterclaiming party discovered the alleged misrepresentations concerning the product at issue, and therefore the limitation issue required a full evidentiary record at trial.

The court also found that the pleadings alleged misrepresentations through corporate communications and other channels and were not limited to personal communications with the individual plaintiffs.

The allegations were sufficiently particularized to sustain causes of action including fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and disgorgement.

Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

A civil action arising from the 2003 purchase of residential property where the defendants allegedly failed to obtain a required certificate of approval for a septic system.

During a pre‑trial in a long‑standing action commenced in 2008 under the Simplified Procedure Rules, the court addressed ongoing delays and the addition of multiple third parties.

To ensure finality and advance the proceeding, the court ordered that the matter proceed to a summary trial with affidavits serving as examinations‑in‑chief and imposed strict procedural deadlines for document disclosure, expert reports, affidavits, requests to admit, and trial materials.

The court also fixed the trial date and limited cross‑examinations.

The plaintiff sought foreclosure on a mortgage securing loans advanced to her spouse and his son, who were registered owners of the mortgaged property.

One defendant disputed executing the mortgage and argued that any enforcement was barred by the limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court found on a balance of probabilities that the defendant had signed the mortgage and that the document was valid and enforceable.

Interpreting the mortgage as collateral security with a fixed term and demand feature, the court held that the limitation period had not expired because demand was made in 2008 prior to maturity of the mortgage term.

The court granted foreclosure and possession of the mortgaged property.

The applicant, who has bipolar affective disorder, alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability after her employment was terminated for performance issues.

She signed a release upon termination but her psychiatrist subsequently requested accommodation.

The Tribunal found that the respondent did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, of the applicant's disability prior to termination, as she had returned from medical leaves with no restrictions and made no request for accommodation.

The Tribunal further held that the release signed by the applicant barred any post-termination duty to accommodate.

The application was dismissed.

The respondent employer brought a preliminary motion to dismiss a human rights application as an abuse of process, arguing the applicant had signed a full and final release upon termination.

The applicant, who has bipolar affective disorder, argued the release was signed under duress and without legal capacity.

The Tribunal found no duress and concluded the applicant had the legal capacity to sign the release.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the motion to dismiss because the employer ignored a letter from the applicant's psychiatrist requesting accommodation sent shortly after the termination, and because there were unresolved questions regarding the employer's knowledge of the disability and whether the release violated the Employment Standards Act by excluding disability benefits during the statutory notice period.