Sexual assault

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his daughter.

The trial judge was Justice Fletcher Dawson, sitting with a jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination of the complainant's mother and sisters regarding uncharged abusive conduct; (2) that the trial judge made a section 276 error regarding evidence of the complainant's sexual activity; and (3) that the trial judge made a Browne v. Dunn error by failing to ensure that contradictory evidence was put to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault against his stepdaughter beginning when she was 15 years old, with violations occurring over approximately 20 months.

The trial judge relied heavily on an audio recording surreptitiously captured by the complainant in her bedroom on November 3, 2019.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge unfairly amplified the audio recording during deliberations, misapprehended its contents, misapprehended evidence relating to chronology of events, erred in assessing credibility of both the complainant and appellant, and misused a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no trial fairness issues, no misapprehension of evidence, and no credibility errors.

The appellant appealed his conviction on five counts (three counts of distributing intimate images without consent, one count of criminal harassment, and one count of sexual assault) on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the conviction for delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found that the net delay of 506 days did not exceed the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan by attributing 196 days to defence delay.

On appeal, the court reconsidered the attribution of three disputed periods of delay in light of subsequent Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions, ultimately finding that the net delay was 515 days, which remained within the reasonable time threshold for a provincial court trial.

The appellant was convicted of one count of assault and one count of sexual assault relating to the same complainant and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant raised two related grounds: first, that the trial was rendered unfair because he lacked testimonial capacity due to mental illness; and second, that the trial was unfair because the counts in the indictment were vague and failed to identify specific instances of assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application regarding the appellant's psychiatric condition, finding that the evidence lacked cogency without expert opinion linking the mental illness to testimonial capacity.

The court also rejected the indictment vagueness argument, finding that the counts did not violate the single transaction rule and that the appellant received full disclosure and knew the case he had to meet.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, contrary to sections 271 and 151(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's lack of embellishment as a credibility factor, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to the complainant being a careful and cautious witness was a proper credibility assessment, and that the reasons, though brief, adequately explained the trial judge's findings when read in context and as a whole.

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault on multiple grounds, including alleged errors in the trial judge's application of the burden and standard of proof, an adverse inference from silence, the admission of testimony regarding the complainant's demeanour, and improper reliance on the complainant's testimonial demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of law or consideration of evidence.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against two children under the age of 16 years.

The trial judge found that the appellant had committed sexual offences against both complainants in a park in Brantford on a single occasion in August 2019, and that he had also sexually abused one complainant over an extended period in the family home prior to the park incident.

The appellant was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: alleged errors in the W.(D.) analysis, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and misapprehension of DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching of his stepsister.

On appeal, the court found two critical errors: (1) the trial judge improperly discontinued cross-examination of a key witness based on insufficient medical evidence and then relied on that witness's testimony to support the conviction, and (2) the trial judge placed undue weight on the appellant's demeanour to reject his evidence as untruthful, despite initially finding him credible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions on two counts were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to prove his innocence rather than requiring the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that the trial judge erred in failing to resolve significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, correctly assessed credibility, and was not required to address every minor contradiction raised by the defence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact with a child under 16 years of age contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code and sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant's testimony, which was corroborated by contemporaneous text messages and video evidence.

The Court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's application of sentencing principles and rejecting the appellant's argument that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the breach of trust involved.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment following conviction on three counts of sexual assault.

The offences occurred in 1989 and involved the appellant's 17-year-old niece whom he had sponsored to come to Canada from the Philippines.

The appellant threatened not to sponsor the complainant's mother and siblings if she revealed the assaults.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in principle by the sentencing judge and dismissed the sentence appeal.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's dementia was rejected as insufficient to warrant sentence reduction.

The applicant was convicted of two counts of human trafficking and sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment.

She sought bail pending appeal on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing an application to re-litigate the hearsay issue; and (3) the trial judge misapprehended evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, granting bail pending appeal.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and one count of gross indecency against his niece and nephew.

He appealed on the basis that his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) was violated.

The trial lasted 660 days from the swearing of the information to the end of closing submissions, exceeding the Jordan threshold of 548 days by 112 days.

The trial judge dismissed the section 11(b) application, finding that after deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances, the net delay fell just short of the threshold.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made errors in calculating defence delay and pandemic-related delay.

After correcting these errors, the net delay was 571 days, exceeding the Jordan threshold by 23 days.

The court set aside the convictions and stayed the proceedings.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple criminal offences involving domestic abuse and sexual assault of his former domestic partner.

He appealed his convictions on two grounds: (1) that the jury charge on myths and stereotypes was imbalanced and insufficient, and (2) that the jury instruction on prior consistent statements was inadequate.

He also sought leave to appeal his five-year sentence for sexual assault, arguing it was excessive and based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding his conduct in other relationships.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge, while not perfect, was functional and equipped jurors to decide the case according to law.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the five-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the severity of the offence and the offender's moral culpability.

The appellant, a bar manager, was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism after sexually assaulting a female employee in the bar basement while intentionally having the incident recorded by a security camera.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the trial judge over-relied on the complainant's demeanor when assessing credibility; (2) the trial judge misapplied the adopted admissions rule by relying on text messages between the appellant and his co-accused; and (3) the trial judge misapplied the doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and extortion, raising two grounds: (1) whether the application judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay following a mistrial, and (2) whether the Crown's improper question about child pornography rendered the retrial unfair.

The Court of Appeal held that mistrials do not reset the Jordan clock but must be assessed within the Jordan framework as potential discrete exceptional circumstances.

The mistrial in this case was found to be a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from a shared misunderstanding of law regarding the materiality of dates in the indictment.

The Crown's improper question was adequately remedied by timely and forceful corrective instructions from the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, two counts of assault, and threatening death committed against his 12-13 year-old step-daughter, as well as his indeterminate sentence as a designated dangerous offender.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant and argued the trial judge erred in principle by misapprehending expert evidence regarding age-related attenuation of violence and reoffending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning or application of the law.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching entered on November 22, 2023.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury to disregard Crown closing submissions regarding the absence of the complainant's mother's testimony about witnessing the alleged incidents.

The appellant argued that the Crown's submission was improper because the mother had told police she witnessed an incident that was not testified to at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown properly based its submission on evidence actually led at trial and that defence counsel's failure to cross-examine the mother about her police statement was a tactical decision.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and incest against his daughter, committed between November 1998 and February 2002 when the victim was between 8 and 12 years old.

He was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the fairness of the trial based on the Crown's closing address and the reasonableness of the incest conviction.

He also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions, sufficient evidence to support the incest conviction, and that the sentence was fit and warranted given the appellant's prior conviction for similar offences against a young child.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and his sentence.

The appellant was charged in September 2019 with sexual assault and administering a noxious substance.

The latter charge was withdrawn.

Following a hung jury in June 2022, the appellant was tried before a judge alone, who found that he sexually assaulted the complainant twice.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter regarding an overbroad search of his cell phone; (2) the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 7 of the Charter based on non-disclosure of the information to obtain the search warrant and minimized the materiality of the hotel video in the conviction; and (3) the trial judge erred in failing to grant sufficient sentencing credit for harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.