Fernando Belton

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to prove his innocence rather than requiring the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that the trial judge erred in failing to resolve significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, correctly assessed credibility, and was not required to address every minor contradiction raised by the defence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact with a child under 16 years of age contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code and sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant's testimony, which was corroborated by contemporaneous text messages and video evidence.

The Court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's application of sentencing principles and rejecting the appellant's argument that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the breach of trust involved.

The appellant appealed convictions for non-consensual distribution of intimate images, criminal harassment, extortion by libel, and mischief to computer data.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, argued that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient assistance and erred by allowing the trial to proceed without counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial was fair, the judge provided adequate assistance, and the appellant's actions suggested an attempt to delay proceedings rather than a genuine inability to secure counsel.

The applicant, who was granted refugee status in 2006, applied for judicial review of a Refugee Protection Division decision ceasing her refugee protection.

The RPD found that the applicant had voluntarily availed herself of the protection of Haiti by obtaining and renewing a Haitian passport and traveling to Haiti at least 11 times.

The Federal Court found the RPD's decision reasonable, noting that the applicant's explanations for the trips did not demonstrate they were involuntary, and that the RPD was not required to assess the risk of return since no evidence of risk was presented.