Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

Four accused were convicted of drug trafficking offences committed for the benefit of a criminal organization (the Five Point Generals), conspiracy to traffic controlled substances, and firearms offences following a three-month jury trial based largely on intercepted communications.

The appellants challenged their convictions on five grounds: jury selection procedures, cross-examination limitations of the Crown's expert witness, exclusion of defence expert evidence, admission of extrinsic misconduct evidence, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.

They also appealed their sentences, primarily challenging the credit awarded for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and three of four sentence appeals, allowing only Shane Evans' sentence appeal based on inadequate credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, a small jewelry business, appealed the dismissal of its action against CIBC following a summary judgment motion.

The appellant claimed that Advantex and CIBC misrepresented a marketing agreement entered into in June 2012, whereby the appellant agreed to pay 14% of sales made through CIBC credit card customers.

The appellant alleged it discovered the misrepresentation in December 2015 when it noticed payment irregularities.

The motion judge found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as it was discoverable no later than December 2012.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on the merits but reduced the costs award from $50,000 to $25,000, finding the motion judge failed to apply the principle of proportionality in a simplified procedure case.

The Attorney General of Canada sought an adjournment of a judicial review application regarding a surrender order to Romania dated March 4, 2019.

The applicant had been in custody in Canada since October 31, 2016, and was subject to a three-year sentence in Romania with credit for time served.

The court granted the adjournment to permit the Minister of Justice to reconsider the surrender decision in light of alleged violations of the Extradition Act, directing reconsideration to occur as soon as possible.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application in contested estate proceedings challenging the validity of powers of attorney executed by their mother in 2013.

The appellants sought to invalidate the 2013 powers of attorney and reinstate 1995 powers of attorney.

The central issue was whether the testator had the requisite capacity to execute the 2013 powers of attorney.

The application judge found that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of capacity with clear evidence on a balance of probabilities.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence or exercise of discretion.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for a fuel oil spill at the respondents' home.

The trial judge found that the appellants negligently failed to identify that the respondents' fuel oil tank, which was labelled for indoor use, was installed outdoors, and failed to tag it as non-compliant.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by applying the 'material contribution' test for causation instead of the 'but for' test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge articulated the wrong test, she effectively applied the 'but for' test by finding the spill would not have occurred if the appellants had fulfilled their regulatory obligations.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's apportionment of liability, finding of contributory negligence, and damages assessment.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition granting a conditional discharge to an NCR accused.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Board found the appellant continued to pose a significant threat and imposed conditions including psychiatric medication compliance, monthly hospital reporting, and substance abstinence.

The Court of Appeal found the Board applied the wrong legal test, conflating the possibility of decompensation with a positive finding of significant threat.

However, fresh evidence of subsequent concerning behaviour (drug use, medication non-compliance, renewed focus on the victim) warranted remission to the Board for reassessment under the correct legal standard.

The Crown appealed the respondent's sentence for sexual interference, arguing it was demonstrably unfit.

The respondent was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault (conditionally stayed) following a jury trial.

The offences involved sexual contact with a 15-year-old complainant who was severely intoxicated.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of six months' imprisonment, reduced to 90 days intermittent upon credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence too lenient and substituted an 18-month sentence, but stayed execution of the remaining custodial portion based on the respondent's rehabilitation efforts and time served in the community without reoffence.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her Superior Court action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant's original Small Claims Court action had been dismissed after a seven-day trial.

She sought to appeal to the Divisional Court but was out of time, and her motion for an extension of time was refused.

The Court of Appeal found that the new Superior Court action was an attempt to relitigate the same issues previously determined and that the respondent had standing to bring the Rule 2.1 motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants sought review of a chambers order dismissing their request to file a 60-page factum in an appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge's decision, finding no error in requiring compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, which limit factums to 30 pages except in exceptional circumstances.

The court found no exceptional circumstances present and determined the appellants could adequately address the relevant issues within the 30-page limit, noting their statement of facts was not sufficiently concise.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his action against the respondent under Rule 2.1.

The Court of Appeal found that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action against the respondent and was plainly frivolous and an abuse of process on its face.

The court upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the Superior Court justice's decision to dismiss the claim without inviting written submissions from the appellant.

The court noted that even if written submissions had been provided, based on the appellant's factum and oral argument, there would be no prospect of a different outcome.

The Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing appealed from a Superior Court declaration that the GotSkill gaming system is not a game as defined under s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had concluded that GotSkill was not a game of mixed chance and skill because a sufficiently skilled player could ultimately beat the machine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that GotSkill is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court clarified that under the Criminal Code, any game containing both elements of chance and skill—regardless of which predominates—falls within the definition of a game.

The presence of a systematic resort to chance when the game is played multiple times, combined with the skill element required in the game task, was sufficient to classify GotSkill as a game of mixed chance and skill.

The appellant developer appealed two summary judgments ordering the return of deposits paid for commercial and residential condominium units in a development.

The respondents had sought to rescind the purchase agreements based on material changes to the development disclosed in revised disclosure statements.

After the developer's financial difficulties led to receivership, the receiver conveyed the units to a third party, making performance impossible.

The motion judge found the agreements were terminated through no fault of the purchasers and ordered return of deposits with interest.

The appellate court upheld both judgments, finding the purchasers had not breached the agreements and were entitled to relief under the contractual termination provisions.

The appellant sought to set aside an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The appellant was a fully informed participant in the settlement, acting on legal advice, and knowingly entered into the settlement structured in the manner challenged on appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no illegality or impropriety in the enforcement of the settlement and upheld the motion judge's decision to enforce it.

The court also upheld the costs award made by the motion judge.

Judgment creditors of a bankrupt company obtained an assignment of the company's claim against its former director for breach of fiduciary duties and failure to supervise.

The creditors commenced an action against the director more than two years after the company's liability was established by judgment.

The central issue was whether the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that while the creditors lacked capacity to sue in the company's name until after bankruptcy, the company itself had discovered the claim when its shareholders received the trial judgment establishing the director's wrongdoing.

The limitation period ran from that earlier date, making the action time-barred.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent approximately $700,000 in damages for personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The main issue at trial was whether the respondent's post-traumatic stress disorder was caused by the collision or by an earlier sexual assault.

The trial judge excluded surveillance video evidence and Facebook posts that the defence sought to introduce as substantive evidence of the respondent's functionality.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the surveillance evidence by dealing with it as a whole rather than taking a discrete approach to each video excerpt, and by concluding that the evidence could only be admissible if it directly contradicted the respondent's testimony.

However, the Court found that even if the surveillance evidence were admissible, it was not so significant that it would have affected the jury's verdict on damages.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping his friend after a judge and jury trial.

He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

On appeal, he challenged the conviction on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in her instructions on the actus reus of aiding and abetting by not emphasizing the need for actual assistance when reviewing the evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in failing to leave with the jury the included offence of "attempt to aid" a kidnapping; (3) the trial judge erred in not linking her W.(D.) instruction to the defence of duress; and (4) the trial judge erred in failing to correct Crown counsel's improper reference to hearsay evidence in closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, cannabis resin, and oxycodone) and sentenced to ten months custody less three days' presentence custody.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds for arrest based on reliable confidential informant information corroborated by police surveillance, that the trial judge did not apply uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and that the trial judge's findings on the trafficking purpose were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed based on fresh evidence of a serious medical issue, and the custodial portion was reduced to time served (44 days with credit for pre-sentence custody), with the victim surcharge set aside.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking following a vehicle stop and search.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter application challenging the legality of the arrest and search.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by treating the existence of statutory authority to arrest for driving with a suspended licence as dispositive, without determining whether the officers subjectively formed an intention to arrest for the road safety purpose underlying that authority.

The court held that the trial judge failed to consider whether the traffic stop was a pretext to further a drug investigation.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and threatening death following a trial by judge alone and sentenced to two years in custody, less time served.

On appeal, the court found that a breach of solicitor-client privilege occurred during trial when the trial judge questioned defence counsel about why certain matters were not put to the complainant during cross-examination.

Defence counsel, in breach of privilege, confirmed that the appellant's testimony differed from what counsel expected.

The trial judge then used this privileged information in his reasons for judgment to draw an adverse inference against the appellant's credibility.

Although the trial judge stated the inference was not determinative, the Court of Appeal found that the use of privileged information created an appearance of unfairness constituting a miscarriage of justice, regardless of whether it was essential to the conviction.

The appellant, Nissa Corporation, inherited a solar power generation lease when it purchased two properties in Napanee from the Business Development Bank of Canada.

The respondent tenant sought declarations that the lease was valid and binding, and that it had the right to connect to the electrical utility system via a transformer located on an adjacent property (60A) and to install inverters in the electrical room of the leased building (61A).

The application judge granted both declarations.

On appeal, the court considered two issues: (1) whether the tenant had the right to connect to the transformer at the adjacent property, and (2) whether the tenant could install inverters inside the building rather than on the roof.

The court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the lease did not extend to the adjacent property but that the tenant could install inverters inside the building.