Karen M. Weiler

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to France for attempted murder.

The applicant argued that the Minister lacked authority to order surrender for attempted murder because the Authority to Proceed was limited to aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was reasonable and that the Minister is not required to align the surrender offence with the offence listed in the Authority to Proceed.

The appellant physician appealed a partial summary judgment order in a medical malpractice action arising from the delayed diagnosis of a brain tumour.

The appellant had admitted breach of the standard of care and causation, leaving only contributory negligence and the specific list of injuries to be determined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error in the burden of proof regarding contributory negligence, and no error in the motions judge's listing of specific injuries based on uncontradicted expert reports.

The mother appealed a trial decision granting sole custody to the father, dismissing her financial claims, and alleged judicial bias because the father's mother worked at the courthouse.

The father cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to reduce the mother's child support obligations by $350 per month for access costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's appeal, finding no error in the custody decision, no basis for the financial claims, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court allowed the father's cross-appeal, removing the access cost deduction and correcting a typographical error in the mother's income for child support purposes, setting ongoing support at $765 per month.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud and use of a forged document.

The charges arose from her cashing Canada Savings Bonds in her sister's name using an allegedly forged power of attorney.

The appellant claimed the funds were hers and placed in her sister's name to hide them during a marital breakdown.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding that even if the funds were hers, cashing bonds in her sister's name constituted fraud, and placed the onus on the appellant to prove the power of attorney was valid.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law on the elements of fraud, improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding the power of attorney, and failed to meaningfully analyze the complainant's evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant pedestrian was struck by a motor vehicle and commenced an action against 'John Doe' within the limitation period.

After the limitation period expired, the appellant successfully moved to substitute the respondent's name for 'John Doe' on the basis of misnomer.

The respondent subsequently brought a successful motion for summary judgment dismissing the action on the basis that the limitation period had expired and the appellant had not exercised due diligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where a true defendant would know on reading the statement of claim that they were the intended defendant, due diligence is not required, and the summary judgment motion was an impermissible indirect attack on the misnomer order.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a schizoaffective disorder.

The appellant argued the Board's reasons were insufficient, unreasonable, and failed to properly consider his refusal of medication due to side effects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's chain of analysis clear, its decision reasonable, and noting the appellant's inability to recognize his illness rendered him incapable with respect to all proposed medication.

The appellant buyer appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for specific performance and damages arising from an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondent sellers relied on an annulment clause to terminate the agreement after a third party registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation on the property just prior to closing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's correspondence on the closing date amounted to a demand for clear title rather than a request to extend closing, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants, authorized medical marijuana users, sued the respondents after being ejected from a bar because they smelled of marijuana.

The motion judge struck their claim under Rule 21 for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and as an abuse of process.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in striking the claim for the tort of intimidation, as all elements were pleaded.

The Court also found the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in concluding the action was an abuse of process based on a misunderstanding of a previous action.

The appeal was allowed in part, reinstating the intimidation claim.

The appellant mother removed her two children from Egypt to Ontario and sought custody under the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA).

The trial judge declined jurisdiction, finding the mother had attorned to the Egyptian courts and should not be rewarded for abducting the children.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the children's psychological distress and allowed the appeal.

The Court held the trial judge erred in his approach to jurisdiction under ss. 22 and 23 of the CLRA, noting that the best interests of the children must prevail over discouraging abduction when there is a risk of serious harm.

The Ontario court assumed jurisdiction and granted interim custody to the mother.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his restaurant.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in her treatment of missing original police notes, and engaged in forbidden oath-helping when assessing police credibility regarding alleged fabricated evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in placing little weight on the missing rough notes given the officers' independent recollections, and no improper oath-helping in the trial judge's consideration of the professional risks officers would face if they fabricated evidence.

The appellant, a criminal defence lawyer, was convicted of smuggling drugs into the Toronto Jail for a former client during a professional visit.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and erred in refusing to order the production of third party records relating to the prevalence of drug smuggling at the jail.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge subjected the appellant's evidence to a stricter level of scrutiny than the Crown's evidence, and erred in concluding that the third party records were not likely relevant.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana and ketamine for the purpose of trafficking after police, acting on a confidential informant's tip and subsequent surveillance, arrested her and searched her vehicle and residences.

On appeal, she argued her ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were violated because the police lacked objectively reasonable grounds for her arrest and the search warrant for her home was unjustified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the informant's tip was credible, compelling, and corroborated by surveillance, providing reasonable grounds for arrest and a sufficient nexus to search the residence.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 13-year-old complainant he met on a dating website.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments, including his reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence, his use of a friend's evidence to corroborate the complainant's allegations, and his finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings and concluding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) test.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against two child complainants and sought leave to appeal a ten-year concurrent sentence.

The court upheld the admission of extrinsic similar fact evidence from two other witnesses, finding the trial judge properly applied the governing framework and reasonably concluded the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect on the issue of actus reus and the credibility of a blanket denial.

The court also held that allegedly improper bad character evidence caused no prejudice because the trial judge effectively disregarded it.

Although the sentencing judge erred by treating extrinsic misconduct as aggravating without the required findings, the sentence remained fit and was upheld.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, arson, and rendering an indignity to a body after he and two accomplices tortured the victim and burned down the house to conceal the crime.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for the production of a Crown witness's third-party psychological records, and in his jury instructions regarding accomplice evidence (Vetrovec warning) and fabricated statements.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred at the first stage of the third-party records analysis, production would not have been ordered at the second stage.

The court also found the jury instructions were adequate and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants sought to amend their statement of claim in a securities class action to add further particulars of wrongful conduct underlying their misrepresentation claims against the corporate respondent.

The motion judge denied leave for most of the amendments, finding they constituted discrete misrepresentation claims requiring fresh leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities Act, and were statute-barred under s. 138.14(1).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, with one limited exception permitting the appellants to plead a narrower omission allegation relating to previously pleaded facts.

The respondent investment dealer terminated the contracts of four sales agents when it closed its Thunder Bay office.

The respondent sued for repayment of transition loans that became due upon termination.

The appellants defended the action, claiming misrepresentation by omission regarding the office closure and equitable set-off.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against two of the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in fact and law, and that a fair and just determination required a trial of all claims and counterclaims together to avoid inconsistent verdicts.

The mother of a child subject to Crown wardship proceedings brought a motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal of a decision dismissing the father's appeal.

The mother had not participated in the trial or the initial appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the Kefeli factors and dismissed the motion, finding that the mother had not formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period, failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the delay, and that her appeal lacked merit as she had not seen the child in over three years and had not participated in the proceedings below.

The appellant appealed a decision making his daughter a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

He argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors and sought to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, including his intention to reunite with the child's mother and the mother's Jewish heritage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors.

The court held that the fresh evidence did not warrant interfering with the trial judge's conclusion that Crown wardship without access remained in the child's best interests, as the appellant failed to rebut the presumption against access and the child required permanency.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant while she was sleeping.

At trial, the appellant denied any sexual contact, but on appeal argued the trial judge erred by not considering the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge found no air of reality to this defence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no clear error in the lower court's conclusion that a defence incompatible with the accused's own testimony lacked an air of reality.