Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring him to pay $150,000 in lump sum child support and ordering his property to vest absolutely in the respondent if unpaid.

The respondent died prior to the appeal, and the proceeding was continued by a litigation administrator.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lump sum support order, finding it was a reasonable exercise of discretion under s. 10(1) of the Child Support Guidelines given the appellant's dissipation of capital assets and failure to pay support since 2001.

However, the court set aside the vesting order, replacing it with an order that the property stand as security for the support order.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of the appeal after its counsel was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants argued that the limitation period was suspended under s. 52 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, because an arbitration had been commenced via correspondence, or alternatively, that the respondent was estopped from pleading a limitations defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties' correspondence merely proposed an arbitration agreement and did not commence an arbitration under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court also found no evidence to support an estoppel claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a cautionary charge regarding his flight from the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of flight was relevant to link the appellant to the apartment, and the risk of it being used for consciousness of guilt did not require a caution.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was entirely warranted on the facts.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board misunderstood the joint submission of the parties and inadvertently imposed a more restrictive condition than intended.

The appeal was allowed to correct the error by substituting the jointly submitted condition regarding community accommodations.

The appellant appealed his sentence, relying solely on fresh evidence regarding his treatment needs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence would not have altered the sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record, and noted his treatment needs could potentially be met in the federal system.

The young person appealed their custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the young person had done well in school and had good prospects, supported by caring grandparents.

The Court allowed the appeal and commuted the balance of the custodial sentence to deferred custody, leaving the probation order intact.

The appellant appealed a decision finding its claim for recovery of repair costs for a deficient sewer system was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the essence of the claim was a breach of duty in 1986 requiring repairs in 2003, and found no basis to interfere with the lower court's decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a left-wing political blogger, sued the respondents for defamation after one of the respondents posted a comment on a right-wing blog describing the appellant as 'one of the Taliban's more vocal supporters'.

The action was brought under the simplified procedure.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the words were not capable of being defamatory, lacked the sting of libel in the context of a political blog, and constituted fair comment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the novel issues surrounding internet defamation in the political blogosphere required a full factual record and were not appropriate for summary judgment, particularly under the simplified procedure where cross-examination is limited.

The appellants, two municipalities, appealed a trial judgment apportioning them 2/3 liability for a motor vehicle accident that rendered two young women quadriplegic.

The trial judge found the unlit, unmarked rural road was in a state of non-repair due to a dangerous 'accident hill' that blinded drivers.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the driver's 1/3 liability should be reduced to 10 percent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were amply supported by the evidence and his apportionment of fault was entitled to substantial deference.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and conspiring to import heroin after a controlled delivery of a package to a third party's apartment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of the third party, who claimed the appellants orchestrated the importation.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was fatally flawed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the charge failed to properly instruct the jury on assessing credibility, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, improperly exhorted minority jurors to reconsider their views, and failed to separately review the evidence against each appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that Ontario lacked jurisdiction over its claim for conversion.

The appellant argued that three presumptive connecting factors under the Van Breda framework applied: a tort committed in Ontario, transfer of information, and personal property in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conversion took place outside Ontario, the transfer of information was unconnected to the tort, and the mere transfer of funds out of Ontario by the appellant was too tenuous a connection to assume jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed the denial of her request for an adjournment and the subsequent dismissal of her cross-application.

She argued that opposing counsel lacked the authority to act on the day of the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge was entitled to accept counsel's assurance of authority and properly exercised his discretion in denying the adjournment.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that the respondent did not engage in fraudulent concealment when it failed to distribute estate assets upon the death of a life tenant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that unconscionable conduct by the respondent was essential to the claim and had not been established.

The court noted the appellant knew of her entitlement in 1978 and could have discovered the estate assets with reasonable efforts.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their claim that they were entitled to a pension option not contained in the respondent's pension plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no statutory or common law obligation to offer such an option, particularly in light of s. 22(5) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act.

The respondents were subject to an extradition request by the United States for fraud.

During the extradition hearing, the judge ordered the Crown to disclose communications regarding the sharing of Canadian-gathered evidence with American authorities, which the respondents argued breached their Charter rights.

The Crown refused to fully comply with the disclosure orders, invited the judge to discharge the respondents without explanation, and immediately appealed the discharge to challenge the interlocutory disclosure orders.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's conduct in forcing an appeal of an interlocutory order without demonstrating a reasonable alternative constituted an abuse of process, and dismissed the appeal without considering the merits of the disclosure orders.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that she aided or abetted the principal offender in fatally stabbing the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge: omitting the requirement of the principal's subjective foresight of death, failing to focus the jury on when the principal's intention was formed, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these errors amounted to errors of law that could have had a significant impact on the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action against the respondent and declaring the individual appellant a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, as the corporate appellant was in receivership and the individual appellant lacked authority to bring a claim on its behalf.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the vexatious litigant declaration, holding that under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, such an order can only be made on an application, not on a motion in an action.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle collision with a propane truck on a snow-covered road.

At trial, the central issue was the municipality's liability for failing to provide proper winter maintenance.

The plaintiff's expert testified that he could not reconcile the municipality's snowplough records with photographs of the accident scene.

The trial judge erroneously characterized this testimony as an unpleaded allegation of fraud and repeatedly refused to accept plaintiff counsel's assertions to the contrary.

Furthermore, the trial judge made an adverse credibility finding against the plaintiff mid-trial based on an allegedly falsified curriculum vitae, and suggested the parties consider this finding in their settlement discussions.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's interventions and premature credibility findings gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender, arguing a denial of natural justice because the order was made without his written submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the applicant was aware of his right to make submissions but failed to do so, and did not attempt to make late submissions or ask for reconsideration.