Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant was convicted of accessing and possessing child pornography after police obtained his subscriber information from his Internet Service Provider (ISP) without a warrant, using it to obtain a search warrant for his residence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the police violated his section 8 Charter rights by obtaining his subscriber information without prior judicial authorization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his internet activity, this expectation was not objectively reasonable given the ISP's terms of service and its legitimate interest in preventing the criminal misuse of its services.

The court also found that the information to obtain the search warrant contained sufficient grounds.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen who previously held refugee status, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering her surrender for extradition to the Czech Republic.

She argued that under the Supreme Court's decision in Németh, her prior refugee status required the Minister to refuse surrender unless circumstances had changed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that Németh did not apply because the applicant's refugee status ceased when she acquired Canadian citizenship.

The Court also rejected arguments that her extradition violated her Charter mobility or equality rights, and found the Minister's decision regarding her health to be reasonable.

The appellant, a dual Canadian and Hungarian citizen with no refugee status, was committed for extradition to Hungary on fraud charges.

The Minister of Justice ordered his unconditional surrender.

The appellant appealed the committal and sought judicial review of the surrender order, arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Németh altered the burden of proof under section 44(1) of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, holding that Németh applies only to individuals with refugee status and does not alter the burden of proof for non-refugees.

The Court found no error in the committal order or the Minister's conclusion that surrender would not be unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed a family law trial decision.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons for judgment were woefully inadequate, as they lacked necessary findings of fact and failed to show the path taken to reach the conclusions, including those related to imputed income.

The Court set aside the challenged orders and directed an expedited new trial for all issues.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought costs for the appeal, a motion to set aside an order, and the underlying motion before the lower court.

The respondents did not oppose the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant costs for all three matters, totaling $49,278.09.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, raising peripheral arguments including want of service and procedural errors by the application judge.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the procedural arguments and no basis to interfere with the application judge's conclusion on the merits.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $1,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that despite not having the benefit of the Combined Air decision, the motion judge developed a full appreciation of the case.

The motion judge was entitled to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence and correctly concluded there was no evidence of over service of alcohol by the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, suppliers of building materials, sued the respondent under s 13(1) of the Construction Lien Act, claiming he was liable for breaches of trust by the general contractor of which he was an officer and director.

The trial judge found the respondent liable, but the Divisional Court reversed this decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Divisional Court that there was no evidence the breaches of trust occurred after the respondent took control of the general contractor in May 2002, and the onus was on the appellants to prove this.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to add four defendants to an action claiming damages from improper foreclosure orders.

The motion judge found the claims against the proposed defendants were statute-barred under the two-year limitation period, as the appellants knew or ought to have known of their involvement well before the limitation period expired.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, rejecting arguments that a ten-year limitation period applied or that the doctrine of special circumstances permitted adding the parties.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Divisional Court decision upholding a finding of conflict of interest against a municipal member.

The Court of Appeal held that section 11(2) of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act provides a complete code for appeals, rendering decisions of the Divisional Court final.

As no further appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, the appeal was quashed.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that a bald assertion of agency in the statement of defence was insufficient to raise a meritorious defence.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment holding the personal appellant liable for the unsafe investment of the respondent's money.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the investment was meant to be safe but was not.

The Court also upheld the finding of personal liability based on a direct relationship between the personal appellant and the respondent, noting this was not a corporate veil case.

The appellants appealed a family law order regarding access and other issues, arguing the trial judge erred by proceeding in the absence of the appellant's mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had sufficient notice to secure the mother's attendance and failed to request an adjournment.

The court declined to retry the issue of access, finding no error in the trial judge's disposition.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the judgment appealed from regarding either the preliminary challenges or the merits.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $1,000.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board, which found him incapable of refusing psychiatric and nourishment treatment.

The appellant argued the Board applied the wrong legal test or was unreasonable in its conclusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the test from Starson v. Swayze and that there was ample evidence to support the finding that the appellant's delusion rendered him unable to appreciate the consequences of his decision.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action brought pursuant to s. 38(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to set aside alleged fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as an abuse of process and barred by res judicata due to the bankrupt's discharge and the dismissal of a prior action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 38(1), the appellant was advancing the Trustee's claim, not its own personal claim, meaning the action was not a collateral attack on the discharge order or barred by res judicata.

The Court also dismissed the respondents' motion to review a decision refusing to order security for costs against the appellant's counsel, who was acting on a contingency fee basis.

The appellant real estate agent sued the respondent vendor for unpaid commission and brought a motion under Rule 45.02 to have the proceeds of the sale, held in trust by the vendor's solicitor, paid into court pending trial.

The master granted the motion, but the Divisional Court allowed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, clarifying that while Rule 45.02 does not require a plaintiff to claim a proprietary right to a specific fund, the plaintiff must claim a legal right to the fund.

Because the appellant's claim was for damages for breach of contract rather than a legal right to the specific trust funds, the test for payment into court was not met.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their claim for statutory rescission of a franchise agreement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the notice of rescission was provided more than two years after the franchise agreement was entered into, pursuant to s. 6(2).

The appeal was dismissed, as it was plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was fully aware of and took account of the relevant factors, and found no error in the sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence excessive and held that the trial judge erred by relying on unsworn, uncontested statements from the appellant's father regarding the appellant's need for drug treatment.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence in the terms of the joint submission was substituted.