John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention in a maximum secure facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition was reasonable, supported by evidence, and the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available.

The Court agreed that any disposition below maximum security would compromise public safety and rejected the appellant's request for an absolute discharge.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for a sexual assault conviction where the Crown had proceeded by indictment.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence was illegal under section 742.1 of the Criminal Code and set it aside.

However, given the respondent's positive rehabilitative steps, time spent on bail, and time served under house arrest, the Court substituted a sentence of time served.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a serious fraud, arguing the sentencing judge misapprehended the duration and magnitude of the offence.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension on the record and held that the sentencing judge was justified in rejecting a conditional sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge relied on flawed identification evidence.

The complainant identified the appellant in the holding cells, a procedure the Court of Appeal found seriously flawed despite the appellant's request for it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered as there was other evidence on the record that might sustain a conviction.

The appellants, commercial fishers on Lake Erie, challenged the regulatory regime under which the provincial Minister of Natural Resources imposed catch quotas for walleye and yellow perch on their licences.

They argued that the federal Fisheries Act and regulations did not validly delegate this authority to the provincial Minister, and that the Minister fettered her discretion and acted unreasonably by adopting the catch recommendations of the international Lake Erie Committee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Governor in Council validly sub-delegated the authority to the provincial Minister, and that the Minister's reliance on the Committee's recommendations was both reasonable and not a fettering of discretion.

The respondents sued Ontario in negligence after their dairy herd suffered health problems and low milk production, alleging that asphalt and concrete waste deposited on their farm by the Ministry of Transportation in the 1960s contaminated their well water.

The trial judge found Ontario liable and awarded damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment and dismissed the action.

The Court held that Ontario did not breach the standard of care because the risk of harm to the cattle from the buried waste was not reasonably foreseeable in the 1960s.

Furthermore, Ontario had no statutory or common law duty to remove the waste or remediate the water, as testing showed the water met the allowable provincial drinking standards.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision that designated the respondent as a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The respondent had a serious criminal record for sexually-motivated offences and was diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD).

The sentencing judge accepted defence expert evidence that the respondent's FASD symptoms could be treated, allowing him to participate in sex offender programs and reducing his risk of re-offending to an acceptable level in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's preference for the defence expert's evidence or her exercise of discretion.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed an order regarding the compellability of two witnesses and the disclosure of certain memoranda, asserting public interest immunity and deliberative secrecy under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that while certain paragraphs of one memorandum contained statements of fact not covered by deliberative secrecy, the trial judge erred in finding the public interest in disclosure outweighed deliberative secrecy for the remaining information.

The court restricted the scope of questioning and excluded another memorandum from evidence entirely.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent landlord for damages after slipping on ice on the walkway leading to her apartment.

The landlord defended the action by relying on a provision in the tenancy agreement that made tenants responsible for snow removal.

The motion judge found the provision was not inconsistent with the Tenant Protection Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that while a landlord may contract with a tenant for snow removal services, such an agreement must constitute a severable contractual obligation.

The provision in this case was inextricable from the tenancy agreement and too vague to create an enforceable contract for services, rendering it void under the Act.

Appeal from dismissal of an application challenging the enforcement of immigration sponsorship undertakings after sponsored relatives received Ontario social assistance.

The court held that the federal and provincial governments have a case-by-case discretion whether to enforce sponsorship debt, and that Ontario unlawfully fettered that discretion by applying policies inconsistent with the family class immigration scheme.

The court further held that sponsors are owed procedural fairness before enforcement, including a meaningful opportunity to explain relevant personal and financial circumstances, consideration of those submissions, and notice of the decision made.

The court rejected the argument that undertakings signed under the former immigration statute became unenforceable under the new regime.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of an unsavoury witness was corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence with great caution and correctly identified evidence capable of confirming the witness's testimony.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a convenience store robbery involving a sawed-off shotgun.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating his criminal record and applying the parity principle compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the appellant's record included a previous penitentiary term and weapons offence, and that the co-accused had pleaded guilty.

The sentence was deemed fit and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown's reference to uncontradicted evidence violated section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act and that the trial judge's answer to a jury question undermined their right to disagree.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that stating evidence is uncontradicted does not amount to a comment on the failure to testify, and that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on their right to disagree.

The appellant mother appealed an order varying a custody and access order that changed the child's primary residence to the respondent father.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to vary the order because there was no explicit finding of a material change in circumstances.

Furthermore, the motion judge erred by resolving conflicting affidavit evidence without a trial and by failing to adequately consider the child's best interests.

The original custody order was restored following a six-week transition period.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that genuine issues for trial existed regarding whether the Consumer Protection Act applied to a handwritten estimate for a construction contract, and whether the contract was exempt from the Act as part of a real estate transaction.

The matter was remitted for trial.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on the respondent.

The trial judge had relied on the victim's wishes, which were found to be borne of love rather than fear, and the respondent's genuine remorse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentence and noting that the offences were out of character and the respondent was making progress with substance abuse issues.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after a 48.5-month non-appellate delay.

The application judge found 23 months of delay attributable to the Crown but dismissed the appellant's section 11(b) Charter application, applying the 'clearest of cases' standard and finding no prejudice to trial fairness.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in law, as a stay is the mandatory minimal remedy for a section 11(b) breach and proof of actual prejudice to trial fairness is not required.

The Court upheld the attribution of delay to the Crown, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault against his wife, brought a motion under s. 683(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to cross-examine her in aid of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The appellant sought to introduce evidence of the complainant's post-conviction allegations and conduct in family court proceedings to show she fabricated the sexual assault allegations to secure child custody.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding it arguable that the fresh evidence could affect the result, and ordered the cross-examination subject to strict conditions to protect the complainant.

The appellant sued a national credit agency, alleging it published inaccurate credit information regarding her default on a debt owed to a bank.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the report of default was correct as the debt arose under a personal guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue for trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and based the decision on how long it takes a person to wake up.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that the trial judge's decision was properly based on factual findings.