John I. Laskin

The plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty regarding the transfer of shares.

The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages by not seeking a court order to freeze the account.

The plaintiff claimed she relied on her solicitor's advice.

The defendants then brought a third-party claim against the solicitor for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act.

The motion judge struck out the third-party claim as disclosing no cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant cannot claim contribution from a plaintiff's solicitor for advice given regarding the mitigation of damages caused by the defendant's own wrong.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and failure to comply with a youth sentence.

The sentencing judge accepted a joint submission that included a one-day jail sentence to allow the appellant to collect his belongings.

However, this inadvertently triggered s. 743.5(1) of the Criminal Code, converting his remaining youth sentence into an adult sentence.

On appeal, with the Crown's consent, the court varied the sentence to time served to reflect the parties' original intent.

The court also corrected the weapons prohibition to a lifetime ban under s. 109(3) due to the appellant's prior robbery convictions.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's decision to discharge a civil jury on the grounds of complexity, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter does not confer a right to a jury trial in civil matters.

The court held that the jeopardy of a civil damages award does not engage section 7, and the class of civil defendants denied a jury trial does not form an analogous ground under section 15.

The appellants appealed an order regarding a claim by Investors Group Trust Co. Ltd. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the respondent's claim was a personal tort action for damages against the appellants and did not assert a claim against an asset of the bankrupt.

The Trustee would only have an interest if a specific asset belonging to the bankrupt was identified.

The moving party sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal concerned an assessment of unpaid legal fees owed to the responding party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay after retaining counsel, failed to perfect the appeal within an agreed-upon extension, and took no steps to perfect the appeal in the months following the dismissal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board refusing to order an independent assessment at the Royal Ottawa Hospital.

The appellant did not challenge his continued detention at Oak Ridge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that an independent assessment was unnecessary was reasonable and supported by the uncontradicted evidence of a doctor.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and drug offences.

On the dangerous driving conviction, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding a police officer's misconduct record but found it would not have affected the trial judge's credibility assessment.

On the drug convictions, the court declined to enter acquittals, finding there was some evidence of continuity, and upheld the summary conviction appeal court's order for a new trial.

The appellant appealed the global sentence of one year in custody imposed for extortion and multiple acts of voyeurism.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge and held that the sentence was fit.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the franchisor and the respondent bank had a sufficiently close connection to make the bank responsible for the franchisor's faults.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that no such genuine issue existed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent brought a motion under rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for an order that the appellant, a non-party lawyer, personally pay the costs of the litigation.

The appellant moved to strike the motion, arguing it was barred by the two-year limitation period in s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and was an abuse of process.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that a motion within an existing action is not a 'proceeding' for the purposes of s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, and found no evidence to support the abuse of process claim.

The respondent settled litigation with his former business partner and subsequently brought a motion under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking costs personally against the partner's former lawyer.

The lawyer brought a motion to strike the costs motion, arguing it was barred by the two-year limitation period in s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and was an abuse of process.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that a motion within an existing action is not a 'proceeding' under s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the abuse of process arguments were matters to be determined on the merits of the Rule 57.07 motion.

The appellant, a dual status offender under the authority of the Ontario Review Board, was convicted of manslaughter for killing a fellow inmate.

The Crown applied to have him declared a dangerous offender.

The sentencing judge found the statutory criteria met and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued procedural flaws regarding notice and the Attorney General's consent, and that the judge erred in not exercising residual discretion given the Review Board's concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the procedural requirements were met and the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism justified the dangerous offender designation.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her action for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police.

She argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the exact words spoken, the police's duty to get her version of events, and the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the charge, noting it fairly focused the jury on whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to deny them costs based solely on the appellant's impecuniosity.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that impecuniosity cannot be the only factor considered, and awarded the respondents $40,000 in trial costs and $7,500 for the appeal.

The landlord sued the tenant in negligence after a fire started in the tenant's unit, causing property damage.

The parties brought a motion by special case to determine if the landlord's subrogated insurer was precluded from maintaining the claim.

The motion judge allowed the claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the Offer to Lease required the tenant to contribute to the cost of insurance, the risk of fire loss passed to the landlord, precluding the subrogated claim.

The respondent was charged with speeding.

The police officer clocked him at 30 km/h over the limit but ticketed him for 15 km/h over.

When the respondent requested a trial, the prosecutor sought to amend the certificate of offence to reflect the higher speed.

The justice of the peace refused the amendment and convicted the respondent at the lower speed, which was upheld on appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the actual rate of speed is not an essential element of the offence but is relevant to the fixed penalty, which courts have no discretion to reduce.

The Court also held that 'amending up' is permissible, provided the requirements of s. 34(4) of the Provincial Offences Act are met.

The appeal was dismissed because the municipality only sought guidance and there was no evidentiary finding of the higher speed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for breach of a 1988 agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondent's obligations under the agreement were predicated on the registration of a new plan of subdivision.

Since the respondent made reasonable efforts but the plan was never approved, the obligations were never triggered, and there was no breach of the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, seeking a finding of contempt against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for a finding of contempt and no error in the motion judge's reasons.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The Public Guardian and Trustee appealed an order appointing it as limited guardian of property for the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the preconditions in the Substitute Decisions Act for making the appointment had not been met.

The court set aside the relevant paragraphs of the lower court's order and directed that the money in question be paid into court to the credit of the respondent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, assault with a weapon, and mischief.

The Court of Appeal set aside the break and enter conviction because the trial judge failed to find that an indictable offence was committed or intended.

The assault with a weapon conviction was also set aside because the trial judge failed to address important exculpatory evidence from the investigating officer.

The court set aside all convictions and ordered a new trial, noting the appellant had already served his sentence.

The plaintiff was injured when she fell from the rear bumper of her parked pick-up truck after the tailgate collapsed due to an allegedly defective latch mechanism.

She sued the manufacturer nearly five years later.

The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the two-year limitation period for 'damages occasioned by a motor vehicle' under s. 206(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the truck was not the dominant feature of the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding the truck was not acting in the character of a motor vehicle and the damages were not occasioned by a motor vehicle.