Jill M. Copeland

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal and cross-appeal arising from the termination of David J. Pateman by Koolatron Corporation after 29 years of employment.

The trial judge found that Mr. Pateman was wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages.

Koolatron appealed on several grounds, including whether Mr. Pateman resigned, mitigation of damages, and the obligation to accept part-time work.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s conclusions.

On cross-appeal, Mr. Pateman successfully argued that the deduction for mitigation was unjustified and that a mathematical error had been made in the damages calculation.

The Court corrected the damages and awarded costs to Mr. Pateman.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Judith Lorraine Farrage and Edmund Farrage regarding the accounting and proceeds from three mortgaged properties in Kitchener, Ontario.

The application judge’s acceptance of the respondent’s expert calculations, subject to a property tax adjustment, was upheld.

The Court found no error in the application judge’s approach to interest calculations or in her assessment of damages, and awarded costs of $7,500 to the respondent.

The appellant, P.M., appealed convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving his niece and daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge’s findings that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages with the complainant provided to police with her mother’s consent, that the trial judge properly excluded a sexually explicit text from an unknown sender under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code, and that the jury was properly instructed regarding the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate.

The decision clarifies the law on privacy expectations in electronic communications in the context of child complainants and the admissibility of evidence of sexual knowledge.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of appeals by the Attorney General of Ontario, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, the Town of South Bruce Peninsula, Alberta Lemon, and the Estate of Barbara Twining, and the allowance of the cross-appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.

The Court orders the Town and the Families to pay costs to the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and the Town to pay costs to Canada, finding the amounts sought reasonable in light of the complexity and significance of the appeal.

The appellant, Z.V., appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appeal raised two grounds: (1) that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant’s evidence regarding consent to oral sex, and (2) that the trial judge erred by using a finding of fabrication in the appellant’s evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt without independent evidence of fabrication.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of the complainant’s evidence and held that the trial judge’s use of the fabrication finding was limited to credibility assessment and did not constitute an error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jerome Williams, appealed the Ontario Review Board’s decision ordering his continued detention in the High Secure Provincial Forensic Programs Division at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

Williams argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge, or alternatively, a transfer to a medium secure facility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board’s assessment of risk and the necessity of continued detention at Waypoint were reasonable and supported by the evidence, particularly in light of ongoing concerns about medication compliance and substance use.

The appellant, A.K.H., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended key evidence regarding photographic exhibits of the complainant’s injuries and the appellant’s statements in a post-incident conversation.

These misapprehensions were material and essential to the trial judge’s reasoning and credibility assessments, warranting a new trial.

The court rejected the appellant’s second ground of appeal regarding the trial judge’s assessment of motive to fabricate.

ID Inc. appealed the dismissal of its claim against StrategyCorp, which arose from a dispute over the transformation of a billboard to a digital sign and a related consulting agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that StrategyCorp did not intentionally interfere with ID Inc.'s economic relations, the consulting agreement was conditional on a separate agreement that never materialized, StrategyCorp had repudiated the agreement which ID Inc. accepted by silence, and StrategyCorp did not breach its duty of good faith.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, The Corporation of the Township of Ignace, appealed a summary judgment order that awarded the respondent, Karen Dufault, damages for wrongful dismissal.

The core issue was the enforceability of termination clauses in an employment contract under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the "for cause" termination clause was unenforceable because its definition of "cause" was broader than the ESA's narrow exception for "wilful misconduct." Applying the principle from Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., the court held that the invalidity of the "for cause" clause rendered all termination provisions in the contract unenforceable, even though the respondent was terminated without cause.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the original award of damages.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay a return order for an infant child to Bangladesh, pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal majority granted the review, set aside the stay dismissal, and granted a stay of the return order.

The majority found that the single judge erred in principle by giving insufficient weight to the serious issue of the relationship between the Children's Law Reform Act and pending refugee claims, and by misapplying the irreparable harm and balance of convenience tests, particularly regarding the child's best interests and the potential loss of refugee status.

The dissenting judge argued that the majority conducted a de novo review rather than applying deference to the single judge's discretionary order.

The appellant, a physician, appealed his conviction on three counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered grounds including the admission and use of cross-count similar act evidence, the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons, errors in credibility and reliability assessment, and the trial judge's treatment of prior consistent statements and motive to fabricate.

The Court found no errors in the trial judge's handling of similar act evidence, the sufficiency of reasons, or the credibility assessments.

It also found no error in the application of the totality principle in sentencing.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order upholding the validity of a marriage contract and denying relief for alleged physical injury and loss of income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to determine the contract's validity on motion, given the appellant's failure to read it and lack of material conflicts in evidence.

The court also upheld the denial of relief for injury, noting no spousal support claim was made and insufficient evidence.

The appellant's request for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed, with the court deferring to the motion judge's discretion on costs, including those for conferences where the appellant was unprepared.

The appellant appealed an order striking his Notice of Application and refusing leave to amend, which sought Charter relief against the respondents.

The motion judge found the Charter claim could not succeed, was a collateral attack on a Law Society decision, and that the Charter did not apply to the individual respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the Charter interpretation or application, and that summary determination was not an abuse of process.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's motion for review of a single judge's order regarding joint representation, deeming it frivolous and an abuse of process.

Ms. Sochnyeva sought a review of a previous order dismissing her motions for a stay of Divisional Court orders, pending her motions for leave to appeal.

She also brought a motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of a previously dismissed leave to appeal motion.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision regarding the stay, noting the matter was moot as her leave to appeal motions had already been dismissed.

The court also dismissed her motion for reconsideration, finding no circumstances to justify reversing the earlier denial of leave to appeal.

The appellants, Stewart Wilson and Elizabeth Wilson, appealed a motion judge's order dismissing two of their actions, one against Sara Fatahi-Ghandehari and another against Abrahams LLP.

The respondents sought dismissal of the appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was an abuse of process given the appellants' history of vexatious litigation and non-compliance with court orders.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be an abuse of process, reflecting frivolous or vexatious allegations and a continuation of issues previously struck by the court.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing her Notice of Objection to a Will and an order for interest on legacies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings and upholding the summary determination of the estate matter under Rule 75.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs order, affirming the discretionary nature of interest and costs awards.

The appellant, T.D., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving two complainants, B.S. and B.B. The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility, specifically regarding inconsistencies in B.S.'s testimony about prior disclosure and the location of incidents, and B.B.'s changing evidence and delayed disclosure of an oral sex incident.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, affirming that the judge was entitled to treat certain inconsistencies as peripheral given the complainants' age at the time of the events.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted by a jury on three counts of sexual assault, appealed his convictions.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by improperly expressing opinions, overemphasizing the Crown's theory, and instructing on vitiation of consent through abuse of authority.

He also contended that the verdict on one count was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge fair and balanced, and the verdict reasonable, particularly in light of the similar fact evidence.

The appellant failed to surrender to the detention centre as required by his release conditions for his appeal.

Despite efforts to confirm his surrender, no information was received.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to the appellant's non-compliance with release conditions and issued a bench warrant.

The appellant appealed convictions for firearms possession, arguing the vehicle search was unlawful under the Liquor Licence Act (LLA), the traffic stop was a pretext, and the evidence did not prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search lawful under the LLA, rejecting the pretext argument (including a new racial profiling claim), and affirming the trial judge's finding of possession based on ample evidence.