Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board.

The first disposition, which transferred him to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), was dismissed as moot by the Court of Appeal as it had been superseded.

The second disposition, which ordered his detention at the highly secure Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care due to worsening behaviour and significant threat to public safety, was upheld.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, emphasizing that public safety, including the safety of hospital staff and co-patients, is the paramount consideration under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and deferred to the Board's expertise in managing the risk posed by the individual.

The appellant, a paralegal prosecutor, was convicted of breach of trust and attempting to obstruct justice for fixing traffic tickets for associates of a police officer with whom she was having an affair.

The police discovered her conduct through intercepted communications, which were subsequently disclosed to her employer.

On appeal, she argued the verdict was unreasonable, the disclosure of the intercepts violated her Charter rights, the convictions violated the Kienapple principle, and the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences reasonable, the disclosure lawful under the Criminal Code, the offences distinct, and the conditional sentence appropriate.

The applicants sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing their application for leave to appeal under s. 131(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, arguing jurisdictional error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding it barred by s. 131(3) of the POA, which prohibits appeals or reviews from leave decisions.

The court also found no jurisdictional failure even if the cited precedent applied.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction on two grounds: the voluntariness of his statements to police and the trial judge's instruction allowing the jury to infer fabrication from these statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the statements were voluntary, noting that the judge conducted a proper contextual inquiry and her findings were entitled to deference.

Regarding fabrication, the court found no procedural unfairness despite the lack of a formal ruling on the voir dire, as the issue was contemplated and ample independent evidence supported the inference of fabrication.

The jury instruction distinguishing between disbelief and fabrication was also deemed correct and balanced.

The appellant, a Canada Border Services Agency officer, appealed a 10-year sentence for conspiring to import cocaine and breach of trust.

The appeal challenged the sentencing range and the judge's consideration of time spent on house arrest and pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 10-year sentence but granted credit for pre-sentence custody, reduced a firearms prohibition to 10 years, and set aside a victim surcharge.

The appellant father appealed a parenting order, seeking sole decision-making responsibility and exclusive residence for the children due to alleged parental alienation by the respondent mother.

The trial judge had previously found alienation but declined to reverse custody due to intervening circumstances (father's new child, pandemic, children's immediate mental health).

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence from a psychologist but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's holistic assessment of the children's best interests, which prioritized their immediate mental health and stability over a disruptive custody reversal, especially given the new family dynamics and pandemic stressors.

The court ordered a brief review hearing in one year to ensure compliance with therapy orders.

The appellant G.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving three complainants.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's application of the rule in R. v. W.(D.), the rejection of the appellant's evidence without sufficient reasoning, and reliance on the absence of a proven motive for fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including the W.(D.) rule, and provided reasoned explanations for credibility assessments, demonstrating proper deference to the trial judge's findings.

This appeal addressed the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction to appoint a representative defendant for an unincorporated association, specifically a trade union, in a wrongful termination claim.

The appellants argued that the Small Claims Court Rules contained an "omission" regarding such orders, precluding reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the Small Claims Court Rules themselves provided the necessary authority for such orders, and that reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure was discretionary but not essential.

The court found no legislative intent to exclude unincorporated associations from the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction, emphasizing the court's role in facilitating access to justice.

The appellant, Stephen Campbell, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for an order that a fresh psychiatric report be prepared to support his not criminally responsible (NCR) defence, which was rejected at trial.

The court found that nothing of substance had changed since the original psychiatric reports were prepared for trial and carefully reviewed by the trial judge.

The motion was dismissed, as there was no proper basis for ordering a fresh psychiatric report.

The appellant, C.K., appealed his sentence of six years concurrent for assault, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The appeal raised two issues: an alleged miscalculation of pre-sentence custody credit and an unreasonable delay between conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the pre-sentence custody calculation.

Regarding the delay, the court noted that a significant portion was attributable to the appellant's own application and other factors, and thus the total delay was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed.

The appellant, Ian Bullens, appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not granting a "Downes credit" for stringent bail conditions that allegedly prevented him from seeing his children.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting that the issue was not fully brought to the sentencing judge's attention and that Downes credits are reserved for "stringent" conditions, which were not met in this case.

The conviction appeal was abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jeremy Reddick, appealed his convictions for second degree murder and assault with a weapon, alleging errors in the trial judge's jury instructions concerning after-the-fact conduct, intoxication, and the permitted use of his spontaneous utterance "They jumped me." The Court of Appeal found that while some instructions could have been more thorough, they did not amount to reversible error or cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, particularly given the lack of objection at trial and the overall context of the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Sara Fuller, appealed her convictions on five counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal challenged the validity of the search warrant that led to the discovery of the drugs, arguing insufficient grounds and staleness of information.

The appellant also raised an issue with the trial judge's reference to her failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were sufficient grounds for the search warrant and that the two-month delay did not render the information stale given the nature of the stolen goods.

The court also concluded that the trial judge's reference to the appellant's failure to testify, while not ideal, did not undermine the conviction as it was intended to demonstrate the absence of alternative reasonable inferences in a circumstantial case.

The appellant, Raymond Gervais, appealed a four-year sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

The assault involved kicking a 66-year-old victim in the head, causing severe injuries, and the appellant had a lengthy criminal record.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge overemphasized denunciation and failed to respect the "jump" principle.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, stating the sentencing judge considered all relevant factors and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the seriousness of injuries and the appellant's record.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, G.C., appealed a lower court's dismissal of his appeal from a summary judgment motion that found his children in need of protection due to a risk of sexual harm by him under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the summary judgment procedure was suitable given the significant consequences and the appellant's inability to cross-examine affiants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the motion judge and appeal judge correctly applied the summary judgment test in child protection cases, including the principles from Kawartha-Haliburton, and properly weighed the evidence.

Mr. Stephens brought a motion seeking to set aside the dismissal of his motion for leave to appeal as abandoned, to appoint amicus curiae, and to order a fresh psychiatric report regarding his criminal responsibility.

The court found no explanation for reinstating the abandoned motion, no proper foundation for a new psychiatric report, and no basis for appointing amicus curiae.

The motion was dismissed.

Darren John sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his appeal from conviction and sentence for knowingly uttering threats.

His primary ground for seeking leave was the alleged non-disclosure of material prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the case did not raise significant legal issues for the general administration of criminal justice and that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit, particularly due to the appellant's failure to raise the disclosure issue during trial.

The appellant, Roseanne Whalen, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder, where she was found guilty of failing in her parental duty to protect her two-year-old daughter from fatal assaults by her girlfriend.

The appeal raised four main issues: the fairness of the Crown's closing argument, the trial judge's instructions on the mens rea required for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, the adequacy of the trial judge's review of evidence relating to mens rea (specifically text messages), and the instruction on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown's closing did not risk an unfair trial, the trial judge's mens rea instructions were ultimately correct despite an initial misstatement, and the review of evidence and after-the-fact conduct instructions were adequate and did not prejudice the appellant.

The appellant, Kevin Luangchaleun, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that ordered his detention in the Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences with conditions allowing community living in approved accommodation.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge or a conditional discharge with a residence requirement, arguing the Board's order was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on the treating psychiatrist's opinion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety if not closely supervised and monitored.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions within an ongoing appeal: one by the appellants to set aside a prior order for security for judgment and costs, and another by the respondents to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance.

The court granted the appellants' motion in part, setting aside the requirement for security for the judgment amount but affirming the order for security for trial and appeal costs.

The respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal was dismissed as moot.

The court allowed the appellants to retract a previous concession regarding the appeal's frivolousness.