David Watt

The plaintiff was awarded $50,000 in damages by a jury following a motor vehicle accident, despite claiming over $1 million.

The trial judge initially set aside the verdict and awarded the plaintiff $196,695 in costs.

The Court of Appeal previously reinstated the jury verdict and remitted the costs issue.

The trial judge again awarded $196,695 in costs.

The defendants appealed the second costs order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of proportionality, and reduced the costs award to $166,695.

The respondent was convicted of seven counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a high-speed collision.

The trial judge suspended the passing of sentence and imposed two years' probation and a two-year driving prohibition, relying heavily on the parity principle due to the lenient sentence received by the other driver involved.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the parity principle and failed to adequately reflect general deterrence and denunciation.

A nine-month custodial sentence and a five-year driving prohibition were substituted.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the Crown's case was entirely circumstantial and that police vetting of prospective jurors constituted an abuse of process.

The court applied the unreasonable verdict standard and held that the cumulative effect of the evidence of motive, opportunity, access, and post-offence conduct was capable of supporting findings of unlawful killing, murder, and planning and deliberation.

The court also held that police checks for criminal records and outstanding charges, without Crown involvement and without any resulting unfairness in jury selection, did not amount to a per se abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a carriage order made by the Superior Court of Justice in a class proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the carriage order is an interlocutory order, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting that the proper route is to the Divisional Court by way of leave to appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The applicant argued the trial judge and appeal judge misapprehended video surveillance evidence regarding his claim of self-defence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the proposed grounds lacked significance to the general administration of criminal justice and the merits were not strong, as the trial judge's findings were based on the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and weapons offences and his sentence of ten years and nine months.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to cross-examine the police officer who prepared the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant, alleging the officer deliberately omitted information to mislead the issuing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the allegation of mala fides.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered the appellant's cooperation in expediting the proceeding.

The appellant appealed his convictions for distributing and possessing child pornography, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached and three statements to police should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the first and third statements.

The court found the appellant was not detained during the first statement, and the third statement was not tainted by any potential breach during the second statement, as the appellant repeatedly declined to contact counsel before the third interview.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering a death threat, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence and erred in applying the third stage of the W.D. analysis.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's boasting or the complainant's description of his post-assault behaviour.

The trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence and accept the complainant's evidence to find the charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving historic intrafamilial abuse, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the credibility analysis failed to address contradictions and frailties in the complainant's evidence.

The court held that the trial judge was alive to the complainant's psychiatric history, substance abuse, delayed disclosure, and conflicts with other witnesses, and properly differentiated between allegations that lacked confirmation and those that had some independent support.

The court further held that a partial admission to the complainant's mother was capable of providing confirmatory support, while other corroborative details were given only slight weight.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a sexual offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements, treating his non-cooperation with police as consciousness of guilt, misapplying reasonable doubt regarding his physical limitations, and ignoring exculpatory portions of his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the prior statements for credibility, properly addressed the physical limitations, and considered the exculpatory statement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error was found in the sentence imposed.

The applicant brought motions to re-open two appeals that had been dismissed as abandoned due to non-attendance and non-compliance.

The first motion related to a summary conviction appeal, which the court dismissed because it did not meet the test for leave to appeal.

The second motion related to a conviction appeal for failing to comply with a court order.

The court dismissed the second motion, finding that the explanation offered for the non-attendance and non-compliance was cast into serious doubt by information before the court, and it would not be in the interests of justice to re-open the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his detention with privileges for supervised community accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence, failed to consider a conditional discharge, and erred by not ordering an independent psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusions reasonable, noting that a conditional discharge was inappropriate given the need for supervised accommodation, and agreeing that an independent assessment was unnecessary.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful confinement and firearms offences following a home invasion.

During closing addresses, the Crown improperly suggested to the jury that the complainant's prior statements to police and at the preliminary inquiry, which were not in evidence, were consistent with her trial testimony and therefore proved she was telling the truth.

The trial judge refused a mistrial application and failed to provide a limiting instruction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the Crown's comments invited the jury to make erroneous use of the evidence and the trial judge's failure to correct the error was fatal.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his statement of defence for failing to pay $3,900 in interlocutory costs.

The motion judge had ruled that impecuniosity was not a valid excuse for failing to comply with costs orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider impecuniosity as a relevant factor.

Striking the defence and exposing the self-represented appellant to a judgment of over $180,000 was a disproportionate response.

The statement of defence was reinstated on the condition that the costs be paid within a year.

The appellant appealed his conviction for spousal sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the grounds relating to the trial judge's reasons but allowed the appeal based on fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence included post-conviction allegations made by the complainant and undisclosed police reports that supported the defence theory that the complainant fabricated the allegations to gain sole custody of their children.

The Court found the undisclosed evidence met the Stinchcombe threshold and impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in his final instructions on reasonable doubt and that the jury selection process was compromised by late disclosure of an annotated juror list by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's short-form instructions on reasonable doubt were problematic, the charge as a whole did not leave the jury under any misapprehension of the standard of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not cause a miscarriage of justice, as defence counsel was provided with the same information and chose not to use it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for threatening to cause the death of a fellow inmate and his parents if the inmate testified against him in an unrelated prosecution.

The appellant argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, improperly used the absence of motive to lie to bolster the Crown witness's credibility, and unfairly intervened during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) framework, correctly considered motive in assessing credibility, and intervened within permissible limits to control the proceedings.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay an order adding two schools to Schedule F of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement pending appeal.

The moving party argued the order triggered an automatic stay under Rule 63.01(1) or warranted a discretionary stay under Rule 63.02(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the order did not create a fixed debt obligation and the balance of convenience favoured the respondents, as a stay would prejudice former students' ability to apply for compensation.

A cross-motion to determine the effective date of the order found the notice of appeal was delivered out of time, but the court extended the time to appeal and expedited the hearing.

The appellant, an immigration consultant, sued a Korean-language newspaper and its reporter for libel over an article concerning a scheme that left South Korean truck drivers stranded in Canada.

At trial, the jury found that the article did not defame the appellant.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was perverse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury acting judicially could have reached it, as it was open to the jury to conclude that the ordinary reader would not understand the article to discredit the appellant.

The appellant moved to amend its statement of claim after the expiry of the limitation period to add its parent corporation as a plaintiff, arguing misnomer.

The Master and Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it was an attempt to add a new party rather than correct a misnomer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming it was not a misnomer and reaffirming that the special circumstances doctrine did not survive the enactment of the Limitations Act, 2002.