David Watt

The appellant, a plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action, appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The appeal judge had overturned a Master's decision allowing the action to proceed, reasoning that the appellant failed to meet her onus by not filing affidavit evidence at the status hearing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that initial status hearings ordinarily proceed on oral submissions and affidavit evidence is not strictly required unless a full hearing is ordered.

The Court further found that the delay was sufficiently explained and partially attributable to the respondent's conduct, permitting the action to proceed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his sentence of life imprisonment.

The appellant attacked his former partner with a baseball bat.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding his alibi defence, by leaving aiding and abetting as an alternative basis for liability, and by discharging a juror without a formal inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and the juror discharge proper.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal domestic attack and the appellant's lengthy criminal record justified a life sentence based on denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of driving 'over 80' causing bodily harm.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant was the driver of the van at the time of the collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge shifted the onus of proof, misapprehended evidence, and failed to disclose a proper basis for finding he was the driver based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge considered the evidence holistically and made no errors in concluding the appellant was the driver.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to two years less a day, plus two years of probation, after serving 599 days of pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give reasons for departing from the usual two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody under the law prior to the Truth in Sentencing Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in principle, removing the usual deference.

However, upon reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court found the ultimate sentence imposed was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a global sentence of five years for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration and leaving the scene of an accident.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to give appropriate weight to the gap principle, failing to consider his unstable health, and relying on a rejected finding of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court noted the appellant's extensive record of nearly three dozen prior related convictions and evidence of continued excessive alcohol consumption during the conviction-free period.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent on a guarantee of a second commercial mortgage.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding he waived his right to raise deficiencies in the respondent's prior enforcement attempts and in concluding there were no genuine issues for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant waived any prior deficiencies by signing a forbearance agreement, which was subsequently breached.

The Court also found the appellant's evidence of an alleged oral forbearance agreement with the first mortgagee consisted of bald assertions unsupported by documentary evidence, raising no genuine issue for trial.